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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON VALUE-ADDED TAXATION 
 
By 
 
ASMAA EL-GANAINY 
 
May 2006 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. James R. Alm 
 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 
This dissertation evaluates the empirical relation between the value-added tax 
(VAT) and the level of aggregate consumption. Furthermore, it develops a theoretical 
framework and an empirical analysis to study the impact of the VAT, as a form of taxing 
consumption, on capital accumulation, productivity growth, and overall economic 
growth.  
While recent theoretical work shows that the VAT may boost capital 
accumulation and growth by encouraging more savings, we find that the net impact of 
consumption taxes on growth and its sources is theoretically ambiguous, and depends on 
the interaction between utility parameters, the interest rate, and the tax structure.  
Moreover, we develop a theoretical model to study the tax design problem in 
order to rationalize the observed variation in effective VAT rates over time in our sample. 
This framework considers both equity and efficiency as important factors determining 
optimal tax structure, and we identify conditions under which taxes could be evolving or 
constant over time.  
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Empirically, we use a panel of 15 European Union countries and employ the 
recently developed GMM dynamic panel techniques. After controlling for the potential 
biases associated with persistence, endogeneity, simultaneity, measurement error, omitted 
variables, and unobserved country-specific effects, we find that (i) the VAT exerts a 
negative impact on the level of aggregate consumption, (ii) the VAT affects physical 
capital accumulation positively, which feeds through to overall GDP growth, and (iii) 
productivity growth seems to be a less relevant channel for the VAT to influence 
economic growth. 
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Essay One: Value-Added Taxation and Consumer Behavior: A Dynamic Analysis 
Introduction 
This study develops an empirical framework of the consumption decision of 
economic agents that incorporates the effects of value-added taxes (VAT) as a 
comprehensive broad-based consumption tax. It is well-known that consumption decision 
is crucial for both short-run and long-run analyses. While in the short-run it plays a 
significant role in determining aggregate demand and its fluctuations, in the long-run it 
has a central function in economic growth and welfare. Indeed, aggregate consumption is 
the biggest component of aggregate demand in any nation, constituting about two-thirds 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in most countries. Therefore, accurate inspection of 
consumption decisions has been at the heart of economic research for several decades. 
The vast theoretical literature on consumption and savings started early with 
Fisher’s (1930) Theory of Interest, Keynes’s (1936) Absolute Income Hypothesis, 
Duesenberry’s (1949) Relative Income Hypothesis, Friedman’s (1957) Permanent Income 
Hypothesis (PIH), and Ando and Modigliani’s (1963) Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH). 
More recently, researchers incorporated different views and components to consumption 
theories, For instance, Dynan (1993) and Skinner (1988) looked at precautionary saving 
motives; whereas Hall (1978) and Shea (1995) studied aspects related to uncertainty and 
the random walk hypothesis. On the empirical side, Boskin (1978) and Feldstein (1996a) 
investigated the determinants of consumption; while Aschauer (1985), Feldstein (1980), 
and Lewis and Siedman (1998) tackled the estimation problems and examined the 
influence of different fiscal and monetary policy variables. Yet, it is surprising that this 
steady flow of research is still largely inconclusive, both theoretically and empirically.   
  
2
However, the literature on the VAT is small relative to its rapid and seemingly 
attractive spread all over the globe.1 In more than 120 countries, the VAT - as a major 
source of governments’ revenue - affects about four billion people (i.e., about 70 percent 
of the world’s population). Thus, exploring its influence on major economic indicators, 
such as consumer spending, is of interest to practitioners and academics, as well as to 
policymakers. 
Recently, the effect of tax policy on economic behavior, particularly on saving 
and consumption, has gained a lot of attention with the increase in the number of tax 
reform proposals in many countries including the United States (U.S.). The majority of 
these tax reform proposals advocate the replacement of the income-based tax with a 
comprehensive consumption-based tax. The argument in favor of consumption-based 
taxes is that it exempts savings and capital income from the tax base, and hence it boosts 
household saving.2 More saving would lead to higher investment, and ultimately 
stimulate economic activity, growth, and the future standard of living. As such, there is 
an apparent need to understand and evaluate the mechanism through which such reforms 
can influence the behavior of economic agents with respect to their consumption/saving 
decision. In fact, Summers (1981) and more recently Lewis and Seidman (1999) have 
studied the theoretical relationship between consumption tax on one hand, and savings 
and capital accumulation on the other. Nonetheless, not much emphasis has been put into 
its impact on consumer behavior, specifically from an empirical point of view. Therefore, 
                                                 
1 Much of the VAT literature has been concerned with its design, implementation, administration, 
efficiency, and revenue performance. See, for example, Ebrill et al. (2001) for a detailed discussion of these 
issues.  
2 Eliminating taxes on new savings would reduce the price of future consumption compared with current 
consumption. This change in the relative prices induces people to reduce current consumption and save 
more for the future. 
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this study is considered a first step towards examining empirically the impact of the VAT 
- as a broad-based consumption tax - on consumer behavior. As a result, the empirical 
evidence of this study is expected to provide some guidance and insight for policymakers 
when considering different tax reform proposals. In effect, in consumption-driven 
economies such as that of the U.S., it is equally important to investigate the response of 
consumer spending to changes in the VAT rate, as well as to provide policymakers with a 
policy prescription to be taken into account when evaluating different tax reform 
proposals.  
The goal of this study is to empirically investigate the effect of an increase in the 
effective VAT rate on the level of per capita aggregate household consumption. Since 
household consumption and saving are considered two faces of the same coin, evaluating 
the impact of the VAT on consumption would provide us with a good approximation of 
its impact on private saving. Empirical stylized facts show that the effective VAT rate 
varies over time within each country in our sample. This fact, in turn, implies that the 
VAT generates an intertemporal effect which affects the relative prices of current 
consumption vs. future consumption. In other words, the tax shock generates substitution 
and income effects.3 Theoretically, the net impact of these two forces on the level of 
aggregate private consumption is ambiguous. This raises the urge to provide empirical 
evidence on the direction of the relation between the VAT and the level of household 
consumption. 
This study contributes to the existing literature along three dimensions. First, the 
idea linking consumption taxes in general, and the VAT specifically, to consumer 
                                                 
3 If current VAT rate is higher than that of the future, then current consumption is relatively more 
expensive, and hence the substitution effect results in a decline in current consumption. The income effect 
reduces consumption in all periods as it leads to a reduction in individuals’ life-time resources.  
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behavior is innovative in the field. Second, the use of panel data analysis is an addition to 
the current literature, which primarily uses time series approach.4 Finally, the use of the 
recently developed dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) system 
estimator as our main econometric methodology is unique in the consumption literature. 
Conditional on a specific set of assumptions, this estimator produces estimates that have 
superior finite sample properties and do not suffer from biases induced by endogeneity, 
simultaneity, omitted variables, or measurement error, which are typically present when 
estimating aggregate consumption functions using macro-level data.    
Our empirical analysis is based on data from fifteen European Union (EU) 
countries over the period 1961-2000. In addressing the issue, the study draws on the 
European experience for several reasons. First, the VAT traces back to the writing of Von 
Siemens, a German businessman in the 1920s, which implies that this system is not only 
a European invention but it was first implemented in Europe. Consequently, it is safe to 
assume that this system is a “well-established” one in Europe and that enables us to 
depict some credible conclusions from the analyses. Second, the EU economies are 
developed and hence they resemble many features of the U.S. economy. Therefore, 
performing the study on these economies would be helpful for policymakers in the U.S. 
to foresee the possible impacts of such tax regime on aggregate consumption and 
economic performance in the U.S. Finally, lack of systematic accessible data on the VAT 
in most developing and transitional economies is an obstacle to performing the analysis 
on these countries. However, it can easily be extended, with some qualifications, to 
include these countries in the future as data becomes available. 
                                                 
4 In fact, panel data models have several advantages. For instance, it allows controlling for individual fixed 
effects (and hence omitted variable bias), it is better suited to understand the dynamics of adjustments in 
the economy, it provides more informative data, and allows for more variability and efficiency.    
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Using a reduced form aggregate consumption function, which allows us to use a 
wide range of consumption determinants; we found that the VAT is negatively related to 
the level of per capita private consumption. More specifically, a one percentage point 
increase in the VAT rate leads to about a one percent reduction in the level of aggregate 
consumption, ceteris paribus. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two surveys the theoretical 
and empirical literature on consumption taxes and consumer behavior. In addition, it 
provides a brief review of the existing VAT literature. Section three presents the 
theoretical model, and the results of the comparative static analysis. Section four presents 
the empirical analysis with emphasis on the empirical strategy which provides an 
overview of the dataset and the empirical specification. Furthermore, it addresses the 
econometric issues and describes the estimation methodology, and finally, it presents our 
basic results, as well as the results of the sensitivity analysis. Section five concludes the 
study with an emphasis on the policy implications of its empirical results, and possible 
future research directions. 
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Literature Review 
Introduction 
A substantial number of studies have attempted to develop theoretical and 
empirical works to understand households’ consumption and saving patterns. 
Furthermore, a number of studies have examined the various theoretical and empirical 
aspects of conversion from an income-based tax system to a consumption-based tax 
system including the response of the savings elasticity, the transitional issues, and the 
welfare effects. This section reviews the literature, with a particular emphasis on the 
impact of consumption tax on consumption behavior. The section is divided into three 
main parts corresponding to theoretical and empirical studies of the effects of 
consumption tax on consumption with a brief survey of the VAT literature. The final part 
concludes the literature survey.  
Theoretical Literature on Consumption Taxes and Consumption Behavior 
Few studies have looked at the theoretical linkage between consumption taxes and 
consumer behavior, mostly focusing on the outcome of a tax reform that aims at 
replacing the income tax with a tax on consumption. For instance, Batina (1999) studies 
the effects of converting from an income tax to a consumption tax in the presence of 
bequests. Using an overlapping generation model, the author finds that taxing bequests at 
the consumption tax rate repels the benefits of the tax reform as saving and capital 
accumulation will no longer increase. In this case, the bequest decision will be distorted, 
as bequests will then suffer from being taxed twice, and this may lead to a reduction in 
capital accumulation when the reform takes place, as there will be less incentive to save 
for bequests. 
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Another study by Lewis and Seidman (1999) has examined the influence of 
converting the income tax to a consumption tax on the elasticity of saving. Using a 
standard isoelastic intertemporal utility function and a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, with other assumptions regarding inelastic labor supply, zero depreciation rate 
of capital, zero government debt, and an annual balanced budget in which government 
consumption expenditures are financed by tax revenues and tax revenues per unit of 
effective labor is the same under all taxes in every year, the authors concluded that 
conversion from an income tax to a consumption tax always increases the steady-state 
capital/labor ratio regardless of the elasticity of saving. They also show that consumption 
tax is not equivalent to wage tax because they yield different steady-state results 
regarding capital/labor ratio. For instance, conversion to a wage tax may increase or 
lower capital/labor ratio, while consumption tax always raises it. The results also imply 
that the saving elasticity is irrelevant to the steady-state effect of conversion because the 
after-tax interest rate is the same in the two steady-states; however, the saving elasticity 
does affect the speed of convergence to the consumption tax steady-state, in particular, 
higher elasticity results in higher speed.  
Matsuzaki (2003) studies the effects of consumption tax on effective demand 
under stagnation. Using a two-class model with uneven wealth distribution, the author 
found that under stagnation, an increase in the consumption tax rate decreases (increases) 
effective demand in the case of heterogeneous households (when the ratio of poorer 
households is large (small) relative to the total population). The author reasons this 
finding as follows. Increasing the consumption tax rate on richer households does not 
affect their consumption because in this case the marginal utility of money reaches its 
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lower bound. However, when the consumption tax rate is increased on poorer 
households, it generates two effects: the pure consumption tax effect which increases the 
household’s marginal utility of money and thus this effect always decrease consumption; 
and the redistribution effect (the government rebates the consumption tax revenue in a 
lump sum manner to all households) which increases poorer household’s consumption. 
Furthermore, the redistribution effect is less effective as the ratio of poorer households is 
larger relative to total population. Therefore, the net effect of consumption tax on poorer 
households depends on which of these two effects dominates.    
Empirical Literature on Consumption Taxes and Consumption Behavior 
Among the empirical studies relating fiscal policy variables to consumption 
behavior are Feldstein (1987), Kormendi (1983), Aschauer (1985), Graham (1993), 
Darby and Malley (1996), and others. These studies have looked at the impact of various 
fiscal variables, such as tax revenues, government transfers, government net debt, and 
government spending (crowding-out effect), on consumer behavior. Furthermore, a large 
number of empirical studies linking taxes and consumption behavior focused on testing 
the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem (RET).5 Several studies have attempted to test the 
RET for the U.S., reaching inconclusive evidence. For instance, Seater and Mariano 
(1985) found no empirical support for the RET, whereas, Bernheim (1987) findings 
supports the existence of simulative effect of government fiscal policy on private 
consumption. Other studies conducted cross-country comparative studies to evaluate the 
                                                 
5 The RET suggests that, given government expenditures and population growth, the shift between bond 
financing and taxation have no effect on the allocation of resources between private consumption and 
saving. Thus, taxes fail to change private consumption levels because consumers have rational 
expectations.   
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existence of the RET in developed countries, such as Evans (1993), Masson et al. (1995), 
Brunila (1997), and Giavazzi et al. (2000) have all reached conflicting results.6  
Nonetheless, empirical literature tying consumption taxes and consumer behavior 
is substantially scarce relative to those studies that use other measures of taxes and to its 
theoretical counterpart.7 An exception is a study by Summers (1981) shows by simulating 
his model into U.S. data that for a wide variety of plausible parameter values, saving is 
very interest elastic implying that shifting away from capital income taxation would 
significantly increase capital formation, making possible long-run increases in 
consumption. As alternatives to capital income taxation, both wage and consumption 
taxes are compared in the steady-state in a general equilibrium framework. The author 
found that the annual welfare gain from a shift to consumption taxation is estimated at 10 
percent of GNP. 
Furthermore, Fullerton et al. (1983) used a dynamic general equilibrium model of 
the U.S. economy and tax system to evaluate the welfare consequences of a change from 
the current U.S. income tax to a progressive consumption tax. The model endogenizes 
households’ saving behavior and assumes that the U.S. economy is on a balanced growth 
path in the presence of existing income taxes. The change results in more savings and less 
consumption but only initially. Consumption ultimately increases as capital stock grows, 
and the economy approaches the new balanced growth path with higher consumption and 
larger capital stock. The authors calculated the discounted present value of the stream of 
welfare gain from this change to about $650 billion in 1973 dollars, which represents 
about one percent of the discounted present value of national income.    
                                                 
6 For a comprehensive survey of the literature on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem see Ricciuti (2003). 
7 Most studies that incorporate taxes when estimating consumption functions use either tax revenue as a 
percent of GDP or a measure of the marginal tax rate to capture the effect of taxes on private consumption. 
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Finally, Lewis and Seidman (1998) assessed the impact of household 
heterogeneity with saving propensities on aggregate saving when converting an income 
tax to an equally-progressive consumption tax. The authors used a graduated schedule 
which ensures that households with the same consumption level are subject to the same 
consumption tax rate despite their income levels. The authors carried out simulations 
using U.S. data and found that household heterogeneity may increase aggregate saving by 
11 percent when an income tax is converted to an equal yield consumption tax. 
While a study by Poterba (1988) looked at how changes in income taxes affect 
consumer spending,8 no study, to our knowledge, has looked at how these expenditures 
are affected by changes in consumption taxes. Nonetheless, Freebairn (1991) investigated 
the effects of a consumption tax on the level and composition of Australian saving and 
investment. The author shows that the short run effects are small, though positive, on 
aggregate saving due to three reasons: (1) the reduction in marginal tax rates that can be 
financed with a consumption tax will be small; (2) given the continuation of Australia’s 
hybrid income tax system, lower marginal income tax rates on personal income will 
increase the incentive to save on less than a half of household saving; (3) some household 
will not respond to the increased after-tax return from some saving options because their 
behavior is affected by habit or precautionary motives, or because of the presence of 
liquidity constraints. However, the impact on the composition of saving and investment is 
stronger due to heterogeneity in the mix of Australia’s saving and investment, along with 
its hybrid tax system. Therefore, he concludes that the main benefit from the introduction 
                                                 
8 Other studies along the same line include Hubbard et al. (1986), Watanabe et al. (1999) and Steindel 
(2001).  
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of a consumption tax as part of a tax mix change lies in improving the quality of 
investment rather than increasing in the aggregate quantity of saving and investment. 
With regard to the impact of VAT on consumption behavior, Andrikopoulos et al. 
(1993) assessed the short run effects of the VAT on consumption patterns in Greece. The 
study aimed at evaluating the effect a VAT could have on individual commodity prices, 
consumer price index, shares and the allocation patterns of total consumption 
expenditures among groups of commodities. Using time series data from 1958-1986 for 
thirteen commodity groups in Greece, and by utilizing the full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) approach to estimate and test the static almost ideal demand system 
(AIDS) model, the major empirical findings are: (1) the VAT has affected at different 
rates (positively or negatively) the structure of commodity prices. Indeed, the VAT has 
increased the consumer price index by 4.7 percent above the rate expected to prevail 
without it; and (2) the VAT has altered consumption patterns or the allocation of total 
consumption expenditures among the groups of goods and services under investigation. 
This result is due to the considerable divergence between the actual and the predicted 
budget shares, as well as the substantial change of both the compensated and 
uncompensated demands. 
Other studies used computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to assess the 
impact of either introducing the VAT or increasing its rate on the economy, i.e., on 
consumer prices, consumption, investment, and welfare. Most of these studies were 
conducted on developing countries. For example, Rege (2002) found that instant 
implementation of the VAT in India (as to replace other indirect taxes) reduces welfare 
more than if its implementation was gradual because it causes an increase in the price of 
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necessary goods. Therefore, he found that when the essentials are exempt from the tax 
base, i.e., agriculture, food, and textiles, the welfare loss is reduced by about half.  
In a similar study on the Fiji economy, Narayan (2003) found that a 25 percent 
increase in Fiji’s VAT rate led to about 4 percent increase in government revenue, 
assuming 100 percent collection rate, and about 0.6 percent increase in real GDP; 
however, it led to a decline in real consumption, investment, and national welfare. 
Few more studies have examined the various issues involved when implementing 
a VAT in developing and developed countries. For instance, Metcalf (1995) studied the 
issues to be considered when designing a VAT, its mechanism, administration, and 
compliance costs, its economic impact on savings and labor supply, and its distributional 
and transitional concerns if implemented in the U.S. Regarding its impact on saving, the 
author argues that the VAT eliminates the intertemporal consumption distortions caused 
by taxing savings, and if the elasticity of saving with respect to the rate of interest is 
positive, then the VAT will raise the amount of saving via increasing the after-tax rate of 
return on savings. However, he emphasizes that a clear cut answer on whether 
implementing the VAT would increase savings rate is far from being answered.  
Similarly, Bird (2005) discusses the major lessons when introducing a VAT in 
developing and transitional economies (DTE). First, the VAT works well in most DTE 
and better than any other forms of general sales taxes. Second, implementation of the 
VAT depends on “self-assessment,” which is still a problem for many DTE. Third, when 
designing a VAT, it is important to be aware of countries’ situations, which can vary 
substantially across countries and over time within each country. Finally, the main lesson 
lies in the ability of grasping the political economy dimension of the VAT policy and 
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administration. Furthermore, the author asserts that the main challenge facing empirical 
studies on the VAT in DTE is lack of systematic, consistent, and accessible data on the 
VAT in these countries. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this section we presented the current literature on consumption taxes and 
consumer behavior. The results of the review show that the existing literature does not 
provide formal empirical evidence on the relationship between consumption taxes, in 
general, and the VAT, in particular, on consumer spending. Therefore, this study tries to 
fill this void in the literature by providing a thorough treatment of the empirical linkage 
between the VAT and consumption behavior using actual data and proper econometric 
techniques that deal with the standard econometric issues arising in these cases, such as 
the dynamic nature of the model, endogeneity, persistence, simultaneity bias, and omitted 
variable bias.    
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Theoretical Model 
This section aims at developing a theoretical model in which the impact of 
consumption taxes on the level of consumption can be evaluated. In pursuing our goal, 
we follow two steps. First, we derive an aggregate consumption function based on the 
LCH. The model is an application of the model developed by Ando and Modigliani 
(1963) in which we extend the literature by incorporating consumption tax as an 
additional parameter to assess the outcome. Second, we perform some comparative static 
analysis to isolate the influence of consumption tax on consumption. 
Derivation of Aggregate Consumption Function 
  The LCH visualized consumption decisions as integrated in an intertemporal 
optimization for a representative consumer. In other words, households were faced with a 
forecasted “income stream” which they attempted to allocate over their lifetime. 
Therefore, agents choose a consumption path over their lifetime which maximizes their 
intertemporal lifetime utility function weighted by a subjective discount rate, subject to 
an intertemporal budget constraint which is governed by a discounted stream of future 
income and the wealth they are born with.  
Assumptions of the Model: 
1) Individuals are unrestricted to access capital markets. 
2) Each person works from i = 1 to i = R and retires from i = (R+1) to i = J. 
3) All workers at any point in time receive the same real wage. 
4) The government has a balanced budget (cash flow budget constraint). 
5) Consumption is a normal good in all periods. 
6) Utility is derived from consumption in all periods. 
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7) Individuals’ utility function is concave and time-invariant to insure smoothness of 
consumption in both periods, that is, .0)(.0)(. <′′>′ UandU  
8) The tax on consumption is imposed on consumption in all periods. 
Following Lewis and Seidman (1999) and Bakhshi (2000), we assume that each 
individual maximizes his/her lifetime utility by choosing the stream of consumption from 
(c1, c2,…, cJ) subject to his/her lifetime budget constraint as follows: 
∑
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ct+i: Consumption in different periods. 
  J: Certain date of death. 
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where:  
it+τ : consumption tax rate in different periods, which equals ( )itc it cT ++ , where  
c
itT + represents tax revenues from the consumption tax in different periods and ct+i 
represents the tax base which is consumption in different periods. Therefore, the 
tax rate represents the effective rate. 
 r: real interest rate 
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The first-order conditions (F.O.Cs) of the maximization problem are given by: 
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Put (4) in (3) to obtain the Euler equation: 
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Note that according to (5), the consumer can not improve his/her utility by 
reducing consumption in one period, say (t), and then increasing it in another period, say 
(t+1). 
Now, let us assume a specific form for the utility function to get a closed-form 
solution. In fact, Bakhshi (2000) mentioned that a closed-form solution is obtainable if 
the utility function takes one of the following forms:   
i) Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). 
 ii) Constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). 
 iii) Quadratic utility function. 
 For our purpose here, let’s assume a CRRA or CES or isolelastic utility function: 
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where: σγ
1=  , and σ  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
Put (6) in (5) and with some algebraic manipulation we get the following: 
i
it
t
it
t
t
it
rc
c
cU
cU ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡′
′
++
+
1
1
1
1
)(
)( ρ
τ
τγ
      (7) 
Put (7) into the budget constraint (2) for ct+i to get: 
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Therefore, 
)(1 ttt hac += β          (8) 
Where β  is a proportionality factor which is a function of the interest rate, tastes 
(utility function parameters, ργ and ), age of the individual and the length of his/her life, 
and consumption tax rates, that is: 
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Equation (8) is similar to the one obtained by Ando and Modigliani (1963), where 
(1/β) is equivalent to Ω in their notation. 
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Assuming that all consumers behave like a representative one at a particular 
economic age, then (8) can be interpreted as representing aggregate consumption function 
when the population has a specific age and income distribution; therefore our aggregate 
consumption function is given by: 
)(1 ttt HAC += β          (9) 
Comparative Static Analysis 
In this section we perform a comparative static analysis to isolate the impact of a 
change in consumption tax rate on consumption. Since optimality conditions require a 
uniform characterization of the Euler equations for any two periods, we focus on a tax 
shock between periods (t) and (t+1), which generalizes to any number of periods. 
Recall the F.O.Cs, (with the assumption that tax rates are not equal in the two periods): 
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where )( tU refers to the first derivative of the utility function with respect to period’s (t) 
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9 In this experiment, we hold all variables, such as interest rate, and income in all periods constant while 
varying only consumption tax rates. 
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The Boardered Hessian is given by: 
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The second-order conditions (S.O.Cs) imply that D is positive, since, by assumption, 
tU and 1+tU are positive, whereas ttU , and 1,1 ++ ttU are negative, and tttt UU ,11, ++ = by 
symmetry. 
Therefore, we have a system of three equations with three unknowns: 
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Using Cramer’s rule, we can solve for ⎟⎟⎠
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If we assume that )0( 1 =+tdτ then: 
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Equations (20) and (21) show the impact of a change in current and future tax 
rates on current consumption, respectively. Clearly, the impact of current consumption 
taxes on current consumption is theoretically ambiguous.10 The reason is that there are 
two competing effects, i.e., the substitution effect given by the term 
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10 Recall that (Ct), (Ct+1), (τt), (τt+1), (r), (λ), and [D] are all positive, whereas, (Ut+1, t+1) is negative, and 
(Ut,,t+1) is indeterminate.   
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increases.11 The reason is that, when current tax rate increases, individuals anticipate that 
future one will decline. This change in the relative price of consumption today vs. 
tomorrow leads to lower levels of current consumption as current tax rates climbs.  
However, the second effect is the income effect which leads to an ambiguous 
impact on current consumption. The reason is that the sign of )( 1, +ttU is indeterminate. If 
it is positive then the term ⎟⎟⎠
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the income effect has a negative sign. In that case, both effects work in the same direction 
enforcing each others, and an increase in the current consumption tax rate reduces current 
consumption. If, however, )( 1, +ttU is negative, the sign of the term representing the income 
effect is indeterminate and, hence, the total impact of an increase in current tax rate on 
current consumption is ambiguous. 
For the impact of an increase in future taxes on current consumption, the 
substitution effect in this case {given by the term ⎟⎟⎠
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positive and, hence current consumption increases as future tax rate increases.12 This is 
logical; because it implies that current consumption is cheaper relative to future one, and 
therefore it is expected to be positive (it is exactly the opposite of the previous case).  
Similar arguments hold for the ambiguous impact of the income effect due to the 
presence of the term )( 1, +ttU , as discussed. If it is positive the income effect has a 
negative sign and the two forces work in opposite directions. If, however, it is negative, 
                                                 
11 Note the negative sign preceding the term representing the substitution effect in equation (20). 
12 Note the positive sign preceding the term representing the substitution effect in equation (21). 
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the sign of the term representing the income effect is indeterminate and the overall impact 
of an increase in future taxes on current consumption is theoretically unclear.    
Concluding Remarks 
In this section we derived an aggregate consumption function that incorporates 
consumption taxes. We showed that consumption is proportional to life-time income. The 
proportionality parameter is similar to the one derived by Ando and Modigliani (1963), 
with tax structure included as an additional parameter. The results of the comparative 
static analysis show that the impact of present consumption tax on present consumption is 
theoretically ambiguous due to the presence of two competing effects, i.e., the 
substitution effect and the income effect.  
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Empirical Analysis 
Empirical Strategy 
While previous empirical studies capture a number of factors relevant to 
consumption decision, they vary considerably in the data coverage, empirical 
specification, and econometric procedure. Our primary objective here is to extend the 
literature by providing a comprehensive characterization of the empirical association 
between the level of per capita private consumption and the VAT rate, as well as a broad 
range of potentially important consumption determinants using the best available data. To 
do that, we complement and extend previous work along two dimensions. First, we adopt 
a reduced form approach which includes a variety of consumption determinants identified 
in the literature, rather than adhering to one particular, narrow, structural model. Second, 
we employ a variety of estimation methods but focus our attention on estimators that 
attempt to control for endogeneity, omitted variable bias, simultaneity, and measurement 
error. 
The data. The dataset includes 15 European Union (EU) countries over the period 
1961-2000. Annual data on household (private) consumption expenditures (constant 1995 
$U.S.), household (private) consumption expenditures per capita (constant 1995 $U.S.), 
GDP (constant 1995 $U.S.), GDP per capita (constant 1995 $U.S.), inflation - consumer 
prices (annual %), total population, old population, and consumer price index (CPI) 
(1995 = 100) are drawn from the World Development Indicators CD-ROM (2004) of the 
World Bank. Data on unemployment rate (annual percent, monthly averages), and long-
term interest rates (annual percent, average) are obtained from the OECD Economic 
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Outlook, No. 75.13 Due to difficulty in obtaining data on household wealth, we use 
financial system deposits to proxy for households’ wealth. This variable is drawn from 
the Financial Structure and Economic Development Database of the World Bank 
(2000).14 Data on different tax revenues, i.e., the VAT ($U.S.), taxes on goods and 
services ($U.S.), taxes on income, profits and capital gains ($U.S.), taxes on payroll and 
workforce ($U.S.), and total tax revenues ($U.S.) are drawn from the OECD Revenue 
Statistics CD-ROM 1965-2001 (2002).15  
We generated three tax variables from the collected data: 
(a) VATRatet =  )100(*
$US) 1995(constant                            
 esexpenditurn consumptio final (private) household Total
$US) 1995(constant  Revenue VAT
⎪⎪⎭
⎪⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
      
(b) TotConsTax_VATt = {Taxes on goods and service revenue ($U.S.) – VAT revenues ($U.S.)} 
(c) TotIncomeTaxt = {Taxes on income, profit and capital gain ($U.S.) + payroll taxes ($U.S.)}. 
Consumption, income, wealth and the two tax revenue data are in real terms;16 
and have been transformed into their natural logarithm equivalent.17  
A complete and detailed discussion of the variables’ definition and sources is 
provided in Table A1 of Appendix A. We generated five-year averages for all the 
variables for two reasons. First, as we are more interested in the long-run effects of the 
VAT on consumption, we followed the common practice in the literature in such cases 
and generated these averages to remove the cyclical effects of business cycle fluctuations. 
                                                 
13 Also available online at: 
http://ceres.sourceoecd.org/vl=617395/cl=91/nw=1/rpsv/ij/oecdstats/16081153/v115n1/s1/p1  
14 Available online at: http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/database.htm 
15 Also available online at: 
http://thesius.sourceoecd.org/vl=2303064/cl=27/nw=1/rpsv/ij/oecdstats/16081099/v55n1/s5/p1 
16 The real series are obtained by deflating the nominal ones using the consumer price index (CPI 
1995=100). 
17 The main advantage of such transformation is to stabilize the variance. 
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Second, because our preferred econometric technique; i.e., the GMM-System estimator, 
which will be discussed as we proceed, is better suited for samples with small number of 
time observations (i.e., when T is small and N is large).18 Nonetheless, we provide 
estimation results based on the annual data. Consequently, we have two different “sub” 
datasets, namely the five-year averaged data and the annual data. 
Tables A2 and A3 of Appendix A provide descriptive statistics of the five-year 
averaged and the annual datasets, respectively. Descriptive statistics of the averaged 
dataset show that the effective VAT rate ranges between zero and 17.36 percent – which 
is achieved in Denmark in 2000 - with a sample mean of 5.39 percent, whereas it varies 
between zero and 19.25 percent – which is achieved in Sweden in 1995 - with the same 
sample mean in the annual dataset.19 Moreover, the sample mean of the dependent 
variable, i.e. per capita household final consumption expenditures (in constant 1995 
$U.S. and in natural logs) is about 9.2 $U.S. in both samples.20  
Major empirical determinants of household consumption. Before addressing the 
various determinants of household consumption and the logic behind including each of 
them in our set of explanatory variables, we want to emphasize that our dependent 
variable is the (ln) level of per capita household final (private) consumption expenditures 
(Ln Ct). We chose this variable as our dependent variable, because we are interested in 
examining the response of the per capita level of private (household) aggregate 
consumption to changes in the effective VAT rate.  
                                                 
18 The reasons will be discussed in more detail as we proceed. 
19 The minimum value is zero because we included observations in years in which the VAT was not yet 
introduced in some countries. If however, we drop the zeros from the sample, the number of observations 
drops from 118 to 90 in the averaged dataset, and in that case the minimum effective VAT rate is 0.19 
percent in 1970 in Luxembourg. If the zeros are dropped from the annual dataset, the number of 
observations falls from 590 to 419, and in that case the minimum effective VAT rate is 0.43 percent in 
1972 in Ireland.  
20 For further details on data description see tables A2 and A3 of Appendix A. 
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The set of regressors includes the following: 
Lagged household final consumption expenditures (Ln Ct-1). This variable is 
included to represent the influence of habits acquired in the past on current consumption 
behavior (i.e., habit persistence). We expect a positive sign on this estimate, and the 
magnitude, according to the partial adjustment model, should lie be between zero and 
one.21 Since any level of actual consumption represents the accumulation of all past 
experience, and we assume, reasonably, that the “habit persistence” effect induced by 
past consumption on current behavior would be strongest when t is small and gradually 
die away as t becomes larger, we include only a single lag of only one time period. 
Income (Ln Yt). Income is measured by the (ln) level of GDP per capita (constant 
1995 $U.S.). According to the PIH agents will base their consumption decision not on 
their current income but on a measure of their permanent income or their average income 
over their life-cycle. Since this measure of income will vary much less from year to year 
than does current income, current consumption will also vary less than current income, 
therefore, the relationship is not one-to-one. This means that we would expect a positive 
marginal propensity to consume out of current income and the magnitude should be 
somewhere between zero and one. 
Income growth (Growth Y).  We follow adaptive expectations model, this means 
that consumers look forward in time using past expectations. In that case, we use the 
conventional practice in the literature to proxy for life-cycle income employing, in 
addition to the current level of income, a measure for the growth of income. Since 
expected future income can be projected by past change in income (i.e., income growth), 
then a positive growth of income implies that expected future income is affected 
                                                 
21 See Brown (1952) for more details on habit persistence model of the aggregate consumption function. 
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positively, and hence current consumption increases. As such, the level of income 
represents the anticipated/planned component of life-cycle income, whereas income 
growth represents the unanticipated/windfall element.  
Household wealth (Ln Wt). We use the (ln) level of per capita financial system 
deposits (real $U.S.) as a proxy for households’ wealth. According to the PI/LC 
hypotheses, current consumption depends on human and non-human wealth. While 
human wealth (i.e., wage income) is measured by life-time income (as described above), 
non-human wealth (i.e., non-wage income) can be proxied by some measure of financial 
assets holding. Given that the association between wealth and consumption is, 
theoretically, positive; we expect a positive sign on this variable. Since one of the LCH 
predictions is that the marginal propensity to consume out of wage income is much larger 
than that out of non-wage income, we would expect that the estimated wealth elasticities 
will be smaller than those of income elasticities, if our results are in line with the LCH. 
Unemployment rate (URatet). The unemployment rate (measured by the ratio 
between the number of unemployed and total labor force) is generally included to proxy 
either for the effects of liquidity constraints and/or uncertainty regarding future income 
(short-run fluctuations of income). Therefore, higher unemployment rate is associated 
with lower levels of current consumption. 
Inflation rate (Inflationt). Inflation rate is measured by the annual change in 
consumer prices (annual percent). The inclusion of the rate of inflation is logical since it 
can be used to proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty regarding economic performance, 
nominal incomes, future policies, and consumer confidence. In that case, higher inflation 
rates affect real incomes adversely, leading to lower levels of consumption. Moreover, to 
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the extent that the increase in inflation is unanticipated, confusing the increase in the 
overall price level with a rise in the relative prices of certain goods, leads to a reduction 
in consumption.  
Old dependency ratio (Oldt). Since we rely on the PI/LC hypotheses as a 
theoretical foundation for our empirical estimation, we use the old dependency ratio, 
defined as the ratio of population over 65 year of age to total population, to capture life-
cycle effects. The LCH predicts a positive effect of old dependency ratio on 
consumption, whereas the PIH predicts that its influence on consumer behavior is 
insignificant.   
Long-term interest rate (LTRt).22 The interest rate is typically included to capture 
three effects. First, the intertemporal substitution effect associated with changes in the 
relative price of current versus future consumption, because higher interest rates increase 
the cost of current consumption relative to future one which motivates people to shift 
consumption from the present to the future. Second, the income effect that tends to raise 
consumption at all dates. Third the human wealth effect which reduces consumption in all 
periods, because higher interest rates reduces the present discounted value of future 
income. In principle, the effect of the interest rate is, theoretically, ambiguous, because 
the net effect of an increase in the interest rate depends on which of these forces 
dominates.23 However, the usual presumption is that it is negative.24 
We use long-term interest rates for two reasons. First, since our focus is on the 
long-run effects of the VAT on consumption, the long-term rates of interest are more 
                                                 
22 In principal, long-term interest rate is broadly defined as a 10-year average government bond yield. A 
full definition of LTR is provided in Table A1 of Appendix A.  
23 It depends also on whether the individual is a saver or dissaver. 
24 In principal, we assume that the sum of the substitution and wealth effects outweighs the income effect. 
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relevant. Second, lack of relatively longer data series on short-run interest rates is another 
motive to use long-term rates.  
The effective value-added tax rate (VATRatet). This variable is our key variable, 
which is calculated using the formula explained earlier. We choose to include the VAT in 
our equation in the form of effective rate, rather than as a revenue measure for two 
reasons. First, since we are interested in the intertemporal effect generated by the VAT as 
a tax on consumption, the effective rate is more capable of capturing that effect than a 
revenue measure, as it is easier to perceive altering relative prices of consumption today 
vs. consumption tomorrow.25 Second, to control for variations in the VAT’s statutory 
rates, exemptions …etc. across the EU countries and within each country, a measure of 
effective rate is more appropriate for comparability purposes. According to our 
hypothesis, the VAT is negatively related to the level of per capita private consumption; 
hence it should appear with a negative sign. 
Total consumption tax revenues excluding VAT revenue (Ln TotConsTax_VATt). 
We control for the possible impact of other consumption taxes in our equation by 
including a measure for other consumption tax revenues excluding those from the VAT. 
We calculated this variable as explained earlier. As this tax measure includes taxes levied 
on imports and exports (as part of the taxes on goods and services), its definite sign is 
largely uncertain. It depends on several factors. First, the proportion of import and export 
taxes relative to the total tax revenue on goods and services. Smaller fraction of trade 
taxes implies that these two taxes are relatively less important source of tax revenue in 
                                                 
25 If the tax increases the relative price of current consumption in terms of future consumption, then the 
intertemporal effect generated by the tax shock may lead to a reduction in consumption. 
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the EU countries, and hence their qualitative effect can be ignored.26 Second, the relative 
size of these two trade tax variables to each others. If more taxes are levied on imports 
than on exports, then most of the tax burden is borne by “home” residents. In that case, 
consumption will decline as a result of a relatively larger import taxes (at least for those 
imported goods). If however, more taxes are collected from exports, then consumption 
level at “home” should not be affected. This means that either a negative sign or an 
insignificant result is expected.  
Total income tax revenue (Ln TotIncomeTaxt). To control for the potential 
influence of income taxes on current consumption, we include a measure of income tax 
revenue in our estimated function. This variable is calculated from the collected tax data 
as explained previously. The base of an income tax includes income from both labor 
(earnings) and capital (such as rent, interest, dividends, or capital gain). Taxing the return 
from capital has two competing effects: (1) the substitution effect which tends to tilt 
prices in favor of current consumption and against future consumption, as it makes future 
consumption more expensive; and (2) the income effect which reduces total life time 
resources, and induces individuals to consume less in all periods. The net effect of these 
two forces is, theoretically, ambiguous. Therefore, a range of outcomes is possible. While 
a positive sign implies that the substitution effect is greater than the income effect, a 
negative coefficient means that the income effect is the dominant force. Finally, an 
insignificant result probably implies that these two effects cancel each others.     
Empirical specification. We employ a reduced form linear equation, which 
allows us to include a broad range of consumption determinants. We focus our attention 
on a “core” set of regressors selected based on theoretical connection and analytical 
                                                 
26 Total trade taxes are the sum of tax revenues collected from import and export taxes. 
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relevance; however, we also examine the empirical role of a number of less-standard 
consumption determinants.  
Following previous literature, our core regressors include a standard group of 
income-related variables, namely the (ln) level and the rate of growth of real per capita 
income, and (ln) level of per capita real household (private) wealth; other variables 
include real long-term interest rate, old dependency ratio, two tax control variables, 
namely (ln) level of per capita total consumption tax revenue excluding the VAT 
revenue, and (ln) level of per capita total income tax revenue, and finally our variable of 
interest, the effective VAT rate. 
We perform additional empirical experiments using two measures of 
macroeconomic uncertainty, namely inflation rate and unemployment rate. These 
variables capture precautionary saving effects. More specifically, inflation rate has been 
used in the literature as a proxy for price uncertainty; whereas unemployment rate has 
been used, more generally, to proxy for macroeconomic instability.27 
Econometric Issues and Methodology28 
We are interested in estimating the following simple AR(1) consumption model 
with unobserved country-specific effect: 
titititi XCC ,,1,, µβα +′+= −   α < 1      (22) 
TtandNifor ...,,2...,,1 ==  
where: 
tiC ,   Observable dependent variable. 
                                                 
27 See for instance, Deaton (1977) and Fischer (1993). 
28 This section borrows heavily from Arellano and Bond (1991), Loayza et al. (2000) and Bond et al. 
(2001).  
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tiX ,   K × 1 vector of observable independent variables. 
β K × 1 vector of parameters. 
ti,µ  Random disturbance term satisfying the following assumptions: 
storandjiifEandEE sjtititi ≠≠=== /0)(,)(,0)( ,,22,, µµσµµ µ  
N Number of cross-sectional units (countries) 
T  Number of time periods (years) 
To estimate this model, we consider four estimators. While we realize the 
dynamic nature of our equation and that one or more of the right hand side variables 
is/are endogenous, which implies the necessity for an appropriate estimator that deals 
with these problems; we present regression results based on estimators that do not 
confront these problems to provide comparisons.29 The reason is that our preferred 
dynamic panel estimator, which incorporates these issues, is sometimes criticized based 
on the fact that it is very sensitive to any small changes in the instrument set and/or the 
set of explanatory variables. Therefore, our first estimator is the basic pooled OLS 
(POLS) estimator using the White (1980) covariance estimator to produce consistent 
covariance matrix estimates when heteroskedasticity is an issue.30  However, the POLS 
estimator suffers from several problems in our context. First, it ignores the panel nature 
of the data. Second, it assumes that the errors are serially uncorrelated for a given 
country.31 Third, it does not account for the country-specific effect. Fourth, it neither 
                                                 
29 The dynamic model is a regression in which the lagged value of the dependent variable is one of the 
explanatory variables. As pointed out by Bond (2002), even if we are not directly interested in the 
coefficient on lagged dependent variable, allowing for dynamics in the underlying process may be crucial 
for recovering consistent estimates of other parameters.  
30 Panel-level Heteroskedasticity has been tested using the likelihood ratio test (LR). The significant p-
value reveals that the null hypothesis of homoskedastic errors has been rejected. 
31 We have tested for panel-level autocorrelation using Wooldrige (2002) test. The significant test-statistics 
indicates the presence of autocorrelation.  
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confronts the endogeneity problem of the regressors nor the effect of including lagged 
dependent variable among the explanatory variables in the model, i.e., the dynamic nature 
of our equation. Therefore, the simple OLS estimator on the pooled data turns out to be 
biased and inefficient. Furthermore, the estimated standard errors are wrong as they do 
not take into account the dependence of the error term within country over time. 
Given the limitations of the POLS estimator in our context, as well as the 
previously discussed advantages of panel data models, we employ a two-way error 
component model, in which we include year dummies to account for time-specific 
effects.32 In that case, we decompose the error term )( itµ as follows: 
tititi ,, εληµ ++=   
where: 
iη  Unobservable country-specific effect 
tλ  Unobservable time-specific effect 
ti,ε   Stochastic error term that is identically, independently distributed (IID) 
with zero mean and constant variance ),0(~ 2, σε IIDti . 
If )(( ) tandi λη are fixed parameters, then the fixed effect error component 
specification has been specified. If, however, )()( ti and λη are random parameters, then 
the random effect error component specification has been specified. The Hausman (1987) 
specification test is used to test whether the fixed or random effects model provides a 
better fit. Results from the Hausman test reject the null hypothesis; therefore, the fixed 
                                                 
32 See Baltagi (2001) for a detailed discussion of the two-way error component models. 
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effect model is chosen. As a result, we estimate equation (22) using two-way fixed effect 
model (FE) as our second estimator (also known as the within estimator). 
Although the fixed effect estimator controls for the unobserved country-specific 
effect, it fails to account for the other problems in our model. More specifically, it does 
not deal with the issues raised by endogeneity of the regressors, measurement error, and 
simultaneity bias which renders the within estimator biased and inconsistent. This 
discussion convinces us that the estimation procedure needs to tackle several issues. First, 
we must allow for the possible endogeneity of one or more of the explanatory variables.33 
Second, we must address the potential problem of measurement error in measures of the 
dependent and independent variables, which is a typical problem for macro-level data. 
Third, we must tackle the problem of omitted variable bias. Fourth and finally, our 
estimator must take into account the possibility of simultaneity bias.  
To address these issues our “main” econometric technique is based on generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimators applied to dynamic models using panel data. If a 
specific set of assumptions is met – which will be discussed as we proceed, the dynamic 
GMM estimator allows us to control for all the problems discussed previously. 
At this point, we must clarify the extent to which we control for joint endogeneity. 
For that purpose, our panel estimator uses “internal instruments,” that is, instruments 
based on lagged values of the explanatory variables. Through this method, we can relax 
the assumption that the independent variables are strictly exogenous; however we cannot 
allow for full endogeneity of the explanatory variables. To be precise, we must assume 
that the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous, which means that they can be 
                                                 
33 In fact, the presence of lagged dependent variable among the regressors implies that it is - by 
construction - correlated with the country-specific component of the error term. 
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affected by current and past realizations of the error term, but uncorrelated with future 
realizations of the error term.34 Conceptually, weak exogeneity does not mean that future 
levels of consumption cannot be correlated with current realizations of variables such as 
income growth or the interest rate (as would be predicted by forward-looking 
consumers). Rather, weak exogeneity means that future innovations (or unforeseen 
changes) to the level of consumption do not influence previous realizations of 
consumption determinants. Relaxing the strict exogeneity assumption of the explanatory 
variables allows for the possibility of simultaneity and reverse causality, which are very 
likely to be present in consumption equation. We believe that this assumption is not 
particularly restrictive; furthermore, we can statistically examine its validity through 
several specification tests, as explained below. 
Recall that we are interested in estimating equation (22) with unobserved country-
specific effect; where tiiti ,, εηµ +=  is the usual “fixed effects” decomposition of the error 
term. Following Arellano and Bond (1991), Ahn and Schmidt (1995), and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) we assume that iti and εη have the standard error components structure: 
TtandNiforEEE ititii ...,,2...,,10)(,0)(,0)( ,, ===== ηεεη   (23) 
In addition, we assume that the transient errors are serially uncorrelated: 
standNiforE siti ≠∀== ...,,10)( ,, εε      (24) 
And finally, we assume that the initial conditions 1iC are predetermined: 
                                                 
34 See Chamberlain (1984) for more details. Note, however, that if xi, t is endogenous 
then 0)(0)( 1,1,,, ≠≠ −− titititi xEandxE εε , and in that case valid instruments are six ,  with s = 1, …, t-2, 
as 0)( ,2, =− titixE ε . If, however, tix , is predetermined (weakly exogenous), then 
0)(0)( 1,1,1,, =≠ −−− titititi xEbutxE νε , and in that case valid instruments are xi,s with s = 1, …, t-1.    
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TtandNiforCE tii ...,,2...,,10)( ,1, ===ε      (25) 
In specification (22), as lagged dependent variable is one of the explanatory 
variables, it is expected to be correlated with the country-specific component of the error 
term ( iη ). The suggested solution to resolve this problem is to first-difference equation 
(22) to eliminate the country-specific effect: 
)()()( 1,,1,,2,1,1,, −−−−− −+−′+−=− titititititititi XXCCCC εεβα    (26) 
Clearly, the use of instruments is necessary to deal with several problems. First, 
the problem imposed by the existence of lagged difference of the dependent 
variable )( 2,1, −− − titi CC  among the regressors. This means that it is correlated with the 
error term )( 1,, −− titi εε . Second, the possible endogeneity of the other explanatory 
variables X.  
Assumptions (23), (24), and (25) imply the following moment restrictions: 
2...,,30)]([ 1,,, ≥==− −− sandTtforCE titisti εε     (27) 
2...,,30)]([ 1,,, ≥==− −− sandTtforXE titisti εε     (28) 
Moment conditions (27) and (28) are then used to calculate the dynamic panel 
GMM-Difference estimator, under the assumptions that the error term is serially 
uncorrelated and that the lagged levels of the explanatory variables X are weakly 
exogenous, as explained above.35 
Nonetheless, Blundell and Bond (1998) pointed out that when the time series are 
persistent (like consumption and GDP) and the number of time series observations is 
                                                 
35 As pointed out by Arellano and Bond (1991), the moment conditions of the GMM-Difference estimator 
imply the use the lagged levels of the explanatory variables dated (t – 2) and earlier as instruments for the 
equation in first-differences.  
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small, the GMM-Difference estimator has been found to have poor finite sample 
properties, in terms of bias and imprecision. The reason is that, under these conditions, 
lagged levels of the series are only weakly correlated with subsequent first-differences. 
Therefore, the available instruments for the first-differenced equations are weak.36 
Asymptotically, the coefficients’ variance of the GMM-Difference estimator rises in the 
presence of weak instruments. In small samples, instrument weakness results in biased 
coefficient estimates of the GMM-Difference estimator as shown in Monte Carlo 
experiments. Furthermore, by first-differencing the cross-country dimension of the data is 
lost. Finally, Griliches and Hausman (1986) argued that differencing may decrease the 
signal-to-noise ratio, thus worsening the degree of biases resulting from measurement 
error.  
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed an alternative 
approach to deal with these problems. This alternative method estimates the regression in 
differences jointly with the regression in levels to produce a GMM-System estimator. The 
main advantage of the system estimator over the difference estimator is that the former 
exploits an assumption about the initial conditions to obtain moment restrictions that 
continue to be useful even for persistent series. Therefore, it is shown that this estimator 
have superior finite sample properties in terms of potential biases of the coefficient 
estimates, in addition it reduces the asymptotic imprecision associated with the difference 
estimator. The reason behind this result is that the inclusion of the regression in levels 
does not eliminate cross-country variation nor does it strengthen the degree of 
measurement error. Moreover, the variables in levels, obviously, are more serially 
correlated than in differences, this implies that they sustain a stronger correlation with 
                                                 
36 See Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond et al. (2001) for further details.  
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their instruments. However, the inclusion of the regression in levels requires appropriate 
instruments to be used to control for country-specific effect. More specifically, lagged 
differences of the explanatory variables are used as instruments. These are considered 
valid instruments if the following two assumptions are met: (1) the error term is serially 
uncorrelated; and (2) although there may be correlation between the country-specific 
component of the error term )( iη and the levels of the explanatory variables, there is no 
correlation between the error term and the differences in these explanatory variables. This 
assumption is drawn from the following stationarity properties: 
qandpallforXEXEandCECE iqtiiptiiqtiipti ][][][][ ,,,, ηηηη ++++ ==  (29) 
The additional moment conditions for the regression in levels (the second part of the 
system) are given by: 
10)])([( ,1,, ==+− −−− sforCCE tiististi εη      (30) 
10)])([( ,1,, ==+− −−− sforXXE tiististi εη      (31) 
Using the moment conditions in equations (27), (28), (30), and (31) produces the 
GMM-System estimator, in which the difference equation uses lagged levels as 
instruments, while the equation in levels uses lagged differences as instruments.37 
Specification tests. Consistency of the GMM-System estimator depends on the 
validity of the assumption that the error term, )( , tiε , is serially uncorrelated; and on the 
validity of the instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) suggested two specification tests. The first one considers the 
assumption of serially uncorrelated errors. It is applied to the first-difference equation 
                                                 
37 Arellano and Bover (1995) pointed out that since lagged levels are used as instruments in the differenced 
equation, only the most recent difference should be used as instrument in the levels equation. Redundant 
moment conditions would result by using other lagged differences. 
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residuals in order to purge the unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated )( iη .  By 
construction, we would expect the differenced error term to be first-order serially 
correlated even if the original error term is not, because )( 1,, −− titi εε  is correlated with 
)( 2,1, −− − titi εε  since they share the term )( 1, −tiε . Therefore, the test tests whether the 
differenced error term is second-order serially correlated.38 Under the null hypothesis of 
no second-order correlation, this test has a standard normal distribution. If we do not fail 
to reject the null of no second-order correlation, it indicates that some lags of the 
dependent variable, which might be used as instruments, are in fact endogenous, thus 
considered “bad” instruments. 
The second test is the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions (which is the 
minimized value of the two-step GMM criterion function). This test tests for the overall 
validity of the instruments. Under the null hypothesis of the validity of the instruments 
(i.e., the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals, or whether the instruments, 
as a group, appear exogenous), this test has a 2χ distribution with (J-K) degrees of 
freedom, where J is the number of instruments, and K is the number of regressors. The 
Hansen J-Statistic is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.39 Failure to reject 
the null hypotheses of both tests provides support to our model. 
We estimate the following aggregate level equation of per capita private 
consumption:40 
TtNiZVATRateCC tiititititi ...,1;,...1,,3,21,1, ==++++= − εηβββ   (32) 
                                                 
38 Note here that since the error terms from the regression in levels include the country-specific effect )( iη , 
we cannot use these error terms (from the level regression) to perform our test of serial correlation. 
39 Note that the Hansen test is the heteroskedasticity-robust version of the Sargan test. 
40 We chose to estimate the per capita equation because it is more comparable across different units. 
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where i  refers to countries, t  to time, and )( ,tii εη +  to the composite error term that 
includes the country-specific time-invariant unobservable effect ).( iη  
The (ln) level of per capita private final consumption (constant 1995 $U.S.) is 
given by )( ,tiC , )( ,tiVATRate is our variable of interest, the set of control variables is 
given by )( ,tiZ , which includes (ln) level of income, income growth rate, (ln) level of 
wealth, interest rate, (ln) level of per capita income tax revenue, (ln) level of per capita 
other consumption taxes revenue (excluding the VAT revenue), old dependency ratio, 
inflation rate, and unemployment rate.  
While this presentation of the methodology treats all variables as weakly 
exogenous (with respect to ti,ε ), practically, however, we treat some variables as strictly 
exogenous (with respect to ti,ε ). These variables include households’ wealth, inflation 
rate, unemployment rate, old dependency ratio, and the two tax control variables (i.e., 
income tax and other consumption taxes). 
As a linear GMM estimator, the GMM-System estimator has one-step and two-
step variants. Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) pointed out that 
although asymptotically more efficient, the two-step estimates of the standard errors tend 
to be severely downward biased, though in theory the standard covariance matrix is 
already robust. To compensate – for the downward biasness, our GMM-System estimator 
employs a finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by 
Windmeijer (2005), which dramatically improved accuracy in his Monte Carlo 
Simulations. For our purpose here, we specify that the robust estimator of the covariance 
matrix of the parameter estimates be calculated. The resulting standard errors are 
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consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation 
within panels. This makes the two-step robust more efficient than one-step robust, 
especially for system GMM. Nevertheless, for completeness and as a robustness check, 
we employ both one-step and two-step robust estimators as our third and fourth 
estimators, respectively.  
Estimation Results 
We now present the estimation results for private consumption function. We 
organize our discussion around the “core” empirical specification presented earlier (it is 
shown in Table B1 of Appendix B).  
We note from the results presented in tables B1 through B14 of Appendix B that 
the specification tests generally support our dynamic GMM estimates (as shown in 
columns (3) and (4) of Table B1). The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (p-
value = 0.49 and 0.69 for the one-step and two-step GMM-System estimators, 
respectively). Similarly, the tests of serial correlation reject the hypothesis that the error 
term is second-order serially correlated, providing additional support to the use of 
appropriate lags of the explanatory variables as instruments for the estimation.  
Basic results. Table B1 of Appendix B reports the results of private consumption 
regression using alternative estimators on the five-year averaged data and utilizing the 
core specification. Our preferred estimation method uses the two-step GMM-System 
estimator. Therefore, we first discuss the results obtained with this estimator (columns (4) 
of Table B1) and then compare them with those obtained with alternative estimation 
methods.   
  
42
Before presenting the results in more detail, we must clarify their interpretation. 
Our econometric methodology is designed to isolate the effect of the exogenous 
component of each of the explanatory variables on aggregate consumption. To the extent 
that our assumptions regarding the instruments utilized in the GMM procedure are 
correct, we isolate the causal effects of the explanatory variables on aggregate private 
consumption. As mentioned, the specification tests presented in our results support the 
validity of our instruments and hence, allow us to draw inferences regarding the 
connection between the exogenous component of policy and non-policy variables and the 
level of household private consumption. Therefore, when we point out to the effect of a 
given variable on consumption, we are referring to the correlation between the exogenous 
component of that variable and consumption. 
The results show a statistically significant relation between the exogenous 
component of the effective VAT rate and the level of private aggregate consumption. As 
expected, the direction of the relation is negative, implying that consumption declines by 
more than one percent when the VAT rate is increased by one percentage point. The 
results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The economic weight of the 
results can be shown by a simple example. Consider, for example, Italy’s median value 
for effective VAT rate over the period 1961-2000 was 3.62 percent. An exogenous 
increase in VAT rate that brought it to the sample median of 5.09 percent would result in 
a 1.63 percent lower consumption over five-year period.41 This latter value translates 
roughly to 0.33 percent lower consumption per year. This negative link between the VAT 
                                                 
41 This result follows from 5.09 – 3.62 = 1.47, and (1.47)*(1.11) = 1.63, where 1.11 is the point estimate of 
VATRate in column (4) of Table B1 of Appendix B. 
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rate and private consumption is not due to simultaneity bias, omitted variables, or 
measurement error.  
We now turn to a detailed discussion of the results obtained in column (4) of Table B1: 
Habit persistence. As expected, (ln) level of lagged consumption has a positive 
and significant coefficient (at the 10 percent level) whose size (0.37) indicates the 
presences of habit persistence in consumer behavior.42 
Income. Both the (ln) level of real per capita income and its growth rate have a 
positive and significant effect (at the 5 percent, and 10 percent levels of significance, 
respectively) on private consumption. The point estimate reveals that the elasticity of 
consumption with respect to income equals 0.45.43 In turn, the estimated growth 
coefficient indicates that an increase in the growth rate of income by one percentage point 
leads to about 0.82 percent increase in private consumption. This result is consistent with 
consumption smoothing by forward-looking agents.  
Wealth. The estimated wealth elasticity equals 0.05, with a positive but 
insignificant coefficient. This result shows that the marginal propensity to consume out of 
income is much larger than that out of wealth.   
Interest rate. The rate of interest has a negative and significant impact, at the 5 
percent significance level, on private consumption; suggesting that the sum of its 
substitution and human wealth effects outweighs its income effect. The magnitude of the 
                                                 
42 The best way to interpret the coefficient of lagged consumption is in terms of the “speed of adjustment” 
in consumer behavior. For example, with the point estimate of lagged consumption equal to 0.37, the 
adjustment rate is equal to 0.63. The latter value means that 0.63 of the difference between desired and 
actual consumption is eliminated in five years. 
43 To put it differently, it means that an increase in income of 10 percent raises private consumption by 
about 4.5 percent, on average. 
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estimated coefficient indicates that an increase of one percentage point in the rate of 
interest drives private consumption down by about 0.84 percent. 
Fiscal policy. We included three variables under this category: 
i. VAT Rate. The effective VAT rate is our key variable. It appears with a 
negative and significant coefficient. The 1 percent level of significance 
implies the existence of a strong statistical correlation. Furthermore, the 
economic significance is sizable since the point estimate of the 
coefficient indicates that, on average, a one percentage point increase in 
the VAT rate will lead to 1.11 percent decline in the level of private 
consumption. Therefore, our result provides support to our hypothesis. 
ii. Total consumption tax revenue excluding VAT revenue.  The results on 
our first tax control variable show that its influence on private 
consumption is statistically insignificant, with a positive sign and very 
small magnitude (almost zero). As we discussed earlier, the positive 
coefficient can possibly indicate that a larger proportion of trade taxes  is 
collected from exports, however, the insignificant results might imply 
that trade taxes, on average, do not constitute a large fraction of the total 
taxes collected from goods and services. Indeed, total trade taxes 
constitutes only 4.4 percent of total taxes on goods and services, hence 
their impact on consumption is trivial. 
iii. Total income tax revenue. The results indicate that the correlation 
between total income tax revenue and aggregate level of per capita 
private consumption is statistically insignificant. Since income taxes 
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generate substitution and income effects, which typically work in 
opposite directions; thus one possible explanation of the insignificant 
result is that these two forces cancel out each others leaving an 
insignificant impact on the level of aggregate consumption. The small 
magnitude of 0.04 implies that the economic significance of this variable 
is negligible.  
Old dependency ratio. Our demographic variable appears with an unexpected 
positive sign, though it is statistically insignificant. This insignificant result implies that 
consumers base their consumption decisions on the PIH.  
Sensitivity analysis. In order to test for the robustness of the basic results and to 
enlighten their interpretation, we also conduct a sensitivity analysis along three 
dimensions. First, we utilize alternative econometric techniques. Second, we work with 
two data sets based on the relevant time interval; i.e., with five-year averaged data and 
annual data. Third and finally, we bring in the importance of other explanatory variables.  
Alternative estimators. Table B1 of Appendix B also presents results obtained 
with alternative estimation techniques. The first estimator, shown in column (1), 
represents the static OLS estimates using pooled data. As explained above, POLS is 
likely to be biased and inconsistent because it ignores unobserved country-specific effects 
and joint endogeneity of the explanatory variables. To control for country-specific 
effects, we use the two-way fixed effect estimator as our second estimator. However, the 
within estimator does not solve the joint endogeneity problem. An additional problem 
already noted earlier is that the presence of a lagged dependent variable renders the 
within estimator biased and inconsistent. Finally, column (3) presents the results obtained 
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with the one-step GMM-System estimator which deals with country-specific effects, joint 
endogeneity, and the inclusion of lagged dependent variable as one of the regressor. 
Nevertheless, the one-step GMM-System estimator is less efficient than the two-step 
estimator as indicated previously. 
In many cases, the results obtained with our preferred two-step GMM-System 
estimator are qualitatively similar to those obtained with alternative estimators. All 
estimators yield positive effects of the (ln) level of income, growth rate of income, (ln) 
level of wealth, and negative effects of interest rate, although, the coefficients vary in size 
and statistical significance. Most interestingly, the VAT Rate appears with a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient in all estimators, though with varying magnitude and 
level of significance. There are, however, some prominent exceptions. For example, the 
sign of the coefficients on old dependency ratio and total consumption tax revenue 
excluding VAT revenue do not show a clear pattern across alternative estimators, though 
they appear to be insignificant in all cases. Likewise, total income tax revenue is 
obviously positive and insignificant across alternative estimators; nonetheless, it is 
significant in our third estimator, i.e., one-step GMM-System estimator. 
Alternative time units. In Tables B8 through B14 of Appendix B we employ the 
annual dataset to perform our analysis. The results indicate that the specification tests 
generally do not support our dynamic GMM estimates (as shown in columns (3) and (4) 
of Table B8). The p-value of the Hansen test is consistently equal to 1.00, indicating that 
our model is heavily over-identified which leaves our instruments invalid. The reason for 
that is because of the large time dimension (i.e., T = 40) in the annual regressions, which 
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simply means that there are many more moment conditions than parameters to estimate.44 
However, we present these results for completeness. Several conclusions emerge from 
these results. First, most of the explanatory variables appear with the expected sign, 
though with varying size and level of significance. Second, the VAT Rate appears with 
the expected negative sign and is significant across alternative estimators. Third, unlike 
the case with the five-year averaged data, old dependency ratio appears to influence the 
level of per capita private consumption significantly in the case of POLS estimator. 
Fourth, income growth seems to be more relevant in this case (note the high level of 
significance in all estimators). Fifth, wealth seems to be important in the case of POLS 
and the FE estimators, but continues to appear with an insignificant coefficient in the two 
GMM estimators. Sixth, there is no clear pattern regarding the influence of total 
consumption tax revenue excluding VAT revenue in terms of its sign and level of 
significance across the two samples for all four estimators. Finally, there are some 
similarities between both samples, for instance lagged consumption, (ln) level and growth 
rate of income are consistently positive while the rate of interest is constantly negative, 
despite the fact that there are notable differences in terms of their size and level of 
significance. 
Additional explanatory variables. We added other potential determinants of 
private consumption which are excluded from the core set of explanatory variables 
because they are either less commonly used in the literature or because they are less 
relevant for our purpose here as we are more interested in examining long-run behavior. 
Furthermore, we tested the sensitivity of our results by dropping some variables from the 
                                                 
44 Recall that consistency of GMM estimates is established under the assumptions that T is small and N is 
large. In this case we have 40 annual observations for 15 countries, which means that T > N, and that 
invalidates this main assumption.  
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core specification. In the latter case, we focused on only two variables, namely the 
growth rate of income and the old dependency ratio. Tables B2 through B4 of Appendix 
B present the sensitivity of the core results to dropping one or more of these variables 
using the five-year averaged data. Generally, the core results are not sensitive to dropping 
income growth and/or old dependency ratio. The coefficients of lagged consumption, (ln) 
level of income, and (ln) level of wealth preserve their expected positive sign with 
relatively comparable size and level of significance across alternative estimators. An 
important observation in this case is the significant impact of wealth on consumption 
level when one of the variables (or both) is (are) dropped from the core specification. 
Similarly, the rate of interest and our variable of interest, the VAT Rate, are consistently 
negative and significant at various levels of significance with analogous magnitude. 
These results imply that our core results are not sensitive to changes in the core 
specification, which provides further support to our model and hypothesis.  
In addition, we included two macroeconomic uncertainty variables, namely 
inflation rate and unemployment rate. These variables are included in Tables B5 through 
B7 of Appendix B. Using the five-year averaged data, we find that both of these variables 
are statistically not different from zero, with the exception of the POLS estimates in 
which unemployment rate is significant at 10 percent level. Furthermore, their small 
magnitude implies the absence of economic significance as well. Both variables appear 
with an unexpected positive sign in most cases. A possible explanation for this result is 
that these two variables are “more” relevant in the short-run and when studying business 
cycles’ behavior. Since we have controlled for the effect of business cycle fluctuations by 
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averaging our data, there is a chance that the effects of these variables have vanished, 
leaving an insignificant impact on consumption. 
When we turn to the annual data regressions in Tables B12 through B14 of 
Appendix B, we note that in Tables B12 and B14 the POLS and FE estimators show that 
inflation rate has a negative and significant impact on the level of aggregate consumption. 
However, these results are reversed in terms of the sign and level of significance in the 
two GMM-System estimators, with a very small magnitude (almost zero). Tables B13 
and B14 show that unemployment rate appears with a negative coefficient in all 
estimators, except in the POLS estimates of Table B13. The rate of unemployment seems 
to affect the level of aggregate consumption significantly in the POLS and the one-step 
GMM-System estimates. These results confirm our predictions regarding the insignificant 
influence of the business cycle variables on the long-run level of aggregate consumption.  
Concluding Remarks 
As indicated earlier, the purpose of this study is to empirically examine the 
correlation between the VAT and the level of per capita private consumption. Using a 
sample of fifteen EU countries over the period 1961-2000 and the recently developed 
dynamic panel GMM-system estimator, we find that the VAT is negatively correlated 
with the level of aggregate consumption. More specifically, a one percentage point 
increase in the VAT rate leads to about a one percent reduction in the level of per capita 
aggregate consumption, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the results of the sensitivity analysis, 
using various estimators, alternative time units, and additional explanatory variables confirm 
our basic results.  
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Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Future research 
This essay has attempted to expand our understanding of the relationship between 
consumption taxes, in general, and the VAT, in particular, and consumption behavior. 
The first section presented the motivation and the goals of the essay. The second section 
provided a survey of the existing theoretical and empirical literature on this subject, with 
a conclusion that pointed out to what has been done and what is needed.  
In section three, we developed a theoretical framework of consumer spending. 
The model is an extension of the model developed by Ando and Modigliani (1963), in 
which we derived an aggregate consumption function that explicitly incorporates 
consumption taxes as an additional parameter. Furthermore, we provided comparative 
static analysis to isolate the effect of consumption taxes on the level of consumption. We 
found that the effect of an increase in the current consumption tax rate on the level of 
aggregate consumption is theoretically ambiguous due to the presence of two competing 
effects, i.e., the substitution effect and the income effect. 
Section four presented the empirical model to estimate the impact of the VAT on 
consumer spending. The model is considered a first attempt to explicitly include and 
estimate the effects of the VAT on consumption behavior. Unlike almost all previous 
literature which is based on structural models that use single-country, time-series 
approach, we used a panel dataset that includes 15 EU countries and spans the years 
1961-2000. We adopted a reduced form approach which allowed us to include a variety 
of consumption determinants identified in the literature. Our model is estimated using 
estimation methods that allow controlling for endogeneity of the regressors and country 
heterogeneity using internal instruments, i.e., the dynamic panel GMM estimators. Our 
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benchmark results are further confirmed with the results of the sensitivity analysis, using 
various estimators – namely, pooled OLS, two-way fixed effect, and one-step GMM-
System; alternative time units; and additional explanatory variables. Overall, our 
estimation results are satisfactory and pass the Hansen and the serial correlation 
specification tests of the one-step and two-step GMM-System estimators. In particular, 
we found a negative and robust correlation between the VAT rate and the level of per 
capita aggregates household consumption. More specifically, a one percentage point 
increase in the VAT rate leads to about a one percent reduction in the level of per capita 
aggregate consumption, ceteris paribus. 
The results of this study are valuable because they provide us with more precise 
marginal effects, as well as because of its policy implication. Since aggregate 
consumption is an important element in evaluating society’s welfare and it feeds through 
to savings, capital accumulation and growth, which in turn affects future welfare and 
standard of living; policymaker should take into account the potential impact of the VAT 
on households’ consumption decision when designing a VAT-type consumption tax 
proposal, as it seems to influence current and future consumption and welfare. 
While this study serves as a first attempt to provide empirical evidence on the 
relationship between the VAT and consumer spending, there remains much to be done. 
For instance, an interesting extension would be to develop a formal theoretical model of 
consumption behavior that incorporates, along with consumption taxes, other views of 
consumption such as liquidity constraints, uncertainty regarding future income or future 
taxes, and administration and compliance costs. The last view is of significant relevance 
if future research is to be directed to establish the relationship between the VAT and 
  
52
consumer spending in developing countries. Other possibilities include conducting an 
empirical study that compares the effect of the VAT on consumption across developing 
and industrial countries, which is likely to be different, given the limited administrative 
capacity of taxpayers and tax authorities in these countries.  
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Essay Two: Value-Added Taxation, Economic Growth and the Sources of Growth: 
Theory and Evidence 
Introduction 
Economic growth is the basis of increased prosperity in any nation. Investment in 
new capital (both human and physical), the implementation of both new production 
techniques and new products are the foundations of the growth process. Taxation, 
through its effect on the net rates of return to investment, savings, labor supply, the 
expected profitability of research and development, the cost of capital, and the possibility 
of transferring income between household with different consumption-savings patterns, 
can affect what choices are made, and ultimately, the growth rate of the economy.45 
Several empirical papers have tested for the effects of fiscal policy, in general, and taxes, 
in particular, on growth in various ways. Most of these studies found a significant 
negative impact.46  
The recently growing number of proposals for fundamental tax reform in many 
countries including the United States (U.S.) ends up in many cases at proposing a shift 
from the current income tax regime to a broad-based consumption tax regime, such as the 
value-added tax (VAT). The purpose of such a change, as articulated by its proponents, is 
to stimulate economic activity and promote efficiency in resource allocation. Therefore, 
understanding the channels through which such reforms can influence economic growth 
                                                 
45 For a detailed presentation of the theoretical connection between tax policies and the economy’s level of 
income and its endogenous growth rate see Barro (1990), Rebelo (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), 
Pecorino (1993), Xu (1994), Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998), Judd (1999), and Turnovsky (2000), 
among others.  
46 The empirical literature includes Levine and Renelt (1991), Plosser (1992), Engen and Skinner (1992), 
Cashin (1995), Barro (1996), Agell et al. (1997), Leibfritz et al. (1997), Miller and Russek (1997), Kneller 
et al. (1999), Fölster and Henrekson (2000), Myles (2000), and Leach (2003), among others. 
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and its sources, namely capital accumulation and productivity growth is becoming crucial 
for academics and policymakers.  
The principal argument for the consumption tax as growth enhancer is 
straightforward. Proponents of consumption-based taxes argue in its favor because of its 
potentially positive impact on household saving, since savings are exempted from the tax 
base which implies that the after-tax rate of return on savings is higher. More saving 
would lead to: (i) higher investment in physical capital – since the cost of capital is lower 
because consumption-based taxes remove the tax on capital income; (ii) greater 
productivity – if tax reform sufficiently broadens the tax base by eliminating various tax 
preferences, then it might lead to an increase labor supply, and hence productivity, 
because it allows for a reduction in the marginal tax rate on labor income;47 and (iii) more 
output in the long-run.  
While few studies, such as Summers (1981) and more recently Petrucci (2002) 
have looked at the effect of consumption tax on capital accumulation, no study to our 
knowledge has examined its impact on productivity growth. Furthermore, to our 
knowledge no formal argument has been provided to examine in a unified fashion, that 
includes a theoretical treatment as well as an empirical analysis, the potential influence of 
consumption taxes on the sources of growth.  
Therefore, the goals of this study are: (i) to develop a theoretical framework that 
incorporates consumption taxes to assess their impact on per capita physical capital 
growth, per capita productivity growth and overall per capita income growth; (ii) to 
                                                 
47 However, if the reform does not broaden the tax base, then taxes on earnings must climb to maintain the 
same amount of revenues and in that case tax reform might lead to a reduction in labor supply. The reason 
is that the tax base for a consumption tax is smaller than that of an income tax, with saving being the 
difference. 
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empirically test how the VAT, as a broad-based consumption tax, affects growth and its 
sources. In other words, as predicted by most tax reform proposals, does an increase in 
the effective VAT rate lead to: (1) an increase in the economy’s per capita income growth 
rate ?; (2) an increase in the rate of per capita physical capital growth rate ?; and finally, 
(3) an increase in the per capita productivity growth rate ?; and (iii) to develop a 
theoretical framework to explain the observed variation in effective VAT  rates over time 
in our sample by studying the tax design problem.  
This study contributes to the existing literature in several directions. First, it 
provides a formal and unified theoretical framework to address the connection between 
consumption taxes on one hand, and growth and its sources on the other. Second, with the 
observed variation in effective VAT rates over time, the study develops a theoretical 
model, which incorporates both equity and efficiency considerations as they are 
considered important factors determining tax structure, to identify conditions under 
which differential taxation, as well as uniform taxation over time is optimal. Finally, the 
use of the recently developed dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) 
system estimator as our main econometric methodology adds an additional layer of 
originality to the study. If a particular set of assumptions is met, the finite sample 
properties of these estimates are better in the sense that they do not bear biases induced 
by endogeneity, simultaneity, omitted variables, or measurement error, which are typical 
issues to deal with when estimating growth equation using macro-level data. Hence, the 
theoretical piece as well as the empirical evidence of this study is expected to provide 
some guidance and insight for policymakers when considering different tax reform 
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proposals, as they may yield serious long-run consequences with respect to the 
economy’s performance, and hence the future standard of living.   
Our theoretical model relies on Diamond’s (1965) overlapping generation model 
in order to include both efficiency and equity considerations in our analysis as it allows 
for heterogeneity among individuals. The results show that consumption taxes affect 
growth and its sources through the savings channel; nonetheless their net effect is 
theoretically ambiguous and depends on the interaction between utility parameters, 
interest rate, and the tax structure. Furthermore, the results of the tax design problem 
show that if the change in taxes that keeps the economy at the same social welfare level is 
not equal (equal) to the change in taxes that keeps the economy at the same revenue set, 
evaluated at proportional taxation, then differential (uniform) taxation over time is 
optimal.  
With respect to the empirical analysis, we use the same dataset used by Beck et al. 
(2000) and added to that our variable of interest (i.e., the effective VAT Rate), as well as 
the other two tax control variables we employed in the first essay (i.e., total consumption 
tax revenue excluding VAT revenue and total income tax revenue). However, the dataset 
includes only fourteen EU countries and spans over the period 1961-1995.48 We employ 
the same four estimators used in the first essay, namely, pooled OLS, two-way fixed 
effect error component, one-step GMM-system, and two-step GMM-system estimators. 
Our empirical results indicate that the effective VAT rate is positively and significantly 
correlated with growth and capital accumulation. The correlation is found to be robust 
across various estimators and model specifications. However, the VAT appears to have 
                                                 
48 The dataset includes only 14 countries, rather than 15, because data on educational attainment are not 
available for Luxembourg. Furthermore, data on capital accumulation and productivity growth is available 
only up to 1995. 
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an insignificant, though positive, effect on per capita productivity growth. More 
specifically, using the simple conditioning information set, which includes in addition to 
our variable of interest, two other tax control variables, initial income to control for 
convergence, and schooling to control for the level of human capital, we find that a one 
percentage point increase in the VAT rate would lead to a 0.23 percentage point increase 
in the growth rate, and to a 0.28 percentage point increase in the capital growth rate, 
ceteris paribus.   
   The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two surveys the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature on growth and its sources on one hand and 
consumption taxes on the other. Section three presents the theoretical model, and 
provides a treatment for the tax design problem. Section four presents the empirical 
analysis with an emphasis on the empirical strategy which provides an overview of the 
dataset and the empirical specification. The section also discusses the econometric issues, 
the estimation methodology, presents the basic results, as well as the results of the 
sensitivity analysis. Conclusions, policy implications, and possible future research are 
presented in section five.  
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Literature Review 
Introduction 
A substantial number of studies have attempted to develop a theoretical linkage, 
as well as an empirical investigation of the relationship between taxes and economic 
growth. In fact, neoclassical and endogenous growth theories have substantially different 
implications about how changes in certain variables, such as the saving rate, the 
population growth rate, and several government-policy variables, including taxes, affect 
long-term growth rate. In particular, the exogenous growth theory, developed by Ramsey 
(1928), and typified by Solow (1956), Swan (1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965) 
predicts that such changes, while permanently affect the steady-state level of output per 
capita, will alter its growth rate only temporarily during the transition period, and have no 
permanent effect on the economy’s steady-state growth rate.  In contrast, endogenous 
growth theories, pioneered by Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), and Rebelo (1991), among 
others, predict that such changes will permanently change the growth rate of per capita 
output in the long-run.49 
While the link between taxes on one hand and growth and its sources on the other 
occurs through a straightforward channel – taxes reduce private returns to accumulation 
in human and physical capital, which leads to lower growth rates of output, capital, and 
productivity, the empirical literature is inconclusive regarding the magnitude of the 
effect.50 For instance, the recent theoretical contributions of Lucas (1990), Stockey and 
                                                 
49 Since neoclassical growth theories do not provide persuasive answers to the central questions about 
economic growth, this leads us to concentrate on the other group of economic growth theories, i.e., 
endogenous growth theories. 
50 In fact, the magnitude of the influence depends on several factors, such as the degree of labor elasticity, 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in the utility, the rate of depreciation of human and physical 
capital, and factor shares in the production of human capital and physical output. Other factors may include 
the extent of substitutability between physical and human capital in production, the time-horizon of 
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Rebelo (1995), and Hendricks (1999), among others concluded that the growth effects of 
taxes are limited. On the contrary, King and Rebelo (1990), Jones et al. (1993), Razin and 
Yuen (1996), and Yakita (2003), among others concluded that tax policies have moderate 
to large growth effects. 
On the empirical front, even with the substantial number of empirical studies 
exploring the impact of taxation on economic growth, no single conclusive answer has 
been provided on the direction and/or the size of the influence. For instance, the 
contributions of Koester and Kormendi (1989), Barro (1991), Easterly and Rebelo 
(1993), Engen and Skinner (1996), and Padovano and Galli (2001) among others have 
found significant negative effect of the marginal tax rates on the growth rate and/or the 
level of real GDP per capita. In contrast, Levine and Renelt (1992), Slemrod (1995), 
Kneller et al. (1998), and Myles (2000), among many others have concluded that the 
impact of taxation on growth and/or the level of income are either negligible, difficult to 
isolate and measure, not robust, and/or undetermined.   
To summarize, there is a general consensus among most researchers that taxes, at 
least theoretically, have permanent negative real effects on growth rates in an endogenous 
growth model. Nonetheless, there is much controversy regarding the magnitude of the 
effect ranging from zero to as much as eight percentage points.   
The aim of this section is to provide a survey of the literature, placing emphasis 
on the studies that have focused, in particular, on the impact of consumption taxes on 
growth and its sources. The section is divided into three main parts as follows. Part one 
reviews the theoretical literature relating consumption taxes on one hand and growth and 
                                                                                                                                                 
households, the degree of openness in the economy, and uncertainty regarding future rate of return. See 
Myles (2000) for a detailed discussion of these issues.  
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its sources on the other; whereas, part two reviews the empirical literature on the same 
subject. The final part presents the conclusions drawn from the literature review.     
Theoretical Literature on Growth, Sources of Growth and Consumption Taxes 
Most taxation and growth studies examined the consequences of capital and/or 
income taxation on the economy’s growth rate. However, one of the few studies that 
looked at consumption tax and growth is conducted by Turnovsky (1996). He considered 
the role of consumption taxes in enhancing economic growth. The author demonstrated 
that the trade-off between the optimal income tax and consumption tax depends crucially 
on the externalities generated by government expenditures on the returns to capital, 
which in turn depend upon two factors: (1) the level of government expenditure relative 
to its social optimum; and (2) the degree of congestion. He found that an increase in the 
taxation of capital offset by either a reduction in debt or in the consumption tax will 
lower the equilibrium growth rate, yet an increase in the consumption tax which is offset 
by a reduction in debt has no effect on the equilibrium growth rate, but if it is offset by a 
reduction in the taxation of capital it will increase the growth rate. 
Another study by Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) examines the 
macroeconomic effects of consumption and factor income taxation on resource 
allocation, economic growth, and welfare. These effects are studies in the context of 
models in which growth is driven by human and physical capital accumulation. The study 
showed that the effects of labor, capital, and consumption taxes on growth depend on the 
role played by human capital accumulation, technology, and the nature of leisure activity. 
In particular, the authors showed that the elasticity of labor supply plays a crucial role in 
determining the effects of consumption taxes on growth. The results indicate that 
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consumption tax distorts the labor (or education) – leisure decision, and hence it reduces 
the economy’s growth rate. However, it does not affect the capital-labor ratio, and hence 
it does not reduce capital accumulation. Therefore, the authors suggest that a heavier 
reliance on consumption taxes relative to income taxes in the transition to the balanced 
growth path is an appropriate feature of an optimal tax policy plan.         
Finally, Petrucci (2002) explored the consequences of a consumption tax on 
capital formation and economic development by utilizing a simple one-sector endogenous 
growth model with finite horizons. In order to be able to focus exclusively on the effect 
of the consumption tax on the relative price of consumption today and tomorrow, the 
author assumed inelastic labor supply to eliminate the intertemporal consumption-leisure 
distortion brought about by the consumption tax. He found that, in the endogenous 
growth model with new generations continuously entering the economy, consumption 
taxation reduces aggregate consumption and raises savings, stimulating capital 
accumulation and economic growth, under two scenarios. First, when currently living 
consumers are lump-sum rebated for the tax; and second when the increase in the 
consumption tax is accompanied by a reduction in public debt. The author asserts that 
under the first scenario, consumption taxes affect aggregate saving through the 
intergenerational redistribution of income, as young consumers save relatively more than 
old ones, which is carried out by the allocation of tax revenues. Therefore, the positive 
effect of consumption tax on saving and economic growth is due to demographic 
heterogeneity of households. In the second scenario, however, the reduction in public 
debt that accompanies the increase in consumption tax reduces the share of consumption 
in national income, spurs capital accumulation and long-run economic growth as the 
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change in public debt redistributes wealth among generations, while consumption 
taxation per se is neutral. However, if income is not intergenerationally redistributed 
between living generations and generations that are still unborn because the resources 
from taxation were used to finance unproductive public spending, the net effect of 
consumption tax on growth rate would vanish. This result creates a transitional 
adjustment of the economy, in which the short-run effects of consumption taxation on 
real growth and the ratio of private consumption to national income are smaller than the 
long-run outcomes. Ultimately, the author concluded by a policy recommendation which 
supports revenue-neutral tax proposals that seek to reduce output tax in favor of 
expenditure tax, since the latter creates less distortion; and hence, it boosts capital 
accumulation and growth. 
With respect to productivity growth, only few studies have looked at the influence 
of income tax on productivity growth.51 For instance, Nerlove et al. (1990) provide some 
theoretical foundation of the possible channels through which income taxes might affect 
the overall productivity level of the economy. More specifically, the authors showed that 
a comprehensive income tax which is applied to both labor and capital incomes generates 
a bias against investment in human capital relative to investment in physical capital; 
therefore, it has a negative effect on human capital accumulation, and in turn on overall 
productivity level. Moreover, Cassou and Lansing (1998) develop a quantitative 
theoretical model to show that the trend of increasing tax rates in the U.S. economy offers 
a good explanation for the post-1970 productivity slowdown.  
 
                                                 
51 To our knowledge, no formal argument has been provided to show the theoretical or the empirical 
connection between consumption taxes and productivity growth.  
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Empirical Literature on Growth, Sources of Growth and Consumption Taxes 
Few papers examined the empirical correlation between consumption taxes on 
one hand, and growth and its sources on the other. Most of these studies conduct 
numerical simulations; for instance, Pecorino (1994) uses the U.S. economy in 1985 as a 
basis for his benchmark parametrization to facilitate comparison with the results obtained 
by Lucas (1990). The simulation results show that replacing the income tax with a 
consumption tax leads to an increase in the growth rate of the order 1 percent per capita 
per year. 
Mendoza et al. (1997) consider the role of consumption taxes, as well as other 
taxes in altering long-run growth rates. Their model predicts that assumptions regarding 
households’ rate of time preference, the available technologies for physical and human 
capital accumulation, as well as the incidence of income tax play crucial role concerning 
the effects of direct and indirect taxes with respect to growth and capital accumulation. 
Nevertheless, the general result is that income taxes are growth-reducing, while growth 
effects of consumption taxes are ambiguous and depend in particular on the elasticity of 
labor supply. They conduct numerical simulations which supports the Harbergr’s 
supernuetrality conjecture in the light of endogenous growth theory. They showed that a 
10 percentage points change in tax rates result in about 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points 
change in the long-run investment rate, and in about 0.1 to 0.2 of a percentage point 
change in the long-run growth rate of output. In addition, the authors found that 
investment and growth effects of changes in labor income taxes are stronger relative to 
those resulting from changes in capital income and consumption taxes. This result is 
further supported by an empirical estimation in which they employed panel data from 18 
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countries (G7 and 11 OECD countries), over the period 1965 – 1991. The authors found 
that a cut of 10 percentage points in labor and capital income taxes increases investment 
rate by about 1 to 2 percentage points,  whereas an increase of similar magnitude in 
consumption taxes increases the long-run investment rate by about the same magnitude. 
The authors conclude that tax rates are not statistically-significant determinants of 
growth. 
Altig et al. (2001) simulate fundamental tax reform in the U.S. using a large-scale 
dynamic life-cycle computable general equilibrium model. The model compares the 
welfare and macroeconomic effects of transitions to five fundamental alternatives to the 
current U.S. federal income tax, including a proportional income tax, a proportional 
consumption tax, the flat tax, the flat tax with transition relief, and the X tax.52 The 
numerical results show that long-run output increases significantly by replacing the 
current U.S. federal income tax with a proportional consumption tax. In fact, the authors 
found that in the long-run, capital stock exceeds its initial value by 25.4 percent, and 
output would increase eventually by 9.4 percent. However, these gains come at a high 
welfare cost as lower life-time income groups are hurt by the reform. Under a flat tax, the 
welfare of the lower-income individuals is improved but at the expense of lowering the 
increase in the long-run capital stock and output to only 15 and 4.5 percent, respectively. 
Concluding Remarks 
This section has shed light on the current literature on consumption taxes on one 
hand, and growth and its sources on the other. The results of the survey reveal that while 
the existing literature provides a formal treatment of the theoretical connection between 
                                                 
52 All these taxes, except the proportional income tax, are different alternatives of taxing consumption. 
Under the X tax, high-wage earners are placed in a higher tax bracket than low-wage earners. A detailed 
description of these taxes is provided in table (3) on p. 586 of the original paper.   
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consumption taxes and growth, it does not provide an answer for its correlation with the 
sources of growth. Furthermore, the scarcity of empirical literature that addresses the 
same issue using actual data and appropriate econometric techniques is an additional 
indication for the need for a formal and comprehensive treatment of the relationship 
between consumption taxes and growth and its sources both theoretically and empirically.  
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Theoretical Model 
This section develops a theoretical model in which we examine the growth, 
capital accumulation, and productivity growth effects of changes in the consumption tax 
rates in a two-sector endogenous growth model. We tackle the issue by deriving all three 
equations based on Diamond’s (1965) overlapping generation model. As such, the model 
allows us to account for heterogeneity in order to be able to assess both equity and 
efficiency considerations. Furthermore, we expand the analysis by incorporating the tax 
design problem, in order to provide a theoretical framework to explain the observed 
variation in effective VAT rates over time in the EU countries. 
Consumption Taxes and Endogenous Growth in an Overlapping Generation Model 
The model developed in this section is a simplified adaptation of the R&D and 
growth models developed by Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion 
and Howitt (1992). We extend the basic model to incorporate consumption taxes and then 
assess their effects on growth and its sources.  
The economy consists of finitely-lived individuals, competitive firms, and the 
government. The main assumptions are: 
1. Time is discrete. 
2. Each individual lives for two periods only. 
3. Lt individuals are born in period t. 
4. Population grows at rate n, i.e., Lt = (1+n) Lt-1. 
5. Each individual supplies one unit of labor when he or she is young, and divides 
the resulting labor income between first period consumption and saving; in the 
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second period, the individual consumes the saving and any interest he or she 
earns. 
6. We assume a constant-relative-risk-aversion utility.  
Household behavior. The representative consumer maximizes his/her life-time utility 
by choosing the stream of consumption )( 1,2,1 +tt CandC subject to its life-time budget 
constraint, in which he or she takes the paths of interest rate, real wage and taxes as 
given.  
Formally, 
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where: 
c1,t is consumption of young in period t. 
c2,t+1 is consumption of old in period t+1. 
1+tr  is the interest rate. 
tτ  is the consumption tax rate in period t. 
1+tτ is the consumption tax rate in period t+1. 
tt wA  is labor income. 
θ  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.53 
ρ  is the exogenous rate of time preference (discount rate).54 
                                                 
53 The smaller is θ , the more willing the household is to allow its consumption to vary over time.  
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The budget constraint states that the present value of life-time consumption equals 
the present value of life-time labor income.  
The lagrangian function is given by: 
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The first-order conditions of the maximization problem are obtained by differentiating 
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From (36) and (37) we get the following Euler equation:55 
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Substituting (39) into (38) and solving for tc ,1 :  
                                                                                                                                                 
54 If 0>ρ , individuals place greater weight on first-period than second-period consumption, and vice versa. 
The assumption that 1−>ρ ensures positive weight on second-period’s consumption.  
55 Note that if )( 1+= tt ττ , the Euler equation reduces to ( ) ( )θρ
1
1,11,2
11 ++= ++ ttt rcc .  
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Equation (40) shows that the interest rate and the consumption tax rates determine 
the fraction of income the individual consumes in the first period.  
From (39) and (40), we can solve for 12 +tc : 
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Let )( 1,,1 ++ tttrs ττ denote the fraction of income saved, then (40) implies: 
tttttt wArsc )](1[ 1,,1,1 ++−= ττ         (42) 
Substituting for tc ,1  from (40) and solving for ),( 1,1 ++ tttrs ττ we get: 
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The impact of current and future consumption taxes on private savings rate is 
given by equations (44) and (45), respectively: 
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Equation (44) implies that, theoretically, current consumption taxes have an 
ambiguous effect on private savings rate. Indeed, the effect is determined by the 
interaction between utility parameters )( θρ and , the interest rate )( 1+tr and the tax 
structure ( )1+tt ττ (which measures the relative price of consumption today versus 
tomorrow).  
Firms. The production side of the economy is composed of many identical 
competitive firms. There are two sectors in the economy, a goods-producing sector 
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(which is modeled according to equation (46)), and a R&D sector in which additions to 
the stock of knowledge is made (modeled according to equation (47)) as follows: 
10])1([])1[( 1 <<−−= − ααα
tLttKt
LaAKaY    (46) 
),,( 0ALaKaGA tLtKt =         (47) 
where:56 
 Yt is output. 
 Kt is capital. 
 Lt is labor. 
 At is technology. 
 A0 is initial level of knowledge. 
 )1( Ka− is the fraction of capital stock used in producing goods. 
 Ka  is the fraction of capital stock used in R&D. 
 )1( La−  the fraction of labor force used in producing goods. 
 La  the fraction of labor force used in R&D. 
Production function (46) is assumed to have CRS and to satisfy the Inada conditions. 
Divide both sides of (46) by Lt and take logs to obtain: 
ttLKt
akaay ln)1(ln)1(ln)1()1(ln)(ln αααα −++−−+−=    (48) 
where ttt aandky ,, represent output per labor, capital per labor and technology per labor, 
respectively. 
Since we know that: 
                                                 
56 Equation (47) is similar to the one used in Romer (1996) for given levels of knowledge in the initial 
period. 
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The Dynamics of the Economy 
Let )(
k
s denote the fraction of savings devoted to capital accumulation, 
and )( as the fraction of savings devoted to knowledge accumulation. For simplicity, 
suppose these fractions are given such that: 
]1,0[)( 1,,1 ∈= ++ ktttkk whererss ϕττϕ      (50) 
]1,0[)( 1,,1 ∈= ++ atttaa whererss ϕττϕ      (51) 
1=+ ak ϕϕ           (52) 
)( 1,,1 ++=+ tttak rsss ττ         (53)  
where ),( 1,1 ++ tttrs ττ  is defined in equation (43) and refers to overall income devoted to 
savings.  
The equation of motion of (k). The capital stock per unit of labor in period (t+1) 
is given by a fraction )( ks of the amount saved by young individuals in period (t); that is: 
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where )( ks is defined in equation (50). Note that the population growth rate is given 
by
nL
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t
t
+=+ 1
1
1
. Re-write equation (54) as follows: 
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Substituting for )( 1,,1 ++ tttrs ττ from equation (43), the per capita capital accumulation 
equation is given by: 
⎪⎪
⎪
⎭
⎪⎪
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
++
+
+
+−+−+=
−
+
+
+
−
+ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1)1(1
)1( t
t
t
t
t
ttk
t r
r
n
Aw
k
ρτ
ττϕ
θθ
θ
.  (56) 
Since markets are competitive, the following must hold:  
)( 11 ++ ′= tt kfr .          (57) 
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Substituting equation (58) in (56) yields: 
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Note that in equation (59) the evolution of k is determined given its initial value.  
The impact of consumption taxes on per capita physical capital can be assessed 
from equation (59). However, the equation shows that taxes affect per capita capital (and 
per capita productivity as shown below) in the same way as they affect saving. The only 
difference is that the impact is scaled by a constant factor as follows: 
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where ( )
t
s τ∂∂ (.)  and ( )
1
(.) +∂∂ ts τ  are derived in equations (44) and (45). Therefore, 
the impact of consumption taxes on per capita capital accumulation is theoretically 
ambiguous and depends on the interaction between utility parameters, the interest rate 
and the tax structure. 
The equation of motion of (a). The technology per unit of labor in period (t+1) is 
given by a fraction )( as of the amount saved by young individuals in period (t): 
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where )( as is defined in equation (51). Therefore,  
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Substituting for tttt wandrs )( 1,,1 ++ ττ from equations (43) and (58) respectively, the per 
capita productivity equation is given by: 
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Note the close similarity between (59) and (64). 
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Therefore, the impact of consumption taxes on per capita productivity is given by: 
( )
t
tttta
t
t s
n
kfkkfAa τϕτ ∂∂+
′−=∂
∂ + (.)
)1(
)]()([1        (65) 
and, 
( )
1
1
1 (.)
)1(
)]()([
++
+ ∂∂+
′−=∂
∂
t
tttta
t
t s
n
kfkkfAa τϕτ ,      (66) 
where ( )
t
s τ∂∂ (.)  and ( )
1
(.) +∂∂ ts τ  are derived in equations (44) and (45). Therefore, 
the impact of consumption taxes on per capita productivity growth is theoretically 
ambiguous and depends on the interaction between utility parameters, the interest rate 
and the tax structure. 
The impact of consumption taxes on growth. Obviously, the impact of 
consumption taxes on growth feeds through capital accumulation and productivity 
growth. Consider the following: 
By definition, we know that at time (t+1) the following holds: 
ttt kkk −= +1&           (67) 
where: 
 tk is initial endowment of capital. 
 1+tk  is defined in equation (59). 
Divide (35) by tk : 
t
tt
t
t
k
kk
k
k −= +1&           (68) 
Thus, the impact of current and future consumption taxes ),( 1, lyrespectivett +ττ on 
capital accumulation is given by equations (69) and (70): 
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and, 
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⎛
∂
∂
tt
tt
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kk ττ
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,       (70) 
where ( ) ( )
111 +++ ∂∂∂∂ tttt kandk ττ  are given in equations (60) and (61), 
respectively. Equations (69) and (70) indicate that the sign of ( )
ttt
kk τ∂∂ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ &  is the same 
as the sign of ( )
tt
k τ∂∂ + 1 , and the sign of ( )1+⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ∂∂ ttt kk τ&  is the same as the sign 
of ( )
11 ++ ∂∂ ttk τ .   
By similar steps, the impact of consumption taxes )( 1, +tt ττ on productivity growth 
is given by equations (71) and (72):57 
( ) ( )
tt
tt
tt a
a
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∂
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+ 1
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and, 
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∂
∂
tt
tt
tt a
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,       (72) 
where ( ) ( )
111 +++ ∂∂∂∂ tttt aanda ττ are given in equation (65) and (66), respectively. 
Equations (71) and (72) indicate that the sign of ( )
ttt
aa τ∂∂ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ &  is the same as the sign of 
( )
tt
a τ∂∂ +1 , and the sign of ( )1+⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ∂∂ ttt aa τ&  is the same as the sign of ( )11 ++ ∂∂ tta τ .   
                                                 
57 Since by definition, at period (t+1), ttt aaa −= +1& , where ta is initial endowment of technology and 1+ta  
is defined in equation (64). 
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Applying the partial derivatives with respect to )( 1+tt andττ  to equation (49) gives: 
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and,  
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&&&&
represent the effects of present 
and future taxes on capital accumulation and on productivity growth, respectively. These 
expressions are defined in equations (69), (70), (71), and (72), respectively. 
Interpretation of the results. Equations (73) and (74) show the channels through 
which consumptions taxes affect per capita growth. More specifically, these channels are 
given by the effect of taxes on per capita capital accumulation and on per capita 
productivity growth. The interesting issue here is that taxes in this model affect both 
channels, and hence, growth in the same manner. The reason is that the impact of 
consumption taxes on both capital accumulation and productivity growth is mainly 
feeding through their respective impacts on the savings rate. However, equation (44) 
shows that the net effect of these taxes on savings, and hence on growth and its sources is 
theoretically ambiguous. Therefore, while the model provides a framework in which the 
effect of consumption taxes on growth and its sources might be addressed, it does not 
provide a clear-cut answer on the direction of the influence, from a theoretical point of 
view. This by itself provides an incentive for further investigation at the empirical front 
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to get empirical evidence on how these variables react in the real world, if at all, to 
changes in consumption tax rates. 
The Tax Design Problem 
This section aims at studying the government’s tax design problem. While the 
above analysis is sufficient for our purpose in this study as it provides the effects of 
consumption taxes on growth and its sources, we believe a closer look at the 
government’s problem might be interesting. The reason in that belief is that empirical 
stylized facts show variations of effective VAT rates across countries and within each 
country in our sample over time. For illustration purposes, Figures C1 through C30 of 
Appendix C provide a graphical representation of the annual, as well as the averaged 
effective VAT rates over the period 1961-2000 for individual countries. Furthermore, the 
same information is provided in Figures C31 and C32 of Appendix C but for the 
averaged sample (i.e., all countries) at both annual and averaged levels, respectively. The 
figures show variation of effective VAT rate over time and across countries. The 
variation is more volatile with the annual data; nonetheless, it is still present with the 
averaged data. Moreover, the volatility is stronger in recent years from around 1986 to 
2000 with the annual data; however, the pattern for Belgium and Spain show some 
stability of the VAT rate recently (1995-2000) with the averaged data. In fact, using 
annual data over the studied period for the years in which the VAT was introduced, the 
highest rate was implemented in Sweden in 1995 (19.25 percent), whereas the lowest rate 
was applied in Ireland in 1972 (0.43 percent), with a sample variance equal to 17.47.58 
With averaged data, the results are slightly different. For instance, Denmark scored the 
highest rate (17.36 percent), while Luxembourg had the lowest rate (0.19 percent) over 
                                                 
58 The highest variance is equal to 35.93 in Denmark, and the lowest is 2.52 in Spain. 
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the studied period, with a sample variance of 19.08.59 Therefore, we believe that studying 
the tax design problem will enable us to provide rationale for these facts, and to 
understand the reasons behind such variation and pattern of the VAT rates in our sample 
over the studied period. 
In this analysis we follow Barro (1979), in which the government achieves its 
objective function subject to its overall intertemporal budget constraint. Our formulation 
is different though in the sense that Barro’s objective function is to minimize the present 
value of revenue-raising costs, while our objective is to maximize the social welfare 
function (SWF).Therefore, the government’s problem is to maximize SWF, which 
includes utilities of all individuals (young and old) in all periods by choosing current and 
future consumption tax rates, subject to its revenue constraint and given individuals’ 
optimal responses (young and old) in all periods. For simplicity, we abstract from the 
government’s ability to issue public debt.  
The government’s optimization problem is:60 
{ } ),,(, * 1,2,* 1,1*,2*,11 +++ = tttttt CCCCVVMax ττ       (75) 
s.t. 
*
11
*
1, )( +++ +== tttttt CCRR ττττ       (76) 
*
ktC Where { }2,1=k         (77) 
tCCC ttt ∀+= *,2*,1*      (78) 
where: 
Index (1) refers to young. 
                                                 
59 The highest variance is equal to 40.39 in Sweden, and the lowest is 2.11 in Spain. 
60 We employ a (SWF) which includes individuals’ utilities of the form: 
))(...),(( ,2,,1,2,1
1
tt
m
tt CCvCCvVV = . Nevertheless, we use the notation in (75) for simplicity.  
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Index (2) refers to old. 
V is an indirect utility function which represents the life-time SWF. 
*
,1 tC is the optimal consumption of young in period t. 
*
,2 tC is the optimal consumption of old in period t. 
*
1,1 +tC is the optimal consumption of young in period t+1. 
*
1,2 +tC is the optimal consumption of old in period t+1. 
Condition (76) assumes that the overall collected public revenue )(R  is fixed, 
while )( 1, +ttR ττ is a function which reflect the taxes that satisfy the public revenue 
constraint. Condition (77) implies that the government takes into account all individuals’ 
(young and old) optimal responses in all periods. Condition (78) is an aggregate condition 
that must be satisfied in all periods. It implies that aggregate consumption in each period 
is the sum of young individuals’ consumption and old individuals’ consumption.  
The government lagrangian function is then given by: 
][)( * 11
**
1,2,
*
1,1,
*
,2,
*
,1 ++++ −−+= ttttGttttG CCRCCCCVL ττλ     (79) 
The F.O.Cs are:61 
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61 As noted earlier, the (SWF) is a function of individuals’ utilities, that is: 
)),(...),(( ,2,1,2,1
1
tt
m
tt CCvCCvVV = , therefore, the F.O.Cs imply )()()( ,, tihhti CvvVCV ∂∂∂∂=∂∂ .  
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To solve for )( *tτ from (80), let ⎥⎥⎦
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But we know that: ( ) ( )( )( )*****
*
1
1
ttttttt
t
CCC
C
ττττ ∂∂=∂∂ .  
Since ( )( )*****, tttt CCttC ττε τ ∂∂=  where **, ttC τε refers to the elasticity of )( *tC with 
respect to )( *tτ , then: 
( ) **,
*
*
*
ttC
t
tt
t
C
C
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τ
τ =∂∂ .         (83) 
Substituting (83) into (82), yields: 
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Similarly, we can solve for )( * 1+tτ : 
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where
*
1
*
1
, ++ ttC τ
ε  is the elasticity of )( * 1+tC with respect to )( * 1+tτ . 
The elasticity terms ),( ** ttC τε and ),( * 1* 1 ++ ttC τε , as well as the 
terms ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∂∂ +
**
1 tt
CC and ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∂∂ +
*
1
*
tt
CC , are related to efficiency, whereas the 
terms )( τφt and )( 1τφ +t are related to equity.62 The expressions derived in (84) and (85) 
show the trade offs between them. For instance, in equation (84), if )( τφt declines (this 
might be due to an increase in the sensitivity of consumption of the young generation at 
period (t) to taxes in the same period), then the welfare cost of taxes for this generation is 
higher. This gives an incentive for the government to reduce )( tτ . Therefore, the presence 
                                                 
62 More specifically, the terms ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∂∂ +
**
1 tt
CC  and ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+∂∂
*
1
*
tt
CC represent the dynamic inefficiency 
from taxation, whereas the terms )( τφt and )( 1τφ +t include the weights the government places on different 
generations, as explained in the model.  
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of equity concerns (measured by )( τφt ) leads to a reduction in taxes in period (t). If we 
assume that the good consumed in period (t) is inelastic and that the effect of present 
taxes on present consumption is negative (i.e., ),( ** ttC τε < 0, this is the case in which the 
substitution effect dominates the income effect), then efficiency considerations dictate 
that )( tτ should be higher. However, if equity considerations are taken into account, a 
lower )( τφt  will tend to reduce )( tτ , as explained above. This discussion shows the trade 
offs between equity and efficiency.  
We provide graphical illustration of the optimal tax system for different 
assumptions regarding the properties of the SW and the revenue functions. For the 
purpose of illustration, let us assume that the SWF is strictly concave on taxes. Assume 
further that the slope of the welfare level set is negative.63 Regarding the revenue level 
set, we assume that it is quasi-concave on taxes. Therefore, for a given tax structure 
{ })(),( 1RtRt +ττ  such that 0)( ≥∂∂ RtR τ and 0)( 1 ≥∂∂ +RtR τ , which imply 0)( 1 ≤∂∂ + RtRt ττ , the 
slope along the tax revenue level set is negative. Our quasi-concavity assumption also 
ensures that 0)( 21
2 ≥∂∂ + RtRt ττ holds. By these assumptions, the SWF and the tax 
possibility set are downward sloping; therefore, depending on the relative slopes of the 
)(V curve and the )(R curve we can get a wide range of outcomes as illustrated in figures 
A – C: 
In Figure A, we assume that the government places a higher weight on the welfare 
of the current generation such that the slope of the SWF is larger (steeper) relative to the 
slope of the revenue curve. As such, if the economy starts at point A, the government can 
                                                 
63 We acknowledge that strict concavity of the SWF is not a sufficient condition to guarantee that the slope 
is negative due to the ambiguity of the sign and the magnitude of )( ttC τ∂∂ and )( 11 ++ ∂∂ ttC τ .  
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maximize society’s welfare by lowering )( tτ and increasing )( 1+tτ while still maintaining 
its revenue requirement. In this case, the economy moves from point A to point B in 
which differential taxation is optimal as it results in the social welfare optimum and the 
society as a whole is made better off. 
In this context, it is appropriate to note that the introduction of public debt into 
this framework will not affect the main results of the model. Even in the presence of debt, 
lower tax revenues in the present call for higher revenues in the future in order to satisfy 
the government intertemporal budget constraint and the differential tax burdens over time 
which maximizes the social welfare. 
 
Figure A. The slope of the SWF is big relative to the slope of the )(R curve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tτ  45
0 
1+= tt ττ  
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A 
B 
1V  
1+tτ  
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Figure B. The slope of the SWF is small relative to the slope of the )(R curve 
 
Figure B illustrates the opposite case of Figure A. The government in this case is 
assumed to place a higher weight on the welfare of the future generation such that the 
slope of the SWF is smaller (flatter) relative to the slope of the revenue curve. Therefore, 
the social welfare optimum which results in an improvement in society’s welfare can be 
achieved if the government increases )( tτ and lowers )( 1+tτ without altering its revenue 
requirement. Thus, the economy moves from point A to point B which achieves the 
highest level of welfare for the society. Therefore, in these two cases differential taxation 
is optimal as it results in an improvement in society’s welfare.  
Next, we provide a formal analysis of the optimal tax system:  
Let V be the indirect preferences over the tax structure such that: 
),( 1+= ttVV ττ          (86) 
Totally differentiating (86) gives: 
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where: 
V
t
V
τ∂
∂  represents the change in SWF due to marginal change in the tax rate in period t. 
V
tdτ represents the size of the marginal change in tax in period t along the SWF level set V. 
V
tV
t
dV ττ∂
∂ represents the total change in SWF due to change in the tax rate in period t. 
We can re-write (87) as: 
0=∇ VdV τ ,          (88) 
where 
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Furthermore, let the tax possibility set or the tax structure satisfy the following condition: 
),( 1+= ttRR ττ          (90) 
Totally differentiate (90) yields: 
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where: 
R
t
R
τ∂
∂  represents the change in R due to marginal change in the tax rate in period t. 
R
t
dτ  represents the size of the marginal change in tax in period t along the R curve. 
R
tR
t
dR ττ∂
∂ represents the total change in R due to change in the tax rate in period t. 
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Equation (91) can be re-written as: 
0=∇ RdR τ ,          (92) 
where 
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By this, our SWF and revenue constraint have been characterized. The following 
proposition formalizes the notion that the optimal tax system leads to the optimum social 
welfare. The social optimum is characterized by a tangency condition between the 
highest level of welfare and the tax possibility set.  
Proposition (1): Optimality of Differential Taxation 
 If 
1+=≠ tt
RV dd ττττ , then differential taxation across time is optimal.64  
Proof of Proposition (1) 
Recall that 
1+= tt
Vd τττ and 1+= ttRd τττ are defined in (89) and (93), respectively.  
Let τττ == +1tt  
By equation (88) we know that 0=∇ VdV τ , which implies that 
( )( )Vt
V
tV
t
V
t V
Vdd
1
1
+
+ ∂∂
∂∂−= τ
τττ , and by assumption we know that
1+=≠ tt
RV dd ττττ . This 
indicates that one of the following cases must hold: 
                                                 
64 The proposition states that, if at proportional taxation the slopes of the SWF and the R curve are not 
equal, then differential taxation is optimal, as it leads to a tangency point at a higher level of SW. In other 
words, if the change in taxes that keeps the economy at the same SW level set (slope of SWF) is not equal 
to the change in taxes that keeps the economy at the same revenue set (slope of R), evaluated at 
proportional taxation, then differential taxation is optimal. 
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Case (1): 0
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This implies that the slope of the SWF is larger (steeper) relative to the slope of 
the revenue curve. Therefore, for each case satisfying this condition there is a set of taxes 
)( 1 Rand tt ∈′′ +ττ such that )( 1 ττττ >′<′ +tt and which increases SWF. Therefore, 
differential taxation is optimal. 
Similarly, we can analyze case (2) which implies that:  
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The last expression implies that the slope of the SWF is smaller (flatter) relative 
to the slope of the revenue curve. Therefore, for each case satisfying this condition there 
is a set of taxes )( 1 Rand tt ∈′′ +ττ such that )( 1 ττττ <′>′ +tt and which increases SWF. 
Therefore, differential taxation is optimal.      ■ 
Differential taxation is not the only case in the optimal tax structure; in fact, an 
interesting case for discussion is the case in which uniform taxation over time is optimal.  
Formally: 
 
  
89
Proposition (2): Optimality of Uniform Taxation 
 If 
1+== tt
RV dd ττττ , then uniform taxation across time is optimal.65  
This condition means that, if the slopes of the SWF and the R curve are equal at 
proportional or uniform taxation, then uniform taxation over time is optimal. Under this 
condition, the society achieves its optimum welfare level at proportional taxation and any 
move from that point will lead to a welfare loss. In other words, if the change in taxes 
that keeps the economy at the same SW level set (slope of SWF) is equal to the change in 
taxes that keeps the economy at the same revenue set (slope of R), evaluated at 
proportional taxation, then uniform taxation over time is optimal. See Figure C. 
Figure C. Uniform Taxation is Optimal 
 
 
In Figure C, the slopes of the SWF and the revenue curve )(R are equal along the 
45-degree line, which implies that )( 1+= tt ττ  at point A. If all other feasible tax policies 
lie on the lower contour set of the SWF, then point A achieves the highest welfare level 
(given a specific level of government’s revenue), and any move from that point will lead 
                                                 
65 The proof follows easily by following similar steps as shown in proof of proposition (1). 
A
R
0V  450 
tτ  
1+= tt ττ  
1+tτ  
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to a lower level of welfare and the society is made worse-off. Under this condition there 
are no gains from differential taxation and optimality is achieved at proportional taxation.   
Interpretation of the results. The above analysis of the tax design problem shows 
that even in the presence of dynamic inefficiency, there could be overall gains in 
society’s social welfare. By proposing differential taxation over time, the government can 
shift taxes across time depending on the weights it places on different generations’ 
welfare. If intertemporal equity considerations dominate intertemporal inefficiency 
concerns, tax shifting allows for welfare gains for the society which can offset, partially 
or fully, the loss caused by the dynamic inefficiency of the differential tax system. For 
instance, the government could place a higher weight on the current generation, and in 
that case it can lower current taxes which lead to an increase in current generation’s 
welfare. At the same time, lower taxes today imply higher ones in the future - in order to 
maintain the government’s intertemporal balanced budget - which lead to a loss in future 
generation’s welfare. However, with the higher weight placed on current generation’s 
welfare, society as a whole benefits from this type of differential taxation. More 
importantly, this analysis demonstrates that a possible explanation for the existing pattern 
of changing VAT rates across the EU countries might be explained by this kind of policy 
in which the government purposely shift taxes across time depending on the weights it 
places on different generations’ welfare. In other words, as the government takes into 
account both equity and efficiency considerations (not only efficiency considerations), a 
pattern of non-constant tax rates might emerge.  
In contrast, if at proportional taxation, the change in taxes that keeps the economy 
at the same SWF is equal to the change in taxes that maintains the same revenue set, then 
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optimality conditions require uniform taxation over time, as there are no gains from 
differential taxation. In this case, society is at its socially optimum welfare level, and any 
move from proportional taxation will result in welfare loss, as shown in Figure C. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this section we developed a theoretical framework to model the impact of 
consumption taxes on economic growth and its sources. Our results indicate that savings 
is the channel through which consumption taxes affect both capital accumulation and 
productivity growth, and that these effects feed through to overall GDP growth. Indeed, 
our results show that the impact of consumption taxes on the savings rate, and hence on 
economic growth and its sources is theoretically ambiguous as it depends on the 
interaction between the utility parameters, the interest rate and the tax structure.  
Furthermore, our analysis provides a rationale for the observed variation in the 
effective VAT rate over time in our sample. Indeed, we obtained two main results. First, 
we have shown that under certain conditions differential taxation over time is optimal. 
The argument simply goes as follows: if the government takes into account both equity 
and efficiency considerations, then there might be conditions in which it can increase the 
welfare of the society even in the presence of dynamic inefficiency due to differential 
taxation over time. This can be done by shifting the tax burden across generations 
depending on the weights placed by the government on each generation’s welfare. For 
instance, if the government places a higher weight on the current generation, it will tax 
current consumption less heavily relative to future consumption. In this case, society as a 
whole gains by differential taxation as it moves to the socially optimum welfare level, as 
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illustrated in Figure A.66 Accordingly, the results of our model imply that in the presence 
of a differential consumption tax system, intertemporal effects are generated; and these 
effects in turn have influence on savings, and hence on growth and its sources. Second, 
we have derived conditions under which uniform taxation over time is optimal, and 
showed that in this case there are no welfare gains from differential taxation, as 
illustrated in Figure C.  
The inconclusive results of our theoretical model motivate further investigation on 
the empirical front. Moreover, lack of empirical evidence in the existing literature on the 
relationship between consumption taxes on one hand and growth and its sources on the 
other, further stresses the need for a comprehensive empirical analysis to study the effects 
of the VAT on growth and its sources. Therefore, next we move to our empirical analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 The opposite case in which the government places a higher weight on future generation is illustrated in 
Figure B. 
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Empirical Analysis 
Empirical Strategy 
Our primary objective here is to extend the literature by providing a 
comprehensive characterization of the empirical association between the economy’s 
growth rate and its sources on one hand, and the effective VAT rate on the other hand 
using the best available data. To do this, we extend and complement previous work along 
three dimensions.  
First, our study is considered a first attempt to provide empirical evidence on the 
relationship between the VAT rate and capital growth, productivity, and economic 
growth. Second, we adopt a reduced-form approach encompassing a variety of growth 
determinants identified in the literature, rather than adhering to one particular, narrow, 
structural model. Third, we employ a variety of estimation methods but focus our 
attention on estimators that attempt to control for endogeneity, omitted variable bias, 
simultaneity, and measurement error. 
The data. The dataset includes 14 European Union (EU) countries over the period 
1960-1995, where available.67 We use the same dataset used by Beck et al. (2000),68 and 
added to that our variable of interest (i.e., effective VAT rate) and two other tax control 
variables (i.e., consumption tax revenue excluding VAT revenue, and income tax 
revenue).69 We followed the typical exercise and generated five-year averages for all the 
variables for two reasons: (1) to remove the business cycle fluctuation effect, as our 
                                                 
67 Note that Luxembourg is not included in the sample due to lack of data for the three dependent variables 
of interest, as well as some independent variables, such as educational attainment.  
68 The dataset is available online at: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20699078~
pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html   
69 These tax variables are the same ones as those employed in essay one. 
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concern is to address growth related questions; and (2) because our preferred econometric 
technique (i.e., the GMM-System estimator, which is discussed in detail in the first essay) 
is better suited for samples with small number of time observations. As such, we have 
seven observations per country, where available.70   
A complete and detailed discussion of the variables’ definition and sources is 
provided in Table A4 of Appendix A, whereas Table A5 provides descriptive statistics of 
the dataset. The data description shows that the effective VAT rate ranges between zero 
and 16.30 percent with a sample mean of 4.51 percent.71 Denmark achieved the highest 
rate of 16.30 in 1995. Furthermore, the sample mean of our three dependent variables; 
GDP per capita growth rate, capital per capita growth rate, and productivity per capita 
growth rate is 0.03, 0.04, and 0.02 percent, respectively.72  
Our goal is to estimate the impact of the VAT on growth and its sources. Therefore, 
we are interested in three dependent variables; namely economic growth, capital growth, 
and productivity growth, as follows: 
Per capita physical capital growth rate (K-Growth). This is the dependent variable 
corresponding to the first equation concerned with estimating the rate of capital 
accumulation measured by the rate of growth of per capita physical capital. Beck et al. 
(2000) generated this variable by deriving an estimate of the initial level of capital stock 
for each country in 1950 assuming that the capital-output ratio was in steady-state. In 
                                                 
70 Our growth equation includes 96 observations – with two missing observations due to data limitations on 
the VAT in Germany prior to 1971, whereas capital accumulation and productivity growth equations 
include 95 observations – with an additional observation lost due to data limitations on these variables in 
Portugal for the last period (1991-95).   
71 As noted in the first essay, the minimum value is zero because we included observations in years in 
which the VAT was not yet introduced in some countries. If however, we drop the zeros from the sample, 
the number of observations drops from 96 to 69 and in that case the minimum effective VAT rate is 0.25 
percent in 1970 in Belgium.  
72 For further details on data description, see Table A5 of Appendix A. 
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later years, capital stock was computed using the aggregate real investment series from 
the Penn World Tables (5.6) and the perpetual inventory method with an annual 
depreciation rate of 7 percent. 
Per capita productivity growth rate (Prod-Growth). This is the dependent variable 
corresponding to the second equation concerned with estimating the rate of productivity 
growth measured by the rate of growth of per capita productivity. We use the same 
simple measure of productivity as the one used by Beck et al. (2000) and Rioja and Valev 
(2004). This measure is based on a neoclassical production function of the form: 
αα −= 1iiii LKAY          (94) 
where:  
 Y is aggregate output 
 K is physical capital 
 L is labor 
 A is the level of total factor productivity 
 α is capital share in the production, and is assumed to equal 0.3 
For simplicity, Beck et al. (2000) assumed that this aggregate production function 
is the same across countries and over time. The authors computed the per capita 
productivity growth rate based on the following formula:73 
Prod-Growth = Growth – (0.3)*(K-Growth) 
GDP per capita income growth rate (Growth). This is the relevant dependent variable 
for the third equation concerned with estimating the “overall” growth rate of the economy 
measured by the rate of growth of per capita real GDP. 
                                                 
73 After dividing by L, taking logs, and rearranging.  
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Following Beck et al. (2000) and Rioja and Valev (2004), our conditioning 
information set includes initial income per capita, secondary schooling, government size, 
openness to trade, and inflation rate.  The rationale for including each of these variables 
is provided below.  
Major empirical determinants of economic growth, capital accumulation and 
productivity growth. Although latest empirical works have shown that growth is 
associated with a large number of variables, we only include the “key” variables that 
contribute to economic performance and its sources, which are primarily based on our 
theoretical foundations.74 We now proceed into a detailed discussion of the set of 
independent variables: 
Initial real income per capita (Initial Income). This variable is measured by the real 
GDP per capita (constant 1995 $U.S.). Data are taken for the initial year of the relevant 
period. Initial income controls for the convergence effect implied in the standard Solow-
Swan growth theory. Neoclassical growth theory implies that countries with higher initial 
per capita GDP have lower growth rates of GDP, capital accumulation, and productivity; 
therefore, we expect a negative coefficient for this variable in all three equations.  
Educational attainment (Schooling). Our measure of educational attainment is given 
by the average number of years of secondary schooling for population over age 15 years 
old. This variable controls for the level of human capital in the country. Since this 
variable has a positve effect on growth, capital accumulation, and productivity, it should 
                                                 
74 Note that we do not include other variables that have been identified as “important” in explaining growth 
equations, such as corruption, political instability, law and order, revolutions and coups, assassinations, risk 
of expropriation, and bureaucratic efficiency. The reason is that our sample includes only developed 
countries, which allows us to safely assume that those countries have already passed a threshold level for 
these variables; and hence they are “irrelevant” from that perspective. 
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appear with a positive coefficient. The intuition is that higher levels of human capital lead 
to higher levels of efficiency in production and this in turn leads to faster rates of growth 
in the economy.  
Government consumption expenditures (Government size). We use government 
consumption expenditures as a percent of GDP to control for the size of the government 
in the economy. Since government consumption expenditures include expenditures that 
involve distortions of private decisions, these distortions can reflect in slower rates of 
growth. This is because government operations are carried out inefficiently; for instance, 
the government’s regularity process imposes unnecessary burdens and costs on the 
economic system, and many of the fiscal and monetary policies, which are primarily 
conducted by governments, tend to distorts economic incentives and results in poorer 
efficiency of the system. Therefore, larger government size is expected to affect growth 
and its sources negatively. 
Openness (Openness to Trade). We use the sum of exports and imports as a percent 
of GDP to measure for the degree of openness in the economy. Theoretically, growth, 
capital accumulation, and productivity increase with favorable movements in the terms of 
trade because it improves the allocation of resources by enhancing productivity via 
encouraging specialization that would be unprofitable in smaller markets. Therefore, the 
correlation between openness to trade on one hand and economic growth and its sources 
on the other is positive.  
Inflation rate (Inflation). The rate of inflation is considered an indicator of 
macroeconomic stability. It is computed as the log difference in consumer price index 
and is included in all three equations to control for the influence of inflation on growth 
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and its sources. Theoretically, inflation affects growth via several channels: first, the 
uncertainty associated with high and volatile unanticipated inflation leads to lower 
accumulation rates of capital, and it undermines the efficiency with which productive 
factors function. In fact, Feldstein (1996b) and Jones and Manuelli (1993) pointed out 
that this result holds even with fully anticipated inflation given the non-neutralities built 
into most industrialized countries’ tax systems. In addition, it undermines the confidence 
of domestic and foreign investors about the future path of monetary policy. Second, the 
accumulation or investment channel operates through the accumulation of human capital 
and/or investment in R&D. Third, inflation lowers growth through the efficiency channel 
by reducing total factor productivity, since higher level of inflation leads to higher menu 
costs (frequent changes in prices which are costly for firms), decreases consumers’ 
optimal level of cash holdings, jeopardizes the efficient allocation of resources because it 
increases the time allocated and the resources included in gathering price information 
within this price-instable environment, and finally it produces large forecast errors by 
altering the information contents of prices. Therefore, inflation affects growth and its 
sources negatively.  
The effective value-added tax rate (VAT Ratet). This is our variable of interest, which 
is calculated using the formula explained in the first essay.75 We choose to include the 
VAT in all three equations in the form of the effective rate, rather than as a revenue 
measure, for several reasons. First, to achieve consistency and comparability in our 
results, since it is easier to draw conclusions when we use the same measure to capture 
the effect of the VAT when we look at growth and its sources as the one used in 
                                                 
75 Table A4 of Appendix A provides a detailed definition of all the variables employed in the empirical 
analysis.  
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addressing consumption behavior. Second, as explained in essay one, using effective 
VAT rates controls for variations in the VAT statutory rates across EU countries, 
allowing us to make comparisons more easily. Third, as we are interested in the 
intertemporal effect generated by the VAT, a measure of tax rate is more appropriate in 
capturing that effect because we can easily comprehend its effect on relative prices. As 
we explained in essay one, non-constant VAT rates over time generate an intertemporal 
effect that affects the relative prices between consumption and saving. This effect 
translates into favorable effect on saving - of course if the tax increases the relative price 
of current consumption in terms of future consumption (saving) - which plays a key role 
in capital accumulation and hence on productivity growth as well as economic growth. 
Therefore, we would expect higher VAT rates to influence growth and its sources 
positively. However, this is a complicated process in which other forces may reverse our 
results. For instance, one might argue that VAT is still a form of taxation, and therefore it 
has a negative effect on growth (consistently with the current theoretical and empirical 
literature on taxation and growth). Moreover, higher VAT rates may generate a 
disincentive to work, leading to lower levels of productivity, and hence it might, at least 
partially, offset its positive effect on productivity. Finally, it is possible also to have a 
positive effect on capital accumulation, which may not translate into positive effects on 
growth given the integrated nature of this process and the presence of other off-setting 
forces, as described above, which may render the VAT to be ineffective in affecting 
growth. Therefore, there is a wide range of possibilities for the impact of VAT on growth, 
capital accumulation, and productivity growth.    
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Consumption tax revenue excluding VAT revenue (TotConsTax_Vat). The share of 
consumption tax revenue excluding those from the VAT in GDP is included to control for 
the possible impact of other consumption taxes, apart from the VAT, on growth and its 
sources. Taxation and growth theories end up in most cases concluding that taxes 
generate distortions, or deadweight losses to societies.76 Therefore, their impacts on 
growth, capital accumulation, and productivity are negative. However, one might argue, 
like the case with the VAT, that consumption taxes can generate a positive effect on the 
economy’s growth rate and its sources, by altering the relative price of consumption and 
saving. Therefore, the impact of other consumption taxes on growth and its sources is 
theoretically ambiguous. 
Income tax revenue (TotincomeTaxt). We include a measure of income tax revenue as 
a percent of GDP to control for the potential influence of income taxes in our estimated 
equations in order to isolate the effect of the VAT on growth and its sources from other 
taxes. The argument for a potential damaging impact of this tax on growth and its sources 
follows along the same line as that of the consumption tax control variable. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that income taxes, unlike consumption taxes, entail two 
competing effects: the income effect (which tends to increase all periods’ savings) and 
the substitution effect (which tends to lower current period’s savings). Therefore, the net 
effect is uncertain as it depends on which of these two forces dominates.  If, for instance, 
the substitution effect outweighs the income effect, a negative impact on growth and 
capital accumulation is expected. Nonetheless, if the income effect more than offsets the 
                                                 
76 The deadweight loss of taxation is the loss of output which would have not occurred in the absence of the 
tax. It can be viewed also as the loss of economic welfare above and beyond the tax revenues collected. The 
economic welfare loss arises from the disincentive effect of taxation on labor supply and saving. See Leach 
(2003) for more details.. 
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substitution effect, a positive sign is expected. Finally, if the two effects cancel out each 
others, an insignificant impact is a potential candidate.     
Empirical specification. Following the same steps of the first essay, we center our 
discussion on a “benchmark” set of regressors chosen based on theoretical connection 
and analytical relevance. We also examine the role of other growth determinants, such as 
government size, openness to trade, and inflation rate. We follow Beck et al. (2000), and 
Rioja and Valev (2004) and employ two conditioning sets. First, we use the “simple” 
conditioning set, which includes initial level of GDP per capita, average years of 
secondary schooling, our variable of interest (i.e., the effective VAT rate) and the two tax 
control variables discussed above.77 Second, we use the “policy” conditioning set, which 
includes the simple set plus three additional policy variables as discussed earlier (i.e., 
government size, openness to trade, and inflation rate). 
Econometric Issues and Methodology 
Following Caselli et al. (1996), Beck et al. (2000), and Rioja and Valev (2004), 
we are interested in estimating the following general equation with unobserved country-
specific and time-specific effects: 
tititititititi XVATRateyyy ,,,1,1,, )ln()ln()ln( εληβγα +++′++=− −−    (95) 
where: 
)ln()ln( 1,, −− titi yy : represents the growth rate of real GDP per capita, or physical 
capital per capita or productivity per capita. 
 tiX ,  K × 1 vector of observable independent variables. 
β K × 1 vector of parameters. 
                                                 
77 That is, the “Benchmark” specification employs the “simple” conditioning set discussed in the text. 
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 iη  Unobservable country-specific effect 
tλ  Unobservable time-specific effect 
ti,ε  Random disturbance term satisfying the following assumptions: 
storandjiifEandEE sjtititi ≠≠=== /0)(,)(,0)( ,,22,, εεσεε ε  
i = 1, …N,  where N refers to number of cross-sectional units (countries) 
t = 2, …T  Number of time periods (years) 
Note that equation (95) can be re-written as: 
1)ln()1()ln( ,,,1,, <+++′+++= − αεληβγα titititititi XVATRateyy  (96) 
From equation (96), it is clear that (95) is the same as estimating a dynamic 
equation that includes lagged dependent variable as one of the regressors. 
The procedure we adopt here is the same as the one we employed in the first 
essay. We estimate all three equations using the same four estimators used in the first 
essay, namely, Pooled OLS (POLS), two-way fixed effect (FE), one step GMM-system, 
and two-step GMM-system estimators.78 We do not attempt to re-explain our 
methodology or our estimators, as they are explained in detail in the first essay; however, 
we provide reasoning of their appropriateness in the new context of growth and its 
sources. 
Our preferred estimator remains the two-step GMM-system estimator; therefore, 
we focus our discussion around its suitability when estimating the growth equation. 
Indeed, there are quite well-known problems when estimating growth equations. Bond et 
                                                 
78 While we follow Beck et al. (2000), and Rioja and Valev (2004) in using the same econometric 
methodology (dynamic GMM-system) in estimating all three equations, it is also reasonable to think of all 
three equations as being dynamic, and that they share similar properties, such as persistence, short time 
series, endogeneity, measurement error …etc. Therefore, we consider the dynamic GMM-system estimator 
the appropriate econometric method when estimating growth and its sources.  
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al. (2001) pointed out that these problems include omitted variable bias, and endogenous 
and mismeasured explanatory variables. Furthermore, when estimating growth equations, 
we are usually faced by persistent data (e.g., GDP), as well as short series (e.g., a small 
number of time observations), as we attempt to average the data every five-year period in 
order to remove the effect of business cycles. Our preferred GMM-system estimator is 
capable of obtaining moment conditions that continue to be informative even for 
persistent data by making use of an assumption about the initial conditions. Furthermore, 
Bond et al. (2001) argued that simulation results have shown that the required 
assumptions of the GMM-system estimator on the initial conditions are legitimate and 
helpful in our empirical application, as they are in line with standard growth 
frameworks.79 
Estimation Results 
We present the estimation results of each of our equations separately. As 
explained above, in all three equations we rely on the same set of regressors.80  Before 
presenting the results in more detail, we must clarify their interpretation. As discussed in 
the first essay, our dynamic GMM-system estimator is designed to isolate the effect of 
the exogenous component of each of the explanatory variables on per capita capital 
growth, productivity growth, and economic growth. To the extent that our assumptions 
regarding the instruments utilized in the GMM procedure are correct, we isolate the 
causal effects of the explanatory variables on growth and its sources. Therefore, when we 
                                                 
79 For a detailed discussion of the GMM-system, as well as other estimators employed in this analysis, see 
essay one.  
80 While it is appealing to think that there should be a different set of explanatory variables for each of the 
estimated equations, we follow the same literature in which all three equations were estimated using the 
same set of regressors, i.e., Beck et al. (2000), and Rioja and Valev (2004). Furthermore, we identified 
capital accumulation and productivity growth as the sources of growth, and therefore, it is logical to think 
of the same set of regrossers that explain growth to explain its sources as well.   
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point out to the effect of a given variable on capital accumulation, productivity growth, or 
economic growth, we are referring to the correlation between the exogenous component 
of that variable and the dependent variable. 
We turn now to a discussion of the effect of VAT on capital accumulation, 
productivity growth, and economic growth. 
Value-added tax and capital accumulation. We organize our discussion for the 
estimation results of the capital accumulation equation around the benchmark empirical 
specification presented earlier (it is presented in column (4) of Table B15 of Appendix 
B). We note from the results that the specification tests generally support our dynamic 
GMM estimates (as shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table B15). The Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term (p-value = 0.30 and 0.54 for the one-step and two-step 
GMM-System estimators, respectively). Similarly, the tests of serial correlation reject the 
hypothesis that the error term is second-order serially correlated, providing additional 
support to the use of appropriate lags of the explanatory variables as instruments for the 
estimation. 
Basic results. Table B15 of Appendix B reports the results of capital 
accumulation regressions using alternative estimators and utilizing the simple 
conditioning set. Our preferred estimation method uses the two-step GMM-System 
estimator. Therefore, we first discuss the results obtained with this estimator (columns (4) 
of Table B15) and then compare them with those obtained with alternative estimation 
methods.   
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The results show a statistically significant relation between the exogenous 
component of the effective VAT rate and the per capita physical capital accumulation. As 
expected, the direction of the relation is positive, implying that a one percentage point 
increase in the VAT rate would lead to a 0.28 percentage point increase in the capital 
growth rate. The results are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The economic 
weight of the results can be shown by a simple example. For instance, the effective VAT 
rate in Austria increased from the 1985-90 period to the 1991-95 period by about 2.86 
percentage point, which represents the average increase in the VAT rate for most 
countries in our sample. In that case, an exogenous increase in the VAT of the size 
experienced by Austria would yield higher capital growth of 0.8 percentage points.81  
Sensitivity analysis. In order to test for the robustness of the basic results and to 
enlighten their interpretation, we also conduct a sensitivity analysis along two 
dimensions. First, we utilize alternative econometric techniques. Second, we bring in the 
importance of other explanatory variables, by using the policy conditioning set discussed 
earlier.  
Alternative estimators. Table B15 of Appendix B presents results obtained with 
alternative estimation techniques; namely the static OLS estimates using pooled data 
(POLS) which is shown in column (1), the two-way fixed effect estimator (FE), which 
appears in the second column, and finally the one-step GMM-System estimator in 
column (3).82  
                                                 
81 This result follows from (2.86)*(0.0028) = 0.0080, where 0.0028 is the point estimate of the VAT Rate in 
column (4) of Table B15 of Appendix B.   
82 The econometric issues associated with each of these estimators, and the properties of their estimates are 
discussed in detail in the first essay.  
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In many cases, the results obtained with our preferred two-step GMM-System 
estimator are qualitatively similar to those obtained with alternative estimators. All 
estimators yield negative and significant effect (at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels) of 
the (ln) level of initial income although, the coefficients vary in size. Most interestingly, 
the VAT Rate appears with a positive and statistically significant coefficient in all 
estimators, though with varying magnitude and level of significance. All other control 
variables do not show a clear pattern across alternative estimators with respect to their 
sign; however, they are all statistically insignificant.  
Additional explanatory variables. Tables B16 through B19 of Appendix B 
present the sensitivity of the basic results to the inclusion of one or more of the policy 
variables. Generally, the main results do not change much in terms of their sign and 
magnitude by adding government size, openness to trade, and/or inflation rate. In all 
cases, the coefficient of the effective VAT rate is positive and significant. However, the 
policy variables do not show a clear pattern across various estimators with respect to their 
sign. However, the impact of the policy variables on capital growth is statistically 
insignificant for all specifications employing the one-step or the two-step GMM-system 
estimators. This result holds whether the variables are included in the estimation 
separately or simultaneously.  In fact, all policy variables appear with an insignificant 
coefficient in most cases (when included separately), with the exception of government 
size (which is significant in the case of the FE estimator at the 10 percent level) and 
inflation rate (which is significant in the case of POLS estimator at the 10 percent level as 
well). When included simultaneously, the impact of policy variables on capital growth 
changes slightly as openness to trade becomes significant at the 1 percent level in the 
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case if POLS, and at the 10 percent level in the case of FE estimator, whereas 
government size becomes insignificant in the case of FE estimator.   
Value-added tax and productivity growth. The benchmark empirical specification 
of the productivity growth equation is presented in column (4) of Table B20 of Appendix 
B. As in the case of the capital growth equation, the results show that the specification 
tests generally support our dynamic GMM estimates (as shown in columns (3) and (4) of 
Table B20). The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (p-value = 0.21 and 
0.19 for the one-step and two-step GMM-System estimators, respectively). Similarly, the 
tests of serial correlation reject the hypothesis that the error term is second-order serially 
correlated, providing additional support to the use of appropriate lags of the explanatory 
variables as instruments for the estimation. 
Basic results. The estimation results of the productivity growth regressions using 
the simple conditioning set and various estimators are reported in Table B20 of Appendix 
B. The results of the two-step GMM-System estimator show a statistically insignificant 
relation between the exogenous component of the effective VAT rate and productivity 
growth, while the positive sign is still maintained. While the positive sign is consistent 
with our expectations that the increase in the VAT rate leads to an increase in capital 
accumulation and productivity growth through its positive impact on savings, the 
insignificant effect could be attributed to the fact that VAT (as other forms of 
consumption taxes) do distort the labor-leisure decision, resulting in a negative impact of 
the VAT on labor supply, as it would drive down the real wage. In fact, Metcalf (1995) 
pointed out that other than its negative impact on labor supply, the VAT is a distortion-
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free tax.83 Therefore, the positive impact of the VAT on productivity (through the savings 
channel) is partially canceled out with its negative impact on productivity (through the 
labor supply channel) leaving a net outcome of positive and insignificant coefficient. 
Sensitivity analysis. We conduct a sensitivity analysis to test for the robustness of 
our results along the same dimensions as we did for the capital accumulation equation, 
namely, by providing estimation results based on other econometric techniques, and by 
testing for the relevance of other policy explanatory variables as follows:  
Alternative estimators. The estimation results using alternative estimation 
methods, namely POLS, two-way FE, and one-step GMM-System are shown in Table 
B20 of Appendix B, columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. 
The results obtained with the two-step GMM-System estimator are qualitatively 
similar to those obtained with alternative estimators, in this case as well. All estimators 
yield negative and significant effect (at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels) of the (ln) 
level of initial income although, the coefficients vary in size. Most interestingly, the VAT 
Rate appears with a positive but insignificant coefficient in all estimators, though with 
varying magnitude. All other control variables have an insignificant effect on 
productivity growth.  
Additional explanatory variables. Tables B21 through B24 of Appendix B 
present the sensitivity of the core results to the inclusion of one or more of the policy 
variables. Generally, the main results are not sensitive to adding government size, 
openness to trade, and/or inflation rate. In all cases, the coefficients of the effective VAT 
rate are positive and insignificant. However, openness to trade and inflation rate do not 
                                                 
83 Metcalf (1995) argues that the effect of the VAT on labor supply depends on its impact through cross-
price elasticities, and treatment of work-related expenses under the VAT. 
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show a clear pattern with respect to their sign across various estimators, and they do not 
have a significant effect on the rate of productivity growth, with one exception in the case 
of POLS in which inflation is significant at the 1 percent level when included 
simultaneously with other policy variables (column (1) of Table B24). Government size, 
however, appears constantly with a negative sign and insignificant coefficient (except in 
the case of FE, the coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level when included 
separately, and at the 5 percent level when included simultaneously with other variables).   
Value-added tax and economic growth. Column (4) of Table B25 of Appendix B 
presents the basic empirical specification of the growth equation. As in the case of the 
capital growth equation and the productivity growth equation, the results show that the 
specification tests generally support our dynamic GMM estimates (as shown in columns 
(3) and (4) of Table B25). The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (p-value = 
0.14 and 0.29 for the one-step and two-step GMM-System estimators, respectively). 
Similarly, the tests of serial correlation reject the hypothesis that the error term is second-
order serially correlated, providing additional support to the use of appropriate lags of the 
explanatory variables as instruments for the estimation. 
Basic results. Table B25 of Appendix B reports the estimation results of the 
growth regressions using the simple conditioning set and various estimators. The results 
of the two-step GMM-System estimator show a statistically significant relation between 
the exogenous component of the effective VAT rate and the per capita growth rate. The 
direction of the relation is positive, implying that a one percentage point increase in the 
VAT rate would lead to a 0.23 percentage point increase in the growth rate. The results 
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are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The economic weight of the results can 
be shown by a simple example. For instance, the effective VAT rate in Austria increased 
from the 1985-90 period to the 1991-95 period by about 2.86 percentage points, which 
represents the average increase in the VAT rate for most countries in our sample. 
Therefore, the effect of such increase on capital growth would be 0.66.84  
Sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity analysis is conducted along the same 
dimensions as we did for the capital growth and for the productivity growth equations as 
follows:  
Alternative estimators. The results of the sensitivity analysis using the simple 
conditioning set and various estimators are reported in Table B25 of Appendix B. In 
many cases, the results obtained with our preferred two-step GMM-System estimator are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained with alternative estimators. All estimators yield 
negative and significant effect of the (ln) level of initial income although, the coefficients 
vary in size. Most interestingly, the VAT Rate appears with a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient in all estimators, though with varying magnitude and level of 
significance. The educational attainment coefficient is unexpectedly negative; however, it 
is insignificant across various estimators. This could be explained by the fact that almost 
all countries in our sample are developed; hence an additional year of schooling does not 
generate a significant effect on the rate of growth. The two tax control variables are 
consistently insignificant. 
Additional explanatory variables. Tables B26 through B29 of Appendix B 
present the sensitivity of the basic results to the inclusion of one or more of the policy 
                                                 
84 This result follows from:  (2.86)*(0.0023) = 0.0066, where 0.0023 is the point estimate of the VAT Rate 
in column (4) of Table B25 of Appendix B.   
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variables. Generally, the core results do not change by adding government size, openness 
to trade, and/or inflation rate. In all cases, the coefficient of the effective VAT rate is 
positive and significant. However, the policy variables do not show a clear pattern across 
various estimators with respect to their sign, and interestingly, they do not have a 
significant effect on the rate of growth across different estimators. For instance, 
government size and openness to trade seem to have insignificant effects on the rate of 
growth; these results hold whether they are included separately or simultaneously with 
other policy variables. Inflation rate appears with a significant coefficient only in the case 
of POLS estimator when included separately.  
Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this section is to examine the empirical correlation between the 
VAT and capital growth, productivity growth, and economic growth. Furthermore, this 
section evaluates the robustness of the main results across various estimators and 
specifications. After controlling for the potential biases associated with persistence, 
simultaneity, endogeneity, measurement error, omitted variables, and unobserved 
country-specific effects, the results suggest that the effective VAT rate is positively and 
significantly correlated with growth and capital accumulation. The correlation is found to 
be robust in the four estimators employed in the analysis. Regarding productivity growth, 
we find that the VAT has no statistically significant effect on the productivity measure 
used. The potential negative impact of the VAT on labor supply might explain the 
insignificant effect of the VAT on productivity. When the positive and significant effect of 
the VAT on capital accumulation is combined with the absence of an effect on productivity, 
the net effect does appear to influence the overall impact of the VAT on economic growth. 
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Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Future Research 
In this essay, we developed a theoretical framework and an empirical analysis to 
study the impact of the VAT, as a form of taxing consumption, on capital accumulation, 
productivity growth, and overall economic growth. On the theoretical front, we used a 
two-sector endogenous growth model based on Diamond’s (1965) overlapping generation 
model, and found that the impact of consumption taxes on growth and its sources feeds 
mainly through the savings rate, nonetheless, these effects are theoretically ambiguous as 
they depend on the interaction between utility parameters, the interest rate, and the tax 
structure. Furthermore, we provided a theoretical framework in which equity and 
efficiency considerations are important factors determining optimal tax structure, and 
identified conditions under which taxes could be evolving or constant over time.  
Empirically, we examined the impact of the VAT on capital accumulation, 
productivity growth, and economic growth using a panel of 14 EU countries over the 
period 1961-95. To deal with the typical issues that arise when estimating growth 
equations, such as persistence and endogeneity, we employed the recently developed 
dynamic panel GMM-System estimators. We found that the VAT affects the sources of 
growth differently. In particular, we found that it affects physical capital accumulation 
significantly, whereas its influence on productivity growth is statistically insignificant. 
When both effects are combined, the significant effect on capital accumulation seems to 
dominate the absence of an effect on productivity yielding a positive and significant 
effect on overall economic growth. More specifically, we found, using the simple 
conditioning information set, that a one percentage point increase in the VAT rate would 
lead to a 0.23 percentage point increase in the growth rate, and to a 0.28 percentage point 
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increase in the capital growth rate, ceteris paribus. Finally, our main results are robust to 
changes in model specifications and econometric methodologies. 
Several policy implications follow from the main findings of this study. First, if 
the government is to consider both equity and efficiency when designing its tax policy, 
then it may conduct a differential tax policy over time, by shifting taxes across 
generations depending on the weights it places on each generation’s welfare. The results 
of such policy include an improvement in society’s welfare, as it moves to a higher social 
welfare level, and the observed variation in effective VAT rates. Second, since the results 
show that the VAT, as a form of taxing consumption, boosts capital accumulation, and 
hence the economy’s growth rate, policymakers should take into considerations this result 
when designing tax reform proposals that aim at increasing saving and investment 
incentives, and ultimately economic growth. Finally, an important result of this study is 
that productivity is not the most effective channel to influence economic growth through 
the VAT, rather it is capital accumulation. This is important for policymakers to keep in 
mind when designing and/or evaluating the costs and benefits of various tax reform 
proposals. For instance, policymakers may need to focus on the most effective investment 
channels through which the VAT can be used to achieve the highest growth rate of 
capital, and eventually of the economy’s income, rather than wasting their resources on 
channels that mainly affect productivity, as it seems to be less relevant to affect the 
economy’s growth rate via the VAT.  
This study could be extended in several directions. For instance, including income 
taxes in the model might be interesting to examine how the main results may change 
when we make the model more “realistic.” In addition, incorporating administrative and 
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compliance costs may lead to different conclusions that might be of interest theoretically 
and empirically. Moreover, further examination of the differential impact of the VAT on 
the composition of investment both theoretically and empirically would provide more 
clear answers on the most effective investment channels to achieve the highest level of 
capital accumulation and economic growth via the VAT. Finally, extending the analysis 
to developing countries is a straight forward exercise that could be done as data becomes 
available. 
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Appendix A: Data Appendix 
Table A1. Essay One’s Data Sources and Definitions 
Variable Name Source Definition 
Ct Household 
final 
consumption 
expenditure 
(constant 1995 
$U.S.) 
World 
Development 
Indicators CD-
ROM 2004. 
The World 
Bank 
Household final consumption expenditure 
(formerly private consumption) is the 
market value of all goods and services, 
including durable products (such as cars, 
washing machines, and home computers), 
purchased by households. It excludes 
purchases of dwellings but includes imputed 
rent for owner-occupied dwellings. It also 
includes payments and fees to governments 
to obtain permits and licenses. Here, 
household consumption expenditure 
includes the expenditures of nonprofit 
institutions serving households, even when 
reported separately by the country. Data are 
in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. 
Household final consumption expenditure 
per capita (private consumption per capita) 
is calculated using private consumption in 
constant 1995 prices and World Bank 
population estimates. 
Yt Gross 
Domestic 
Product (GDP) 
(constant 1995 
$U.S.) 
World 
Development 
Indicators CD-
ROM 2004. 
The World 
Bank 
GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation 
of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data are in 
constant 1995 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures 
for GDP are converted from domestic 
currencies using 1995 official exchange 
rates. For a few countries where the official 
exchange rate does not reflect the rate 
effectively applied to actual foreign 
exchange transactions, an alternative 
conversion factor is used. GDP per capita is 
gross domestic product (constant 1995 
$U.S.) divided by midyear population. 
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Variable Name Source Definition 
Wt Households
’ wealth – 
proxied by 
financial 
system 
deposits 
(real $U.S.) 
Financial 
Structure and 
Economic 
Development 
Database, the 
World Bank. 
Available 
online at: 
http://www.wor
ldbank.org/rese
arch/projects/fi
nstructure/data
base.htm 
Wealth (financial system deposit) is calculated 
using the following formula: 
Wt = {Financial system deposits as a % of 
GDP*GDP}/100 
Financial system deposits as %GDP is defined as 
demand, time and saving deposits in deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions as a 
share of GDP. Calculated using the following 
deflation method: 
{(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at] 
Where F is demand and time and saving deposits, 
P_e is end-of period consumer price index (CPI), 
and P_a is average annual CPI. 
Wealth per capita is wealth (financial system 
deposits) divided by population.  
Oldt Old 
dependenc
y ratio 
(annual, %) 
World 
Development 
Indicators CD-
ROM 2004. 
The World 
Bank 
Percentage of the total population that is 65 or 
older. Population is based on the de facto 
definition of population, which counts all 
residents regardless of legal status or citizenship - 
except for refugees not permanently settled in the 
country of asylum, who are generally considered 
part of the population of the country of origin. 
TotCons
Tax_VA
Tt 
Total 
consumptio
n taxes 
excluding 
VAT 
(constant 
1995 
$U.S.) 
OECD 
Revenue 
Statistics CD-
ROM 1965-
2001 (2002). 
Also available 
on line at: 
http://thesius.so
urceoecd.org/vl
=2303064/cl=2
7/nw=1/rpsv/ij/
oecdstats/1608
1099/v55n1/s5/
p1 
 
 
Total consumption taxes excluding VAT is 
calculated by subtracting VAT revenues ($U.S.) 
from tax revenues on goods and services ($U.S.). 
The calculated series is deflated by the CPI. 
Taxes on goods and services include all taxes and 
duties levied on the production, extraction, sale, 
transfer, leasing or delivery, of goods, and the 
rendering of services, or in respect of the use of 
goods or permission to use goods or to perform 
activities are included here. It covers: 
a. multi-stage cumulative taxes 
b. general sales taxes – whether levied at 
manufacture/production, wholesale or retail level.    
c. value-added taxes.     d. excises 
e. taxes levied on the import and export of goods.    
f. taxes levied in respect of the use of goods and 
taxes on permission to use goods, or perform 
certain activities 
g. taxes on the extraction, processing or 
production of minerals and other products. 
The per capita version of the series is calculated 
by dividing all consumption taxes excluding VAT 
by population.  
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Variable Name Source Definition 
TotInco
meTaxt 
Total 
income tax 
revenue 
(constant 
1995 
$U.S.) 
OECD 
Revenue 
Statistics CD-
ROM 1965-
2001 (2002). 
Also available 
on line at: 
http://thesius.so
urceoecd.org/vl
=2303064/cl=2
7/nw=1/rpsv/ij/
oecdstats/1608
1099/v55n1/s5/
p1 
Total income tax revenue is calculated by the 
following formula: 
TotincomeTaxt = Taxes on income, profit and 
capital gain ($U.S.) + Taxes on payroll and 
workforce ($U.S.) 
The calculated series is deflated by the CPI. 
Taxes on income, profit and capital gain include 
all taxes levied on the income or profits (i.e. gross 
income minus allowable tax relieves or tax 
deductibles) of individuals and enterprises. Also 
covered are taxes levied on the capital gains of 
individuals and enterprises, and gains from 
gambling. 
Taxes on payroll and workforce include taxes paid 
by employers, employees or the self-employed 
either as a proportion of payroll or as a fixed 
amount per person, and which are not earmarked 
for social security expenditure. 
The per capita version of the series is calculated 
by dividing all income tax revenue by population. 
Inflationt Inflation 
rate 
(consumer 
price, 
annual %) 
World 
Development 
Indicators CD-
ROM 2004. 
The World 
Bank 
Inflation rate as measured by the consumer price 
index reflects the annual percentage change in the 
cost to the average consumer of acquiring a fixed 
basket of goods and services that may be fixed or 
changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The 
Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
URatet Unemploy
ment rate 
(annual %, 
monthly 
averages) 
OECD 
Economic 
Outlook, No. 
75. Also 
available online 
at: 
http://ceres.sou
rceoecd.org/vl=
617395/cl=91/n
w=1/rpsv/ij/oec
dstats/1608115
3/v115n1/s1/p1 
 
Unemployment rate is defined as the ratio 
between the number of unemployed and the total 
labor force.   
Where: Total labor force or currently active 
population comprises all persons who fulfill the 
requirements for inclusion among the employed or 
the unemployed.  
The employed include all persons above a 
specified age who during a specified brief period, 
either one week or one day, were in the following 
categories: 
a. Paid employment: 
1. At work: persons who during the reference 
period performed some work for wage or salary, 
in cash or in kind;  
2. With a job but not at work: persons who, 
having already worked in their present job, were 
temporarily not at work during the reference 
period and have a formal attachment to their job. 
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Variable Name Source Definition 
URatet…
Cont’d. 
Unemployme
nt rate (annual 
%, monthly 
averages) 
OECD 
Economic 
Outlook, No. 
75. Also 
available online 
at: 
http://ceres.sou
rceoecd.org/vl=
617395/cl=91/n
w=1/rpsv/ij/oec
dstats/1608115
3/v115n1/s1/p1 
 
This formal job attachment should be 
determined in the light of national 
circumstances, according to one or more of the 
following criteria: (a) if he continued receipt of 
wage or salary; (b) an assurance of return to 
work following the end of the contingency, or 
an agreement as to the date of return; (c) the 
elapsed duration of absence from the job, 
which, wherever relevant, may be that duration 
for which workers can receive compensation 
benefits without obligations to accept other 
jobs. 
b. Self-employment: 
1. At work: persons who during the reference 
period performed some work for profit or 
family gain, in cash or in kind; 
2. With an enterprise but not at work: persons 
with an enterprise, which may be a business 
enterprise, a farm or a service undertaking, who 
were temporarily not at work during the 
reference period for any specific reason. 
The Unemployed: comprise all persons above a 
specified age, who during the reference period 
were: 
a. Without work, i.e. were not in paid 
employment or self-employment during the 
reference period. 
b. Currently available for work, i.e. were 
available for paid employment or self 
employment during the reference period. 
c. Seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in 
a specified recent period to seek paid 
employment or self-employment. The specific 
steps may include registration at a public or 
private employment exchange; application to 
employers; checking at worksites, farms, 
factory gates, market or other assembly places; 
placing or answering newspaper 
advertisements; seeking assistance of friends or 
relatives; looking for land, building, machinery 
or equipment to establish own enterprise; 
arranging for financial resources; applying for 
permits and licenses, etc. 
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Variable Name Source Definition 
LTRt Long-term 
interest rate 
(annual %, 
average) 
OECD 
Economic 
Outlook, No. 
75. Also 
available online 
at: 
http://ceres.sou
rceoecd.org/vl=
617395/cl=91/n
w=1/rpsv/ij/oec
dstats/1608115
3/v115n1/s1/p1 
Long-term interest rates are averages of daily 
figures with the exception of Denmark (end of 
month rates) and France and Ireland (last Friday 
of the month). These rates measure the yield on 
long-term government bond on the secondary 
market with residual maturity of about 10-years. 
Definitions of long-term interest rates for 
individual countries are as follows:                        
Austria: 10-year government bond yield. 
Source: National Bank of Austria (OeNB).            
Belgium: Government bond yield (more than 5 
years, i.e. yield of government bonds with 
maturities of 6-years and over). Source: 
National Bank of Belgium (BNB).                         
Denmark: 10-year central government bond 
yield. Source: National Bank of Denmark.             
Finland: 10-year government bond yield (bid 
rates for issues with maturities of 10 years). As 
from 1 January 1999, the 10 year yield is based 
on quotations for a fixed rate bullet serial bond 
maturing on 25 April 2009. Source: Bank of 
Finland. France: Public and semi-public sector 
bond yield. Source: Banque de France.                  
Germany: Federal bond yield (outstanding listed 
federal securities with residual maturities of 
over 9 to 10 years). Data refer to unified 
Germany from July 1990 and western Germany 
prior to this date. Only bonds deliverable at the 
DTB (German Financial Futures Exchange) are 
included. Source: Federal Bank of Germany 
(Deutsche Bundesbank).                                        
Greece: 10-year government bond yield. 
Source: Bank of Greece. Ireland: 15-year 
government bond yield. Source: Central Bank of 
Ireland.                                                                    
Italy: 10-year government bond yield (gross 
yields of Treasury bonds traded on the Italian 
Exchange, M.O.T., with a residual maturity of 
10 years). Source: Bank of Italy.                            
Luxembourg: Long term government bond 
yield. Source: Central Bank of Luxembourg.         
Netherlands: 10-year government bond yield. 
Source: Central Bank of Netherlands (De 
Nederlandsche Bank). Portugal: 10-year 
government debt bond yield. Source: Bank of 
Portugal.  
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Variable Name Source Definition 
LTRt… 
Cont’d. 
Long-term 
interest rate 
(annual %, 
average) 
OECD 
Economic 
Outlook, No. 
75. Also 
available 
online at: 
http://ceres.so
urceoecd.org/
vl=617395/cl
=91/nw=1/rps
v/ij/oecdstats/
16081153/v11
5n1/s1/p1 
Spain: Long-term government bond yield 
(weighted average yields of bonds with 
maturities of more than two years, 
weighting the yield each operation by the 
negotiated amount). Source: Bank of Spain.    
Sweden: 10-year government bond yield 
(with the exception of 1994, for which data 
refer to 9-year government bonds. Source: 
Bank of Sweden (Sveriges Riksbank).             
United Kingdom: 10-year government bond 
yield. Source: Bank of England.                      
Euro area: Weighted average of 10-year 
government bond yield in euro area 
countries. 
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Table A2. Essay One’s Five-Year Averaged Data Description 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Country code 120 8 4.338609 1 15 
Years 120 1982.5 11.50447 1965 2000 
Index of countries 120 4.5 2.300895 1 8 
Household final (private) 
consumption (constant 1995 $U.S.) 118 10338.24 4145.464 2195.548 23121.63 
Ln household final (private) 
consumption (constant 1995 $U.S.) 118 9.15193 0.450124 7.693553 10.04757 
GDP (constant 1995 $U.S.) 118 18542.1 8553.299 3220.51 51290.13 
Ln GDP (constant 1995 $U.S.) 118 9.70923 0.512891 8.073872 10.84096 
GDP growth (annual, %) 118 2.935521 1.691256 -1.069395 8.543363 
Household Wealth (Financial System 
Deposits) (constant 1995 $U.S.) 118 14511.41 26631.73 706.7617 249273.1 
Ln household Wealth (Financial 
System Deposits) (constant 1995 
$U.S.) 118 9.122341 0.825936 6.544927 12.3017 
Consumer price index (1995 = 100) 120 53.36258 35.52584 1.966127 118.2865 
Inflation rate (consumer prices - 
annual %) 120 6.398743 4.82418 0.459467 23.26107 
Long-term interest rate (annual %, 
average) 101 9.214368 3.594102 4.662833 25.825 
Effective VAT rate (%) 118 5.391109 4.861607 0 17.36483 
Unemployment rate (annual, %) 118 5.496008 3.871731 0.029847 15.57171 
Population, total 120 2.35E+07 2.46E+07 326200 8.21E+07
Ln population, total 120 16.27745 1.364792 12.69515 18.22303 
Old dependency ratio (annual, %) 120 13.17189 9.267651 0.0567365 55.43018 
Total tax revenue ($U.S.) 120 4229.17 4201.052 75.5 18052.56 
Ln total tax revenue ($U.S.) 120 7.69843 1.288984 4.324132 9.800637 
Taxes on goods and services 
revenue ($U.S.) 120 1261.206 1193.909 33.4 5292.02 
Ln taxes on goods and services 
revenue ($U.S.) 120 6.572065 1.181491 3.508556 8.572324 
VAT revenues ($U.S.) 120 687.2042 734.7876 0 3159.98 
Ln VAT revenues ($U.S.) 91 6.444808 0.942586 4.378846 8.056883 
Total consumption tax revenues 
excluding VAT ($U.S.) 120 572.3795 485.332 33.4 2536.74 
Ln total consumption tax revenues 
excluding VAT ($U.S.) 120 5.984188 0.891196 3.508556 7.838112 
Taxes on income, profit, and 
capital gain ($U.S.) 120 1547.824 1804.589 14.1 9643.26 
Ln taxes on income, profit, and 
capital gain ($U.S.) 120 6.524775 1.484694 2.646175 9.172083 
Payroll tax revenue ($U.S.) 120 51.4105 122.3998 0 709.54 
Ln Payroll tax revenue ($U.S.) 73 3.072156 1.956312 -2.30259 6.562047 
Total income tax revenue ($U.S.) 120 1599.234 1846.315 15.3 9734.64 
Ln total income tax revenue ($U.S.) 120 6.56832 1.4756 2.727853 9.181479 
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Table A3. Essay One’s Annual Data Description  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Country code 600 8 4.324099 1 15 
Years 600 1980.5 11.55303 1961 2000 
Index of countries 600 4.5 2.2932 1 8 
Household final (private) 
consumption (constant 1995 $U.S.) 590 10338.24 4154.774 2095.76 24508.08 
Ln household final (private) 
consumption (constant 1995 $U.S.) 590 9.15193 0.451205 7.647671 10.10676 
GDP (constant 1995 $U.S.) 590 18542.1 8579.418 2867.823 58464.23 
Ln GDP (constant 1995 $U.S.) 590 9.70923 0.513626 7.961308 10.97617 
GDP growth (annual, %) 589 2.93726 2.653008 -7.913779 11.56584 
Household Wealth (Financial 
System Deposits) (constant 1995 
$U.S.) 578 13103.88 23954.95 535.5781 434236.8 
Ln household Wealth (Financial 
System Deposits) (constant 1995 
$U.S.) 578 9.087622 0.796726 6.283347 12.98135 
Consumer price index (1995 = 100) 600 53.36258 35.65954 1.862684 126.6441 
Inflation rate (consumer prices - 
annual %) 600 6.398743 5.379519 -0.7078 28.78333 
Long-term interest rate (annual %, 
average) 493 9.222836 3.814909 4.179167 29.74167 
Effective VAT rate (%) 590 5.391109 4.92727 0 19.24977 
Unemployment rate (annual, %) 579 5.584017 3.981099 0.014991 18.43692 
Population, total 600 2.35E+07 2.45E+07 319000 8.22E+07
Ln population, total 600 16.27745 1.360256 12.67295 18.22479 
Old dependency ratio (annual, %) 600 13.17189 9.307893 0.0566084 56.68504 
Total tax revenue ($U.S.) 540 4645.98 4273.548 75.5 18689.2 
Ln total tax revenue ($U.S.) 540 7.890855 1.197407 4.324132 9.835701 
Taxes on goods and services 
revenue ($U.S.) 540 1382.357 1212.075 33.4 5659.6 
Ln taxes on goods and services 
revenue ($U.S.) 540 6.748348 1.100159 3.508556 8.641109 
VAT revenues ($U.S.) 600 687.2042 742.5798 0 3386.5 
Ln VAT revenues ($U.S.) 422 6.567667 0.875858 3.273364 8.127552 
Total consumption tax revenues 
excluding VAT ($U.S.) 540 618.7965 496.2563 33.4 2731.8 
Ln total consumption tax revenues 
excluding VAT ($U.S.) 540 6.104857 0.845762 3.508556 7.912716 
Taxes on income, profit, and 
capital gain ($U.S.) 540 1701.493 1857.252 14.1 10492.8 
Ln taxes on income, profit, and 
capital gain ($U.S.) 540 6.728721 1.390647 2.646175 9.258445 
Payroll tax revenue ($U.S.) 540 56.32722 131.9931 0 1074.6 
Ln Payroll tax revenue ($U.S.) 296 3.495247 1.732126 -2.30259 6.979704 
Total income tax revenue ($U.S.) 540 1757.821 1898.946 15.3 10567.5 
Ln total income tax revenue 
($U.S.) 540 6.771208 1.381647 2.727853 9.265538 
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Table A4. Essay Two’s Data Sources and Definitions 
Variable Name Source Definition 
growth GDP per 
capita 
growth 
(annual, %) 
Levine-Loayza-
Beck Dataset on 
Finance and the 
Sources of 
Growth (2000) 
Growth rate of real per capita GDP. 
K-Growth Growth 
rate of 
physical 
capital per 
capita 
(annual, %) 
Levine-Loayza-
Beck Dataset on 
Finance and the 
Sources of 
Growth (2000) 
Beck et al. (2000) computed capital growth 
rate by deriving an estimate of the initial level 
of capital stock for each country in 1950 
assuming that the capital-output ratio was in 
steady-state. In later years, capital stock was 
computed using the aggregate real investment 
series from the Penn World Tables (5.6) and 
the perpetual inventory method with an 
annual depreciation rate of 7%.  
Prod-
Growth 
Productivit
y per capita 
growth 
(annual, %) 
Levine-Loayza-
Beck Dataset on 
Finance and the 
Sources of 
Growth (2000) 
Productivity growth rate is defined as the rate 
of growth of the “residual” (after capital and 
labor growth rates are accounted for). It is 
computed using the following formula: 
Productivity growth rate = Real per capita 
growth rate – (0.3)*(Capital growth rate) 
Initial 
income 
Initial per 
capita 
income 
(constant 
1995 $U.S.) 
Levine-Loayza-
Beck Dataset on 
Finance and the 
Sources of 
Growth (2000) 
Data of real per capita GDP are taken for the 
initial year of the period. 
Schooling Secondary 
schooling  
Levine-Loayza-
Beck Dataset on 
Finance and the 
Sources of 
Growth (2000) 
Average number of years of secondary 
schooling in total population over 15 years 
old. 
Governmen
t size 
Governmen
t size (as a 
share of 
GDP) 
Levine-Loayza-
Beck Dataset on 
Finance and the 
Sources of 
Growth (2000) 
Real government consumption expenditures 
as a share of real GDP. 
Openness 
to Trade  
Openness 
to trade (as 
a share of 
GDP)   
Levine-Loayza-
Beck Dataset on 
Finance and the 
Sources of 
Growth (2000) 
The sum of real exports and real imports of 
goods and non-financial services as a share of 
real GDP. 
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Variable Name Source Definition 
Inflation Inflation 
rate 
(annual, %) 
Levine-Loayza-
Beck Dataset on 
Finance and the 
Sources of 
Growth (2000) 
Inflation rates are calculated by log 
differencing average annual CPI (consumer 
price index) data from the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), line 64. 
VAT Rate Effective 
Value-
Added Tax 
rate 
(annual, %) 
OECD Revenue 
Statistics CD-
ROM 1965-2001 
(2002) and World 
Development 
Indicators CD-
ROM 2004. 
The World Bank 
We use the same measure of VAT Rate as the 
one used in the first essay. More specifically, 
the following formula is used to compute the 
effective VAT Rate: 
VATRate = {VAT Revenue (constant 1995 
$U.S.)/Total Household (private) final 
consumption Expenditures (constant 1995 
$U.S.)}*(100) 
For more details about the definition of VAT 
revenue, as well as household final 
consumption expenditures see Table A1. 
TotIncome
Tax 
Total 
income tax 
revenue (as 
a share of 
GDP) 
OECD Revenue 
Statistics CD-
ROM 1965-2001 
(2002). Also 
available on line 
at: 
http://thesius.sour
ceoecd.org/vl=23
03064/cl=27/nw=
1/rpsv/ij/oecdstat
s/16081099/v55n
1/s5/p1 
We use the same measure of total income tax 
revenue as the one used in the first essay. 
However, it is included as a % of GDP rather 
than a per capita measure. More specifically, 
the following formula is used to compute this 
tax measure: 
TotincomeTax = Taxes on income, profit and 
capital gain ($U.S.) + Taxes on payroll and 
workforce ($U.S.) 
The calculated series is deflated by the CPI. 
For more details about the definition of 
income, profit and capital gain taxes, as well 
as payroll taxes, see Table A1.  
TotConsTa
x_VAT 
Total 
consumptio
n tax 
revenues 
excluding 
VAT (as a 
share of 
GDP) 
OECD Revenue 
Statistics CD-
ROM 1965-2001 
(2002). Also 
available on line 
at: 
http://thesius.sour
ceoecd.org/vl=23
03064/cl=27/nw=
1/rpsv/ij/oecdstat
s/16081099/v55n
1/s5/p1 
We use the same measure of total 
consumption tax revenue excluding VAT 
revenue as the one used in the first essay. 
However, it is included as a % of GDP rather 
than a per capita measure. More specifically, 
the following formula is used to compute this 
tax measure: 
TotConsTax_VAT= tax revenues on goods 
and services ($U.S.) 
- VAT revenues ($U.S.) 
The calculated series is deflated by the CPI. 
For more details about the definition of taxes 
on goods and services, as well as VAT 
revenues, see Table A1.    
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Table A5. Essay Two’s Data Description 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita growth (annual, %) 98 .0272449 .0157808 -.01 .07 
Capital per capita growth (annual, %) 97 .0360825 .0217254 -.01 .1 
Productivity per capita growth 
(annual, %) 
97 .0171134 .0128257 -.02 .05 
Initial per capita income (constant 
1995 $U.S.) 
98 8973.053 4111.321 1377.04 18981.5 
Secondary schooling (average 
number of years in total population 
over 15) 
98 1.650408 .8827942 .25 3.98 
Government size (as a share of GDP) 98 .1782653 .0433643 .08 .28 
Openness to trade (as a share of 
GDP)   
98 .5596939 .2725461 .15 1.58 
Inflation rate (annual, %) 98 .0683673 .0448984 .01 .21 
Effective VAT rate (annual, %) 96 4.513227 4.416283 0 16.29806
Total income tax revenue (as a share 
of GDP) 
98 12.0649 5.970669 2 29.5 
Total consumption tax revenues 
excluding VAT (as a share of GDP) 
98 6.989082 2.740393 3.356 14.75 
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Appendix B: Results Appendix 
Table B1. Private Consumption Function: Alternative Estimators (Core Model), five-year 
averaged data (1961-2000), (Dependent variable: per capita household final 
consumption): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct 
VATRatet -0.0041* -0.0063*** -0.0097*** -0.0111*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
Ln Ct-1 0.5471*** 0.3283*** 0.3599** 0.3694* 
 (0.0622) (0.0603) (0.1268) (0.1884) 
Ln Yt 0.3172*** 0.5639*** 0.4211*** 0.4464** 
 (0.0509) (0.0748) (0.1228) (0.1665) 
Growth Y 0.0048 0.0089*** 0.0073 0.0082* 
 (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0046) (0.0044) 
Ln Wt 0.0129 0.0421** 0.0578 0.0537 
 (0.0119) (0.0187) (0.0600) (0.0692) 
LTRt -0.0043** -0.0044** -0.0075** -0.0084** 
 (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0031) 
Oldt 0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0010 
 (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0031) (0.0056) 
Ln TotConsTax_VATt 0.0070 -0.0200 0.0004 0.0003 
 (0.0132) (0.0199) (0.0239) (0.0342) 
Ln TotIncomeTaxt 0.0087 0.0235 0.0427** 0.0388 
 (0.0113) (0.0182) (0.0193) (0.0236) 
Constant 0.9605*** 0.3490 1.1220* 0.8628 
 (0.2286) (0.5538) (0.5667) (0.5855) 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
Number of countries  15 15 15 
Hansen Test (p-value)a   0.49 0.49 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation (p-value)b 
  0.69 0.72 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B2. Private Consumption Function: Alternative Estimators (Sensitivity Result), 
five-year averaged data (1961-2000), (Dependent variable: per capita household final 
consumption): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct 
VATRatet -0.0039* -0.0054** -0.0099*** -0.0102*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0024) 
Ln Ct-1 0.5298*** 0.3055*** 0.4455*** 0.4580*** 
 (0.0536) (0.0628) (0.1059) (0.1164) 
Ln Yt 0.3128*** 0.5619*** 0.3340** 0.3070** 
 (0.0442) (0.0787) (0.1317) (0.1251) 
Growth Y     
     
Ln Wt 0.0222* 0.0488** 0.0777*** 0.0821** 
 (0.0118) (0.0195) (0.0256) (0.0280) 
LTRt -0.0041** -0.0038* -0.0073*** -0.0066*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
Oldt     
     
Ln TotConsTax_VATt 0.0022 -0.0196 -0.0028 0.0048 
 (0.0135) (0.0209) (0.0259) (0.0187) 
Ln TotInxomeTaxt 0.0114 0.0248 0.0363 0.0334 
 (0.0105) (0.0191) (0.0305) (0.0261) 
Constant 1.1031*** 0.5040 1.0681 1.1460 
 (0.2430) (0.5781) (1.0005) (0.8591) 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
Number of countries  15 15 15 
Hansen Test (p-value)a   0.75 0.75 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)b 
  0.90 0.90 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B3. Private Consumption Function: Alternative Estimators (Sensitivity Result), 
five-year averaged data (1961-2000), (Dependent variable: per capita household final 
consumption): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct 
VATRatet -0.0039* -0.0060*** -0.0095* -0.0094*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0045) (0.0013) 
Ln Ct-1 0.5545*** 0.3437*** 0.4119** 0.4049** 
 (0.0537) (0.0605) (0.1600) (0.1533) 
Ln Yt 0.2919*** 0.5760*** 0.3391*** 0.3245* 
 (0.0460) (0.0792) (0.1072) (0.1797) 
Growth Y 0.0038 0.0091*** 0.0012 0.0021 
 (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0046) 
Ln Wt 0.0206* 0.0286 0.1081** 0.0844** 
 (0.0117) (0.0183) (0.0427) (0.0315) 
LTRt -0.0041** -0.0045** -0.0063*** -0.0062** 
 (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0023) 
Oldt     
     
Ln TotConsTax_VATt 0.0009 -0.0228 -0.0024 0.0004 
 (0.0137) (0.0201) (0.0315) (0.0153) 
Ln TotInxomeTaxt 0.0147 0.0198 0.0306 0.0432** 
 (0.0109) (0.0189) (0.0401) (0.0181) 
Constant 1.0730*** 0.2554 1.0615 1.3848** 
 (0.2391) (0.5839) (1.0932) (0.5849) 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
Number of countries  15 15 15 
Hansen Test (p-value)a   0.55 0.69 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)b 
  0.43 0.81 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B4. Private Consumption Function: Alternative Estimators (Sensitivity Result), 
five-year averaged data (1961-2000), (Dependent variable: per capita household final 
consumption): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct 
VATRatet -0.0040** -0.0055** -0.0085* -0.0068** 
 (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0044) (0.0031) 
Ln Ct-1 0.5015*** 0.3049*** 0.3668** 0.3616* 
 (0.0651) (0.0634) (0.1670) (0.1710) 
Ln Yt 0.3496*** 0.5623*** 0.3589*** 0.3353** 
 (0.0502) (0.0793) (0.0994) (0.1354) 
Growth Y     
     
Ln Wt 0.0206 0.0485** 0.1069** 0.0730 
 (0.0126) (0.0197) (0.0455) (0.0559) 
LTRt -0.0043** -0.0038* -0.0056** -0.0056* 
 (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0027) 
Oldt 0.0009 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.0037 
 (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0045) 
Ln TotConsTax_VATt 0.0076 -0.0196 -0.0052 -0.0193 
 (0.0130) (0.0211) (0.0380) (0.0274) 
Ln TotInxomeTaxt 0.0047 0.0249 0.0339 0.0620* 
 (0.0106) (0.0193) (0.0458) (0.0298) 
Constant 1.0225*** 0.5115 1.2671 1.8028* 
 (0.2350) (0.5840) (1.1376) (0.9833) 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
Number of countries  15 15 15 
Hansen Test (p-value)a   0.69 0.56 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)b 
  0.49 0.14 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B5. Private Consumption Function: Alternative Estimators (Sensitivity Result), 
five-year averaged data (1961-2000), (Dependent variable: per capita household final 
consumption): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct 
VATRatet -0.0041* -0.0063*** -0.0079* -0.0069** 
 (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0043) (0.0028) 
Ln Ct-1 0.5470*** 0.3375*** 0.3564** 0.3455* 
 (0.0625) (0.0740) (0.1465) (0.1930) 
Ln Yt 0.3170*** 0.6353*** 0.3844** 0.4589** 
 (0.0511) (0.0704) (0.1603) (0.1710) 
Growth Y 0.0048 0.0097*** 0.0104 0.0144** 
 (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0082) (0.0065) 
Ln Wt 0.0131 0.0126 0.0556 0.0207 
 (0.0114) (0.0215) (0.0823) (0.0663) 
LTRt -0.0042 -0.0050** -0.0102*** -0.0121*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0020) 
Oldt 0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0042 -0.0046 
 (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0038) 
Inflationt -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0028 0.0057 
 (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0052) (0.0033) 
U Ratet     
     
Ln TotConsTax_VATt 0.0069 -0.0206 -0.0348 -0.0192 
 (0.0133) (0.0211) (0.0361) (0.0316) 
Ln TotInxomeTaxt 0.0085 0.0108 0.0761*** 0.0623** 
 (0.0121) (0.0193) (0.0249) (0.0223) 
Constant 0.9629*** -0.0565 1.5531* 1.2132 
 (0.2161) (0.5668) (0.7884) (0.9085) 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
Number of countries  15 15 15 
Hansen Test (p-value)a   0.66 0.66 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)b 
  0.41 0.28 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B6. Private Consumption Function: Alternative Estimators (Sensitivity Result), 
five-year averaged data (1961-2000), (Dependent variable: per capita household final 
consumption): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct 
VATRatet -0.0050** -0.0061** -0.0112** -0.0114*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0043) (0.0036) 
Ln Ct-1 0.5499*** 0.3457*** 0.4478** 0.4358* 
 (0.0636) (0.0790) (0.1755) (0.2415) 
Ln Yt 0.3368*** 0.6165*** 0.3959*** 0.3850* 
 (0.0547) (0.0941) (0.0895) (0.1993) 
Growth Y 0.0056* 0.0095*** 0.0093 0.0080 
 (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0082) (0.0113) 
Ln Wt 0.0159 0.0129 0.0683 0.0588 
 (0.0123) (0.0213) (0.0655) (0.1171) 
LTRt -0.0041** -0.0051** -0.0082*** -0.0089** 
 (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0037) 
Oldt 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0036 -0.0056 
 (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0044) (0.0081) 
Inflationt     
     
U Ratet 0.0028* -0.0007 0.0046 0.0028 
 (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0071) (0.0060) 
Ln TotConsTax_VATt -0.0009 -0.0200 -0.0506 -0.0349 
 (0.0133) (0.0211) (0.0561) (0.0763) 
Ln TotInxomeTaxt 0.0049 0.0128 0.0548** 0.0603 
 (0.0116) (0.0195) (0.0220) (0.0643) 
Constant 0.7759*** 0.0355 0.7280 0.9374 
 (0.2492) (0.6388) (0.9669) (1.4607) 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
Number of countries  15 15 15 
Hansen Test (p-value)a   0.55 0.55 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)b 
  0.52 0.54 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B7. Private Consumption Function: Alternative Estimators (Sensitivity Result), 
five-year averaged data (1961-2000), (Dependent variable: per capita household final 
consumption): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct 
VATRatet -0.0050** -0.0061** -0.0079** -0.0074*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0021) 
Ln Ct-1 0.5506*** 0.3463*** 0.2785* 0.3012* 
 (0.0629) (0.0799) (0.1451) (0.1443) 
Ln Yt 0.3377*** 0.6159*** 0.4922*** 0.4258*** 
 (0.0558) (0.0952) (0.0872) (0.1365) 
Growth Y 0.0056* 0.0095*** 0.0070 0.0066 
 (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0061) (0.0044) 
Ln Wt 0.0154 0.0133 0.0458 0.0399 
 (0.0117) (0.0218) (0.0640) (0.0534) 
LTRt -0.0045* -0.0049** -0.0076*** -0.0081*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0022) 
Oldt 0.0008 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0010 
 (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0039) (0.0010) 
Inflationt 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0020 0.0027 
 (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0017) 
U Ratet 0.0029* -0.0008 0.0013 0.0026 
 (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0050) (0.0034) 
Ln TotConsTax_VATt -0.0008 -0.0198 -0.0055 -0.0160 
 (0.0133) (0.0214) (0.0439) (0.0396) 
Ln TotInxomeTaxt 0.0053 0.0124 0.0487 0.0640 
 (0.0123) (0.0202) (0.0289) (0.0394) 
Constant 0.7615*** 0.0347 1.2310 1.6640 
 (0.2297) (0.6442) (0.8495) (0.9461) 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
Number of countries  15 15 15 
Hansen Test (p-value)a   0.42 0.37 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)b 
  0.69 0.30 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
 
 
 
  
133
Table B8. Private Consumption Function: Alternative Estimators (Core Model), annual 
data (1961-2000), (Dependent variable: per capita household final consumption): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct 
VATRatet -0.0007* -0.0013* -0.0021** -0.0015* 
 (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) 
Ln Ct-1 0.8836*** 0.7900*** 0.5562*** 0.4389*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0226) (0.0807) (0.1268) 
Ln Yt 0.0797*** 0.1909*** 0.2773*** 0.3511*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0275) (0.0580) (0.1091) 
Growth Y 0.0028*** 0.0031*** 0.0024*** 0.0029*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009) 
Ln Wt 0.0088*** 0.0075* 0.0265 0.0183 
 (0.0026) (0.0045) (0.0182) (0.0222) 
LTRt -0.0014*** -0.0018*** -0.0010** -0.0019** 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) 
Oldt 0.0003*** -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0009 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0009) 
Ln TotConsTax_VATt 0.0026 -0.0091* -0.0118 -0.0384* 
 (0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0118) (0.0196) 
Ln TotIncomeTaxt 0.0005 0.0081* 0.0362*** 0.0668*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0046) (0.0119) (0.0180) 
Constant 0.2193*** 0.0274 0.9797** 1.3893*** 
 (0.0451) (0.1637) (0.3443) (0.3541) 
Observations 445 445 445 445 
Number of countries  15 15 15 
Hansen Test (p-value)a   1.00 1.00 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)b 
  0.29 0.12 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B9. Private Consumption Function: Alternative Estimator (Sensitivity Result), 
annual data (1961-2000), (Dependent variable: per capita household final consumption): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct 
VATRatet -0.0009* -0.0016* -0.0028* -0.0057* 
 (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0029) 
Ln Ct-1 0.8891*** 0.7526*** 0.4038*** 0.5569** 
 (0.0142) (0.0222) (0.0901) (0.1932) 
Ln Yt 0.0638*** 0.2510*** 0.3653*** 0.5115** 
 (0.0123) (0.0259) (0.0648) (0.2067) 
Growth Y     
     
Ln Wt 0.0073*** 0.0077 0.0332 -0.0994 
 (0.0023) (0.0047) (0.0199) (0.0916) 
LTRt -0.0017*** -0.0022*** -0.0016*** -0.0014 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
Oldt     
     
Ln TotConsTax_VATt 0.0003 -0.0126** -0.0028 0.0277 
 (0.0033) (0.0052) (0.0173) (0.0340) 
Ln TotIncomeTaxt 0.0035 0.0066 0.0427*** 0.0248** 
 (0.0025) (0.0048) (0.0070) (0.0107) 
Constant 0.3488*** -0.1641 1.3931*** -0.2921 
 (0.0492) (0.1651) (0.3237) (0.9459) 
Observations 445 445 445 445 
Number of countries  15 15 15 
Hansen Test (p-value)a   1.00 1.00 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation (p-value)b 
  0.23 0.27 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B10. Private Consumption Function: Alternative Estimator (Sensitivity Result), 
annual data (1961-2000), (Dependent variable: per capita household final consumption): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct 
VATRatet -0.0008* -0.0014* -0.0017** -0.0026*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Ln Ct-1 0.9192*** 0.7821*** 0.6599*** 0.6425*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0229) (0.0530) (0.0907) 
Ln Yt 0.0427*** 0.1917*** 0.1970*** 0.2267*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0268) (0.0524) (0.0660) 
Growth Y 0.0024*** 0.0030*** 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Ln Wt 0.0048** 0.0119** 0.0247** 0.0109 
 (0.0023) (0.0047) (0.0084) (0.0120) 
LTRt -0.0015*** -0.0018*** -0.0010*** -0.0022*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Oldt     
     
Ln TotConsTax_VATt -0.0000 -0.0083 -0.0211** -0.0137 
 (0.0034) (0.0051) (0.0094) (0.0135) 
Ln TotIncomeTaxt 0.0041 0.0092** 0.0411*** 0.0402** 
 (0.0026) (0.0046) (0.0084) (0.0147) 
Constant 0.2910*** 0.0411 0.8558*** 0.8287** 
 (0.0476) (0.1583) (0.2281) (0.3257) 
Observations 445 445 445 445 
Number of countries  15 15 15 
Hansen Test (p-value)a   1.00 1.00 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation (p-value)b 
  0.31 0.11 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B11. Private Consumption Function: Alternative Estimator (Sensitivity Result), 
annual data (1961-2000), (Dependent variable: per capita household final consumption): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct 
VATRatet -0.0008* -0.0016** -0.0042*** -0.0030*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
Ln Ct-1 0.8763*** 0.7442*** 0.4845*** 0.5603*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0226) (0.0729) (0.0941) 
Ln Yt 0.0782*** 0.2512*** 0.3394*** 0.2681*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0253) (0.0405) (0.0772) 
Ln Wt 0.0083*** 0.0124** 0.0233 0.0372 
 (0.0028) (0.0049) (0.0158) (0.0230) 
Growth Y     
     
LTRt -0.0017*** -0.0022*** -0.0018*** -0.0019*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Oldt 0.0003** 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0005 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0012) 
Ln TotConsTax_VATt 0.0014 -0.0118** 0.0283 0.0003 
 (0.0033) (0.0052) (0.0292) (0.0137) 
Ln TotIncomeTaxt 0.0014 0.0079* 0.0144 0.0305** 
 (0.0026) (0.0047) (0.0257) (0.0118) 
Constant 0.3203*** -0.1436 1.0127** 0.9252** 
 (0.0499) (0.1601) (0.3549) (0.3264) 
Observations 445 445 445 445 
Number of countries  15 15 15 
Hansen Test (p-value)a   1.00 1.00 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation (p-value)b 
  0.23 0.15 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B12. Private Consumption Function: Alternative Estimator (Sensitivity Result), 
annual data (1961-2000), (Dependent variable: per capita household final consumption): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct 
VATRatet -0.0008* -0.0019** -0.0021** -0.0023*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0006) 
Ln Ct-1 0.9042*** 0.7956*** 0.5532*** 0.6261*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0228) (0.0740) (0.0570) 
Ln Yt 0.0534*** 0.1874*** 0.2810*** 0.2541*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0264) (0.0600) (0.0497) 
Growth Y 0.0021*** 0.0031*** 0.0025*** 0.0034*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Ln Wt 0.0080*** 0.0117** 0.0256 0.0042 
 (0.0025) (0.0047) (0.0211) (0.0140) 
LTRt -0.0004 -0.0008* -0.0010 -0.0022*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Oldt 0.0003*** -0.0002 0.0008 0.0004* 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Inflationt -0.0013*** -0.0016*** 0.0001 0.0003 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
U Ratet     
     
Ln TotConsTax_VATt -0.0020 -0.0093* -0.0117 -0.0062 
 (0.0035) (0.0050) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
Ln TotIncomeTaxt 0.0023 0.0047 0.0366*** 0.0329** 
 (0.0025) (0.0046) (0.0107) (0.0132) 
Constant 0.3135*** -0.0042 0.9763** 0.7677** 
 (0.0467) (0.1563) (0.3583) (0.2827) 
Observations 445 445 445 445 
Number of countries  15 15 15 
Hansen Test (p-value)a   1.00 1.00 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation (p-value)b 
  0.28 0.10 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B13. Private Consumption Function: Alternative Estimator (Sensitivity Result), 
annual data (1961-2000), (Dependent variable: per capita household final consumption): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct 
VATRatet -0.0009* -0.0013* -0.0020** -0.0023*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006) 
Ln Ct-1 0.9092*** 0.8305*** 0.5763*** 0.6422*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0221) (0.0733) (0.0662) 
Ln Yt 0.0585*** 0.1661*** 0.2431*** 0.2283*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0278) (0.0540) (0.0554) 
Growth Y 0.0024*** 0.0027*** 0.0026*** 0.0035*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Ln Wt 0.0057** 0.0051 0.0139 0.0075 
 (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0130) (0.0146) 
LTRt -0.0015*** -0.0006 -0.0014*** -0.0020*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Oldt 0.0002** -0.0000 0.0006 0.0004 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Inflationt     
     
U Ratet 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0014** -0.0004 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Ln TotConsTax_VATt 0.0006 -0.0081* -0.0072 -0.0083 
 (0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0107) (0.0110) 
Ln TotIncomeTaxt 0.0010 0.0042 0.0449*** 0.0359*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0122) (0.0113) 
Constant 0.2320*** -0.0693 1.1724*** 0.8365*** 
 (0.0490) (0.1780) (0.3600) (0.2475) 
Observations 445 445 445 445 
Number of countries  15 15 15 
Hansen Test (p-value)a   1.00 1.00 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation (p-value)b 
  0.31 0.12 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B14. Private Consumption Function: Alternative Estimator (Sensitivity Result), 
annual data (1961-2000), (Dependent variable: per capita household final consumption): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct Ln Ct 
VATRatet -0.0008* -0.0020** -0.0017** -0.0021*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Ln Ct-1 0.9081*** 0.8066*** 0.5539*** 0.6094*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0229) (0.0719) (0.0682) 
Ln Yt 0.0452*** 0.1811*** 0.2605*** 0.2590*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0302) (0.0618) (0.0599) 
Growth Y 0.0019*** 0.0031*** 0.0028*** 0.0037*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Ln Wt 0.0076*** 0.0072 0.0150 0.0051 
 (0.0025) (0.0045) (0.0129) (0.0163) 
LTRt -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0015*** -0.0025*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
Oldt 0.0003** -0.0002 0.0006 0.0005* 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Inflationt -0.0015*** -0.0017*** 0.0004 0.0008 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
U Ratet -0.0007** -0.0001 -0.0014** -0.0003 
 (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Ln TotConsTax_VATt -0.0016 -0.0101** -0.0090 -0.0057 
 (0.0034) (0.0050) (0.0104) (0.0114) 
Ln TotIncomeTaxt 0.0032 0.0036 0.0463*** 0.0351** 
 (0.0024) (0.0048) (0.0123) (0.0121) 
Constant 0.3609*** 0.0047 1.1947*** 0.8462*** 
 (0.0511) (0.1881) (0.3681) (0.2632) 
Observations 445 445 445 445 
Number of countries  15 15 15 
Hansen Test (p-value)a   1.00 1.00 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation (p-value)b 
  0.32 0.13 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B15. Capital Accumulation Equation (1961-1995): Simple Conditioning Set 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 K-Growth K-Growth K-Growth K-Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0017*** 0.0018** 0.0014** 0.0028* 
 (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0016) 
Initial Incomea -0.0157*** -0.0660*** -0.0671** -0.0936*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0164) (0.0280) (0.0157) 
Schoolingb 0.0008 -0.0077 -0.0444 -0.0262 
 (0.0045) (0.0115) (0.0283) (0.0202) 
TotIncomeTaxta -0.0042 0.0014 0.0401 0.0480 
 (0.0044) (0.0090) (0.0259) (0.0297) 
TotConsTax_VATta -0.0037 0.0035 -0.0035 0.0033 
 (0.0049) (0.0078) (0.0103) (0.0110) 
Constant 0.1703*** 0.6213*** 0.5770*** 0.7555*** 
 (0.0477) (0.1307) (0.1835) (0.1124) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.30 0.54 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.96 0.31 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B16. Capital Accumulation Equation (1961-1995): Policy Conditioning Set (1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 K-Growth K-Growth K-Growth K-Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0016*** 0.0013* 0.0016** 0.0018** 
 (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Initial Incomea -0.0191*** -0.0731*** -0.0424*** -0.0525*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0181) (0.0080) (0.0189) 
Schoolingb 0.0036 0.0124 -0.0280** -0.0250 
 (0.0039) (0.0102) (0.0124) (0.0222) 
Government sizea 0.0028 -0.0250* 0.0455 -0.0214 
 (0.0090) (0.0149) (0.0353) (0.0499) 
Openness to Tradea     
     
Inflationb     
     
TotIncomeTaxta -0.0035 0.0116 0.0045 0.0332 
 (0.0039) (0.0080) (0.0122) (0.0316) 
TotConsTax_VATta -0.0059 0.0084 0.0161 0.0220 
 (0.0053) (0.0075) (0.0115) (0.0145) 
Constant 0.2038*** 0.5829*** 0.4693*** 0.3615*** 
 (0.0755) (0.1621) (0.1295) (0.1295) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.42 0.43 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.17 0.44 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B17. Capital Accumulation Equation (1961-1995): Policy Conditioning Set (2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 K-Growth K-Growth K-Growth K-Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0019*** 0.0017** 0.0027** 0.0017* 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0009) 
Initial Incomea -0.0175*** -0.0651*** -0.0322 -0.0604* 
 (0.0058) (0.0200) (0.0359) (0.0319) 
Schoolingb 0.0023 0.0058 -0.0408** -0.0250 
 (0.0046) (0.0143) (0.0198) (0.0224) 
Government sizea     
     
Openness to Tradea -0.0047 -0.0205 -0.0637 0.0139 
 (0.0035) (0.0194) (0.0397) (0.0436) 
Inflationb     
     
TotIncomeTaxta -0.0024 0.0113 0.0259 0.0253 
 (0.0042) (0.0085) (0.0187) (0.0206) 
TotConsTax_VATta -0.0038 -0.0017 -0.0060 0.0213 
 (0.0045) (0.0077) (0.0167) (0.0150) 
Constant 0.1780*** 0.5665*** 0.2560 0.4998* 
 (0.0473) (0.1771) (0.3111) (0.2999) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.29 0.50 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.12 0.46 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B18. Capital Accumulation Equation (1961-1995): Policy Conditioning Set (3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 K-Growth K-Growth K-Growth K-Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0011** 0.0015* 0.0018* 0.0017* 
 (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
Initial Incomea -0.0185*** -0.0755*** -0.0258 -0.0474* 
 (0.0049) (0.0212) (0.0240) (0.0265) 
Schoolingb 0.0014 0.0058 -0.0737** -0.0258 
 (0.0041) (0.0106) (0.0342) (0.0241) 
Government sizea     
     
Openness to Tradea     
     
Inflationb -0.1034* -0.0580 -0.0414 -0.0298 
 (0.0594) (0.0685) (0.0499) (0.0727) 
TotIncomeTaxta -0.0038 0.0130 0.0182 0.0212 
 (0.0037) (0.0082) (0.0164) (0.0205) 
TotConsTax_VATta -0.0011 0.0047 0.0078 0.0204 
 (0.0050) (0.0069) (0.0112) (0.0143) 
Constant 0.1970*** 0.6597*** 0.2701 0.3873** 
 (0.0425) (0.1770) (0.1857) (0.1959) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.63 0.38 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.86 0.35 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B19. Capital Accumulation Equation (1961-1995): Policy Conditioning Set (4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 K-Growth K-Growth K-Growth K-Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0013** 0.0015* 0.0058* 0.0051* 
 (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0027) (0.0026) 
Initial Incomea -0.0162** -0.0561** -0.0667** -0.0755*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0214) (0.0267) (0.0236) 
Schoolingb 0.0049 0.0165 -0.0953 -0.1010 
 (0.0044) (0.0119) (0.0603) (0.0652) 
Government sizea -0.0168 -0.0246 -0.0615 -0.0730 
 (0.0104) (0.0170) (0.1308) (0.0496) 
Openness to Tradea -0.0117*** -0.0291* -0.0435 -0.0150 
 (0.0042) (0.0164) (0.0565) (0.0419) 
Inflationb -0.1410** -0.0386 0.0543 0.0233 
 (0.0656) (0.0702) (0.0518) (0.0573) 
TotIncomeTaxta 0.0025 0.0154 0.0989 0.1004 
 (0.0044) (0.0093) (0.0950) (0.0575) 
TotConsTax_VATta 0.0045 0.0021 0.0228 0.0099 
 (0.0053) (0.0081) (0.0227) (0.0196) 
Constant 0.1143 0.4131** 0.2665 0.3697 
 (0.0789) (0.1890) (0.3617) (0.2633) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.74 0.58 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.82 0.98 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B20. Productivity Growth Equation (1961-1995): Simple Conditioning Set 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Prod-Growth Prod-Growth Prod-Growth Prod-Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0001 0.0005 0.0006 0.0013 
 (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0010) 
Initial Incomea -0.0150*** -0.0386*** -0.0273** -0.0496** 
 (0.0043) (0.0114) (0.0106) (0.0214) 
Schoolingb -0.0059 0.0021 -0.0096 0.0017 
 (0.0043) (0.0093) (0.0109) (0.0281) 
TotIncomeTaxta 0.0045 0.0009 0.0129 0.0215 
 (0.0028) (0.0067) (0.0111) (0.0164) 
TotConsTax_VATta -0.0028 -0.0064 -0.0006 -0.0007 
 (0.0044) (0.0066) (0.0075) (0.0080) 
Constant 0.1513*** 0.3655*** 0.2395*** 0.4073*** 
 (0.0372) (0.0843) (0.0753) (0.1524) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.42 0.34 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.27 0.30 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B21. Productivity Growth Equation (1961-1995): Policy Conditioning Set (1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Prod-Growth Prod-Growth Prod-Growth Prod-Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0001 0.0007 0.0008 0.0010 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
Initial Incomea -0.0145** -0.0369*** -0.0408*** -0.0624** 
 (0.0056) (0.0108) (0.0135) (0.0306) 
Schoolingb -0.0059 0.0038 -0.0019 0.0110 
 (0.0043) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0308) 
Government sizea -0.0012 -0.0237* -0.0004 -0.0266 
 (0.0090) (0.0130) (0.0457) (0.0661) 
Openness to Tradea       
     
Inflationb     
     
TotIncomeTaxta 0.0047 0.0079 0.0193 0.0423 
 (0.0030) (0.0075) (0.0304) (0.0528) 
TotConsTax_VATta -0.0025 -0.0031 -0.0006 0.0028 
 (0.0052) (0.0068) (0.0073) (0.0096) 
Constant 0.1440** 0.2875*** 0.3373*** 0.4140*** 
 (0.0662) (0.0901) (0.0766) (0.1458) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.30 0.30 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.25 0.29 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B22. Productivity Growth Equation (1961-1995): Policy Conditioning Set (2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Prod-Growth Prod-Growth Prod-Growth Prod-Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0001 0.0006 0.0013 0.0020 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0017) 
Initial Incomea -0.0153*** -0.0397*** -0.0541* -0.0710* 
 (0.0046) (0.0117) (0.0299) (0.0385) 
Schoolingb -0.0057 0.0018 0.0174 0.0109 
 (0.0044) (0.0114) (0.0140) (0.0183) 
Government sizea     
     
Openness to Tradea   -0.0006 0.0063 -0.0298 -0.0327 
 (0.0036) (0.0157) (0.0405) (0.0655) 
Inflationb     
     
TotIncomeTaxta 0.0048 0.0028 0.0318 0.0437 
 (0.0033) (0.0076) (0.0203) (0.0349) 
TotConsTax_VATta -0.0028 -0.0069 -0.0069 -0.0074 
 (0.0045) (0.0067) (0.0129) (0.0131) 
Constant 0.1525*** 0.3800*** 0.4004 0.5247 
 (0.0379) (0.1000) (0.2549) (0.3447) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.40 0.32 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.54 0.78 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B23. Productivity Growth Equation (1961-1995): Policy Conditioning Set (3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Prod-Growth Prod-Growth Prod-Growth Prod-Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0006 0.0012 0.0014 0.0020 
 (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0014) 
Initial Incomea -0.0131** -0.0399* -0.0805*** -0.0895** 
 (0.0054) (0.0210) (0.0207) (0.0386) 
Schoolingb -0.0037 -0.0055 0.0070 0.0120 
 (0.0053) (0.0145) (0.0157) (0.0223) 
Government sizea     
     
Openness to Tradea       
     
Inflationb 0.0140 0.0761 0.0354 0.0947 
 (0.0471) (0.0623) (0.0730) (0.0762) 
TotIncomeTaxta 0.0035 0.0020 0.0442*** 0.0352 
 (0.0034) (0.0097) (0.0149) (0.0282) 
TotConsTax_VATta -0.0034 -0.0040 -0.0031 0.0002 
 (0.0047) (0.0086) (0.0123) (0.0129) 
Constant 0.1269*** 0.3687** 0.6308*** 0.7184** 
 (0.0458) (0.1700) (0.1681) (0.3147) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.52 0.48 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.62 0.67 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B24. Productivity Growth Equation (1961-1995): Policy Conditioning Set (4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Prod-Growth Prod-Growth Prod-Growth Prod-Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0007 0.0005 0.0002 0.0016 
 (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0032) 
Initial Incomea -0.0195*** -0.0375** -0.0552** -0.0743* 
 (0.0046) (0.0142) (0.0195) (0.0349) 
Schoolingb -0.0040 -0.0039 0.0182 0.0375 
 (0.0044) (0.0102) (0.0286) (0.0502) 
Government sizea 0.0081 -0.0262** -0.0148 -0.0705 
 (0.0074) (0.0130) (0.0466) (0.0853) 
Openness to Tradea   0.0016 0.0092 -0.0271 -0.0694 
 (0.0032) (0.0149) (0.0364) (0.0857) 
Inflationb -0.1443*** -0.0931 -0.1171 -0.0405 
 (0.0475) (0.0587) (0.1005) (0.2296) 
TotIncomeTaxta -0.0006 0.0060 0.0312 0.0719 
 (0.0031) (0.0072) (0.0335) (0.0699) 
TotConsTax_VATta 0.0010 0.0045 -0.0225 -0.0169 
 (0.0050) (0.0079) (0.0160) (0.0271) 
Constant 0.2043*** 0.2920** 0.4324*** 0.3479 
 (0.0564) (0.1185) (0.0937) (0.2161) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.33 0.33 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.24 0.20 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B25. Economic Growth Equation (1961-1995): Simple Conditioning Set 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Growth Growth Growth Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0010* 0.0020*** 0.0023*** 0.0023* 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0013) 
Initial Incomea -0.0151*** -0.0808*** -0.0756*** -0.1045* 
 (0.0048) (0.0185) (0.0228) (0.0598) 
Schoolingb -0.0048 -0.0169 -0.0127 -0.0035 
 (0.0054) (0.0124) (0.0192) (0.0435) 
TotIncomeTaxta 0.0018 0.0125 0.0174 0.0411 
 (0.0030) (0.0078) (0.0180) (0.0276) 
TotConsTax_VATta -0.0002 0.0065 -0.0012 -0.0016 
 (0.0045) (0.0063) (0.0087) (0.0093) 
Constant 0.1502*** 0.7261*** 0.6695*** 0.8767* 
 (0.0391) (0.1591) (0.1976) (0.4525) 
Observations 96 96 96 96 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.14 0.29 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.32 0.57 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B26. Economic Growth Equation (1961-1995): Policy Conditioning Set (1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Growth Growth Growth Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0011* 0.0013* 0.0018** 0.0022* 
 (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0012) 
Initial Incomea -0.0205*** -0.0586*** -0.0746*** -0.0776* 
 (0.0061) (0.0152) (0.0199) (0.0439) 
Schoolingb -0.0051 -0.0110 -0.0195 -0.0140 
 (0.0052) (0.0125) (0.0198) (0.0368) 
Government sizea 0.0126 0.0066 0.0367 0.0211 
 (0.0083) (0.0151) (0.0243) (0.0197) 
Openness to Tradea     
     
Inflationb     
     
TotIncomeTaxta 0.0004 0.0063 0.0221 0.0218 
 (0.0030) (0.0086) (0.0191) (0.0314) 
TotConsTax_VATta -0.0029 -0.0061 -0.0065 -0.0024 
 (0.0049) (0.0069) (0.0121) (0.0173) 
Constant 0.2298*** 0.5686*** 0.7351*** 0.7218** 
 (0.0655) (0.1267) (0.1288) (0.3173) 
Observations 96 96 96 96 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.29 0.29 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.31 0.30 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B27. Economic Growth Equation (1961-1995): Policy Conditioning Set (2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Growth Growth Growth Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0010* 0.0013** 0.0031* 0.0030** 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0019) (0.0012) 
Initial Incomea -0.0172*** -0.0496*** -0.0381** -0.0880* 
 (0.0058) (0.0116) (0.0154) (0.0463) 
Schoolingb -0.0022 -0.0065 0.0008 0.0034 
 (0.0051) (0.0112) (0.0315) (0.0353) 
Government sizea     
     
Openness to Tradea 0.0015 0.0033 -0.0735 -0.0445 
 (0.0040) (0.0155) (0.0650) (0.0457) 
Inflationb     
     
TotIncomeTaxta 0.0019 0.0024 0.0336 0.0604 
 (0.0044) (0.0075) (0.0213) (0.0385) 
TotConsTax_VATta -0.0050 -0.0069 0.0078 -0.0032 
 (0.0049) (0.0066) (0.0081) (0.0172) 
Constant 0.1761*** 0.4796*** 0.2122* 0.6365* 
 (0.0482) (0.0983) (0.1097) (0.3263) 
Observations 96 96 96 96 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.63 0.41 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.15 0.49 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
153
Table B28. Economic Growth Equation (1961-1995): Policy Conditioning Set (3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Growth Growth Growth Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0024*** 0.0021*** 0.0032** 0.0028* 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Initial Incomea -0.0224*** -0.0714*** -0.1357* -0.0618* 
 (0.0049) (0.0166) (0.0786) (0.0360) 
Schoolingb -0.0027 -0.0045 0.0045 -0.0398 
 (0.0044) (0.0102) (0.0505) (0.0392) 
Government sizea     
     
Openness to Tradea     
     
Inflationb -0.0861* 0.0162 0.1277 0.1693 
 (0.0477) (0.0445) (0.1115) (0.1177) 
TotIncomeTaxta 0.0008 0.0053 0.0718* 0.0245 
 (0.0026) (0.0083) (0.0423) (0.0223) 
TotConsTax_VATta -0.0019 -0.0040 0.0108 0.0204 
 (0.0041) (0.0077) (0.0092) (0.0181) 
Constant 0.2237*** 0.6575*** 1.0414* 0.5055* 
 (0.0434) (0.1362) (0.5667) (0.2880) 
Observations 96 96 96 96 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.39 0.60 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.42 0.38 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Table B29. Economic Growth Equation (1961-1995): Policy Conditioning Set (4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Two-Way FE GMM-System 
One-Step 
GMM-System 
Two-Step 
 Growth Growth Growth Growth 
VAT Ratet 0.0018*** 0.0017* 0.0026*** 0.0039** 
 (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0019) 
Initial Incomea -0.0182*** -0.0770*** -0.0751*** -0.0853** 
 (0.0048) (0.0215) (0.0213) (0.0347) 
Schoolingb -0.0021 -0.0195 -0.0307 -0.0297 
 (0.0047) (0.0151) (0.0228) (0.0775) 
Government sizea -0.0078 0.0007 -0.0060 0.0358 
 (0.0109) (0.0175) (0.0634) (0.1149) 
Openness to Tradea -0.0011 0.0076 -0.0365 -0.0363 
 (0.0039) (0.0192) (0.0413) (0.0680) 
Inflationb -0.0803 -0.0047 0.0299 0.0754 
 (0.0499) (0.0653) (0.0586) (0.1525) 
TotIncomeTaxta 0.0030 0.0078 0.0594 0.0297 
 (0.0046) (0.0096) (0.0563) (0.0710) 
TotConsTax_VATta -0.0004 -0.0023 -0.0035 -0.0084 
 (0.0048) (0.0088) (0.0094) (0.0176) 
Constant 0.1474** 0.7272*** 0.5582*** 0.7886*** 
 (0.0617) (0.1919) (0.1147) (0.2274) 
Observations 96 96 96 96 
Number of Countries  14 14 14 
Hansen Test (p-value)c   0.59 0.50 
Test for 2nd order serial 
correlation  (p-value)d 
  0.37 0.59 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a In the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable). 
b In the regression, this variable is included as ln (1+ variable). 
c The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
d The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order correlation. 
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Appendix C: Figures Appendix 
Annual Effective VAT Rates in Individual EU Countries (1961-2000) 
 
ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: AUSTRIA (1961-2000)
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Figure C1. Annual Effective VAT Rate: Austria (1961-2000) 
ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: BELGIUM (1961-2000)
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Figure C2. Annual Effective VAT Rate: Belgium (1961-2000) 
ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: DENMARK (1961-2000)
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Figure C3. Annual Effective VAT Rate: Denmark (1961-2000) 
ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: FINLAND (1961-2000)
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Figure C4. Annual Effective VAT Rate: Finland (1961-2000) 
ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: FRANCE (1961-2000)
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Figure C5. Annual Effective VAT Rate: France (1961-2000) 
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Annual Effective VAT Rates in Individual EU Countries (1961-2000)…Cont’d. 
 
ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: GERMANY (1961-2000)
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Figure C6. Annual Effective VAT Rate: Germany (1961-2000) 
ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: GREECE (1961-2000)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
YEARS
EF
FE
C
TI
VE
 V
A
T 
R
A
T
 
Figure C7. Annual Effective VAT Rate: Greece (1961-2000) 
ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: IRELAND (1961-
2000)
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Figure C8. Annual Effective VAT Rate: Ireland (1961-2000) 
ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: ITALY (1961-2000)
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Figure C9. Annual Effective VAT Rate: Italy (1961-2000) 
ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: LUXEMBOURG (1961-2000)
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Figure C10. Annual Effective VAT Rate: Luxembourg (1961-2000) 
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ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: NETHERLANDS (1961-2000)
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Figure C11. Annual Effective VAT Rate: Netherlands (1961-2000) 
ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: PORTUGAL (1961-2000)
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Figure C12. Annual Effective VAT Rate: Portugal (1961-2000) 
ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: SPAIN (1961-2000)
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Figure C13. Annual Effective VAT Rate: Spain (1961-2000) 
ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: SWEDEN (1961-2000)
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Figure C14. Annual Effective VAT Rate: Sweden (1961-2000) 
ANNUAL EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: UK (1961-2000)
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Figure C15. Annual Effective VAT Rate: UK (1961-2000) 
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Five-Year Effective VAT Rates in Individual EU Countries (1961-2000) 
 
FIVE-YEAR AVERAGED EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: 
AUSTRIA (1961-2000)
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Figure C16. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: Austria (1961-2000) 
FIVE-YEAR AVERAGED EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: 
BELGIUM (1961-2000)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
YEARS
EF
FE
C
TI
VE
 V
A
T 
R
A
T
 
Figure C17. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: Belgium (1961-2000) 
FIVE-YEAR AVERAGED EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: 
DENMARK (1961-2000) 
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Figure C18. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: Denmark (1961-2000) 
FIVE-YEAR AVERAGED EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: 
FINLAND (1961-2000)
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Figure C19. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: Finland (1961-2000) 
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Figure C20. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: France (1961-2000) 
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Figure C21. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: Germany (1961-2000) 
FIVE-YEAR AVERAGED VAT RATE: GREECE (1961-2000)
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Figure C22. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: Greece (1961-2000) 
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Figure C23. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: Ireland (1961-2000) 
FIVE-YEAR AVERAGED EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: 
ITALY (1961-2000)
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Figure C24. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: Italy (1961-2000) 
FIVE-YEAR AVERAGED EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: 
LUXEMBOURG (1961-2000)
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Figure C25. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: Luxembourg (1961-2000) 
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Figure C26. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: Netherlands (1961-2000) 
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Figure C27. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: Portugal (1961-2000) 
FIVE-YEAR AVERAGED EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: 
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Figure C28. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: Spain (1961-2000) 
FIVE-YEAR AVERAGED EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: 
SWEDEN (1961-2000)
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Figure C29. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: Sweden (1961-2000) 
FIVE-YEAR AVERAGED EFFECTIVE VAT RATE: 
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Figure C30. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: UK (1961-2000) 
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Figure C31. Annual Effective VAT Rate: Average EU (1961-2000) 
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Figure C32. Five-Year Averaged Effective VAT Rate: Average EU (1961-2000) 
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